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Introduction
This thesis takes as its starting point certain statements made by the meditation teacher 
S.N. Goenka, of which the following is typical:
[W]hatever arises in the mind, the Buddha discovered, will be accompanied by a 
physical sensation.  Hence, whether the meditator is exploring the mental or the 
physical aspect of the phenomenon of “I”, awareness of sensation is essential.
This discovery is the unique contribution of the Buddha, of central importance in 
his teaching.  Before him in India among his contemporaries, there were many 
who taught and practised sãla [morality] and samàdhi [concentration].  Pa¤¤à 
[wisdom] also existed, at least devotional or intellectual wisdom:  it was 
commonly accepted that mental defilements are the source of suffering, that 
craving and aversion must be eliminated in order to purify the mind and to attain 
liberation.  The Buddha simply found the way to do it.
What had been lacking was an understanding of the importance of sensation. 
Then as now, it was generally thought that our reactions are to the external 
objects of sense--vision, sound, odour, taste, touch, thoughts.  However, 
observation of the truth within reveals that between the object and the reaction is 
a missing link:  sensation.  The contact of an object with the corresponding sense 
door gives rise to sensations;  the sa¤¤à assigns a positive or negative valuation, 
in accordance with which the sensation becomes pleasant or unpleasant, and one 
reacts with craving or aversion.  The process occurs so rapidly that conscious 
awareness of it develops only after a reaction has been repeated many times and 
has gathered dangerous strength sufficient to overpower the mind.  To deal with 
the reactions, one must become aware of them at the point where they start;  they 
start with sensation, and so one must be aware of sensations.  The discovery of 
this fact, unknown before him, enabled Siddhattha Gotama to attain 
enlightenment, and this is why he always stressed the importance of sensation.1
1 S.N. Goenka, The Discourse Summaries, Talks from a Ten-day Course in Vipassana Meditation, Igatpuri, 
India, Vipassana Research Institute, 1997, p.58.
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In this striking statement Goenka gives paramount importance to sensations, which is his 
translation of the Pali term vedanà.  This thesis is an exploration of the use of the term 
vedanà in the Pali Nikàyas.  The first chapter focuses on passages in which vedanà 
features in descriptions of practices which lead to liberation from suffering.  The second 
chapter is an extension of the first, studying the use of the term vedanà in passages 
dealing with the causal sequence which has profound soteriological significance, the 
pañicca-samuppàda (“dependent origination”).
The third chapter looks at passages in the Nikàyas which deal with mental and physical 
aspects of vedanà.  Goenka places great emphasis on the role that bodily sensations play 
in the meditation technique that he teaches:
Vipassanà means a special kind of vision:  observation of the reality within 
oneself.  This is achieved by taking as the object of attention one’s own physical 
sensations.  The technique is the systematic and dispassionate observation of 
sensations within oneself.  This observation unfolds the entire reality of mind and 
body.2
This chapter examines texts from the Nikàyas which put vedanà in physical and mental 
contexts.  It also places this issue in the broader context of descriptions of physical and 
mental aspects of other phenomena in the Nikàyas.  Some attention is paid in this chapter 
to conflicting views of various Pali commentaries on these passages.
The fourth chapter surveys passages in the Nikàyas which highlight vedanà in their 
descriptions of the workings of kamma (Skt. karma).
An important preoccupation of this thesis is an examination of passages in the Nikàyas in 
which Pali terms related to vedanà play significant roles, in particular, the terms 
vedayita, vedaniya and the verb pañi-saü-vid.  In the second chapter we see how the verb 
pañi-saü-vid seems to “stand in” for vedanà in certain presentations of the pañicca-
samuppàda.  In the third chapter, it is noted that these terms occur in passages which 
2 William Hart, The Art of Living, Vipassana Meditation as Taught by S.N. Goenka, San Francisco, Harper 
and Row, 1987, p.91.  Goenka also states that “whatever arises in the mind manifests itself as a sensation 
in the body.  One cannot emphasize this teaching enough.”  In U Ba Khin and Pierluigi Confalonieri, The 
Clock of Vipassana has Struck, Seattle, Pariyatti, 1999, p. 101.
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describe combinations of mental and physical events.  They also play an important role 
in descriptions of the working of kamma, as seen in the fourth chapter.
A number of modern writers on the texts of the Nikàyas have commented on the 
importance of the role of vedanà.  Thus Nyanaponika, translating vedanà as “Feeling”:
Through actual experience it can thus be confirmed that the ever-revolving round 
of Dependent Origination (pañicca-samuppàda) can be stopped at the point of 
Feeling, and that there is no inherent necessity that Feeling is followed by 
Craving.  Here we encounter Feeling as a key factor on the path of liberation, 
and, therefore the Contemplation of Feeling has, in Buddhist tradition, always 
been highly regarded as an effective aid on that path.3
To my knowledge, however, none of these writers has ever followed up comments like 
these with any kind of study of this term as it is used in the Nikàyas, let alone thorough, 
detailed and systematic study that the above statement would seem to call for.4
The writers who have made comments like these have strong connections with the 
Theravada tradition.5  Those western scholars who have written on the texts of the Pali 
Nikàyas from a critical point of view almost invariably make no indication that vedanà 
could have any special significance.  Their preoccupations lie elsewhere.  Commenting 
on the increasing number of monographs concerned with Buddhist thought in the last 
twenty-five years, R. Gethin notes that
by far the majority gravitate towards those aspects of the Nikàya thought-world 
that immediately capture the imagination of the mind nurtured in the traditions of 
modern western philosophy:  conditioned arising (pañicca-samuppàda), the 
absence of a substantial self (anattà), and nibbàna.  In these scholars have seen 
reflections of some of the classic preoccupations of western philosophy such as 
causality, the logical contradictions of difference and identity involved in the 
3 Thera Nyanaponika, Contemplation of Feeling, Kandy, Buddhist Publication Society, 1983, p.2.
4 Nyanaponika’s book The Contemplation of Feeling, referred to in the above footnote, is not, as its title 
may imply, a thorough study of the use of the term vedanà in the Pali texts, but a translation of the 
Vedanàsaüyutta of the Saüyuttanikàya, as well as some extracts from other suttas, with a brief 
introduction.
5 See for example those cited at the beginning of the second chapter of this thesis.
3
notion of change, the concept of the person and personal identity, and the 
metaphysics of the absolute.  I do not wish to suggest that one is mistaken in 
seeing such reflections, but only that reflections can be misleading.  The point is 
that in Buddhist thought discussion of pañicca-samuppàda, anattà and nibbàna is 
not pursued as an end in itself but subordinated to the notion of the spiritual path, 
which is hardly true of the discussion of causality, change and metaphysics in 
western thought.  The danger is that we rather hastily translate the Nikàyas into 
terms that are more congenial to us without having first understood the original 
language.6
The important passages on vedanà in the Nikàyas come for the most part as part of 
descriptions of practices which in the terms of these texts lead to a cessation of dukkha 
(“suffering”).  Western scholars have somehow overlooked the importance of the role 
vedanà, an importance which my survey of the use of this term clearly shows it has.
This thesis focuses on the texts of the Nikàyas.  In her recent study, S. Hamilton explains 
why she chooses to use these texts as the focus for her research.  Her comments apply 
also to my own situation:
I … wanted to see what the earliest Pali material had to say on the subject before 
it was significantly adapted or elaborated as the Theravàda tradition developed. 
This approach is not so much intended to suggest that there is a pre-Theravàda 
form of Buddhism as to look at the primary texts without reference to how the 
tradition has interpreted them in later material.7
She notes that she is aware that this approach is “somewhat controversial,”8 and in a later 
study she discusses the dangers of “synchronic essentialism”9:
In effect, this is synchronically analysing a large, ancient, and undatable 
collection of texts without taking into account how they in all probability 
6 R. Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening:  A Study of the Bodhi-Pakkhiyà Dhammà, Leiden, Brill, 
1992, p.19.
7 S. Hamilton, Identity and Experience, the Constitution of the Human Being According to Early 
Buddhism, London, Luzac Oriental, 1996, p.xvii.
8 Ibid., p.xxx.
9 A term used by Edward Said.  See his Orientalism, New York, Vintage Books, 1979, p.240.
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changed over a period of time.  While one can thus come up with what seem to 
be the “essentials” of what they say, it may be that because the material 
developed incrementally there was never a time when the tradition itself viewed 
it in quite that way.  I do no see a way around this problem ...  Having said that, 
given the way the Pali Buddhist texts were preserved and compiled I do not see 
how anyone could treat the Sutta Piñaka other than broadly synchronically.  Any 
attempt to take into account a diachronic perspective would immediately render 
one vulnerable to far more serious criticism ...10
In this thesis I also treat the texts of the Nikàyas synchronically.  For the most part I have 
only examined the Nikàyas, but there are a number of places where I have included some 
discussion of the views of the Pali commentators on certain passages.
One faces many difficulties when dealing with the texts of the Nikàyas.  In discussing 
and analysising them, I am constantly reminded of some comments made by R. Gethin:
We are faced not so much with a single finished canvas as with a bewildering 
array of sketches and detailed studies which it is impossible to take in at once. 
Their subject is seen from different angles and in various aspects;  it is viewed 
from near and afar.11
My approach has been greatly influenced by the great German Indologist Wilhelm 
Halbfass.  His sensitive approach to Indian texts has always struck me as worthy of 
imitation, though I fear that I often fail to fulfil the task that he outlines:
... it is our first responsibility to understand the Indian statements.  But this in 
itself is a complex and elusive process.  It requires, first of all, much learning, 
familiarization and assimilation.  We have to be able to translate the texts into our 
own languages;  we have to listen to them as carefully and patiently as possible; 
we have to be aware of their traditional cultural context and background.  But we 
also have to be aware of our own background...  Mere familiarization and 
10 Sue Hamilton, Early Buddhism:  a New Approach.  The I of the Beholder, Richmond, Surry, Curzon, 
2000, p.5.
11 Gethin, 1992, p.20.
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assimilation are not enough;  this has to be supplemented by conceptual analysis 
and clarification.  We are not just dealing with words.
The relationship and transition between familiarization and clarification is 
complex and elusive.12
The term vedanà is usually translated as “sensation” or “feeling”.  For the purposes of 
this thesis, I have chosen to use this term untranslated.
My translations of Pali passages in this thesis are heavily indebted to the translations of 
Pali texts done by the Rhys Davids, I.B. Horner, F.L. Woodward, K.R. Norman, Bhikkhu 
Bodhi, ¥àõamoli and Maurice Walshe.
12 Wilhelm Halbfass, On Being and What There Is: classical Vaisesika and the history of Indian ontology, 
Albany, State University of New York Press, 1992, p.12.
6
Chapter One:  Vedanà and the soteriological practices described in the four 
principal Nikàyas
The first part of this chapter is devoted to an examination of passages from a number of 
suttas which give importance to vedanà in descriptions of soteriological practices.  Three 
suttas from the Dãghanikàya will be studied, the Brahmajàlasutta, the Mahànidànasutta 
and the Mahàparinibbànasutta.  From the Majjhimanikàya, we will look at five suttas, 
the Cåëa- and Mahà-taõhàsaïkhayasuttas, the Dãghanakhasutta (which is referred to in 
the Commentaries as the Vedanàpariggahanasutta), the Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta, and the 
Chachakkasutta.  A number of suttas from the Saüyuttanikàya will also be studied, 
including some from the section of that nikàya devoted to suttas on the topic of vedanà, 
the Vedanàsaüyutta.
The Brahmajàlasutta
The first sutta of the Dãghanikàya, the Brahmajàlasutta, has a striking example of this 
usage of the term vedanà.  The main part of this sutta1 describes various views, 62 in 
total, represented as being held by thinkers of the Buddha's day.  The 62 views are 
presented in groups, and after each group the following passage appears:
This, bhikkhus, the Tathàgata understands: These viewpoints thus grasped and 
adhered to will lead to such-and-such destinations in another world. This the 
Tathàgata knows, and more, but he is not attached to that knowledge.  And being 
thus unattached he has experienced for himself perfect peace, and having 
understood as they really are the arising and passing away of vedanà, their 
attraction and danger and the escape from them, the Tathàgata is liberated 
without remainder.1
1 Tayidaü bhikkhave Tathàgato pajànàti: “Ime diññhiññhànà evaü-gahità evaü-paràmaññhà evaü-gatikà 
bhavissanti evam-abhisamparàyà ti.” Ta¤ ca Tathàgato pajànàti, tato ca uttaritaraü pajànàti, ta¤ ca 
pajànanaü na paràmasati, aparàmasato c'assa paccattaü yeva nibbuti vidità, vedanànaü samudaya¤ ca 
atthagama¤ ca assàda¤ ca àdãnava¤ ca nissaraõa¤ ca yathà-bhåtaü viditvà anupàdà vimutto, bhikkhave, 
Tathàgato.  DN I 16-17.
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This passage occurs thirteen times2 and is an important structural element in this long 
sutta.
The term vedanà is given a privileged position in this key passage.  The Buddha is 
represented as describing himself as completely enlightened (anupàdà vimutto) when he 
has known as they are (yathàbhåtaü viditvà) certain characteristics of vedanà.  
In the introduction to his translation of this sutta, Bhikkhu Bodhi makes the following 
comments on this passage (he translates vedanà as “feeling”):
Not understanding the real causes for their adherence [to views], the theorists 
delight in the feelings that arise conditioned by the proclamation of their views. 
This generates more craving and clinging in turn, as attempts to recapture the 
pleasant feelings, and these maintain the continued revolution of the round of 
existence.  Since the basic root of the round, and the origin of suffering, is 
craving, and craving is conditioned by feeling, the Buddha singles out feeling as 
the existential factor most requiring examination to bring the round to an end. 
Feeling is the “bait of the round” (vaññàmisa) which will be swallowed when left 
unexamined, but will be discarded if the hook it conceals is detected.  Ignorance 
of feeling means not seeing its origin, passing away, satisfaction, 
unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from it, --the five angles from which any 
mundane phenomenon must be inspected to gain insight into its real nature.  In 
order to contrast the ignorance of the theorists with his own wisdom, in the 
refrain following each of the expositions of views, the Buddha specifies his own 
understanding of feelings under these five headings.3
Bhikkhu Bodhi acknowledges the crucial role that vedanà plays in this process:  “the 
Buddha singles out feeling as the existential factor most requiring examination to bring 
the round to an end.”  I have not, however, been able to find any Pali text which refers to 
vedanà as vaññàmisa. 
2 DN I 6-17, 21-22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38, 38-39 and 39.
3 Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Discourse on the All-embracing Net of Views, Kandy, Buddhist Publication Society, 
1978, p.36.
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The Mahànidànasutta
In the Dãghanikàya's Mahànidànasutta the process of liberation is described with 
reference to sensations.  This is done, however, in an unusual way, in a way which we do 
not find again in the Nikàyas.  Here is the concluding section of the relevant passage:  
From the time, ânanda, when a bhikkhu no longer regards vedanà as the self, or 
the self as being impercipient (appañisaüvedanaü), or as being percipient (attà 
me vediyati) and of a nature to feel (vedanàdhammo), by not so regarding, he 
does not cling to anything in the world.  When he does not cling, he is not 
agitated.  When he is not agitated, he personally attains Nibbàna.  He 
understands:  “Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be 
done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being.”4
Three ways of regarding (samanupassati) vedanà in relation to the self (atta) are given 
here.  When they are avoided, there is liberation.  
R. Gethin has described the centrality of the critique of self in the Nikàyas:
The Buddhist critique of self is directed at all theories or views of the self that 
imply some sort of unchanging self whether that self is conceived of as eternal, 
immortal, or merely subsisting unchanged for the duration of a particular lifetime, 
or any period of time.  As Prof. Norman has shown, the refutation of the 
Upanishadic identification of the àtman with the world is the primary focus of the 
critique of self contained in the Alagaddaåpama Sutta.  Elsewhere Buddhist texts 
attack a whole range of views concerning the self.5
In the preceding section of the Mahànidànasutta, the Buddha explains why each of these 
ways of regarding the self is incorrect.  The first of these, the view that “vedanà is my 
self”, that is the identification of vedanà with an abiding self, is refuted on the ground 
4 Yato kho ânanda bhikkhu n'eva vedanaü attànaü samanupassati, no pi appañisaüvedanaü attànaü 
samanupassati, no pi “Attà me vediyati, vedanàdhammo hi me attà” ti samanupassati, so evaü 
asamanupassanto na ki¤ci loke upàdiyati, anupàdiyaü na paritassati, aparitassaü paccattaü yeva 
parinibbàyati, “Khãõà jàti, vusitaü brahmacariyaü, kataü karaõãyaü, nàparaü itthattàyàti” pajànàti. 
DN II 68
5 R. Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p.148.
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that vedanà is a changing phenomenon, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to 
destruction.6  If the self is identified with vedanà, then the disappearance of the self has 
to be countenanced, which is out of the question for those who hold to the Upaniùadic 
view of the self. 
The second view holds that the self is not vedanà, that the self does not feel.  This is 
refuted on the grounds that if nothing at all were felt, then there could not be the thought 
“I am”.  The third view states that “Vedanà is not my self, but my self is not non-feeling, 
my self feels, my self is of the nature of vedanà (vedanà-dhammo)”.  The refutation of 
this view seems to rest on the Buddha's understanding that there is no vedanà in the state 
of full liberation--nibbàna.  This view is expressed in various places in the Nikàyas.  It is 
found in the reverse (pañiloma) statement of the dependent-orgination formula.  The term 
used for the cessation of vedanà in the reverse statement of the dependent-orgination 
formula is also used in the Buddha's refutation here:  “vedanà-nirodhà”.  Identifying 
one's self as “of the nature of vedanà” (vedanà-dhamma) cannot be correct in terms of 
the ultimate truth of a fully liberated person, because there is a state where vedanà 
ceases, that is nibbàna.
Steven Collins has given a useful summary of this passage:
... the Buddha asks “how many ways are there in which (a man can) regard self?”. 
His interlocutor, the monk ânanda, answers that there are three:  feeling is 
regarded as identical with self, in the words “feeling is my self”;  or the self is 
regarded as without feeling, “my self is insentient”;  or neither of these things is 
the case but “my self feels, my self has the attribute of feeling”.
The Buddha declares that it is “not fitting” (na kkhamati) to regard the matter in 
any of these ways, for the following reasons.  In the first case, where self and 
feeling are identical, he says that feeling is of three types, pleasant, painful, and 
neutral.  With which is the self to be identified, since only one type can occur at 
any given time?  All three types of feeling are impermanent, causally conditioned 
phenomena, so that in any case the self would have to be the same, subject to 
6 vedanà aniccà saïkhatà pañiccasamuppannà khaya-dhammà  DN II 66
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arising and decay.  This is an idea so manifestly untenable for the Buddha as to 
receive no comment.  In the second place, where the self was held to be 
insentient, the Buddha asks, “where there is no feeling at all, is it possible that 
one might say “I am”?”  Since this is not possible, the view is again “not fitting”. 
In the third place, where the self is held to feel, or have the attribute of feeling, he 
asks a similar question:  “where feeling is completely absent ... might one be able 
to say “this (is what) I am”?”  Here also, since this is not possible, the view is 
“not fitting”.7
Liberation comes from not regarding vedanà and atta in any of these three ways (so 
evaü asamanupassanto).8
The Mahàparinibbànasutta
The third sutta of the second volume of the Dãghanikàya is the famous 
Mahàparinibbànasutta.  This long sutta follows the last days and the passing away of the 
Buddha.  Immediately after the description of the passing away of the Buddha, there is a 
series of four verses.  The fourth is shown as being spoken by one of the leading 
disciples of the Buddha, Anuruddha:
There was no breathing in and breathing out for such a one with steadfast mind; 
unmoved, aiming at peace, the muni died.
With undisheartened mind he bore sensation;  like the quenching of a lamp was 
the release of his mind.9
7 Steven Collins, Selfless persons, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p.99-100.
8 The commentary on this passage explains these three statements in a rather curious way.  It sees all five 
aggregates covered by the three statements, the first statement identifying the self with the vedanà 
aggregate, the second identifying the self with the aggregate of matter, or the body (råpa), and the third 
identifying the self with the aggregates of perception, saïkhàras and consciousness.  The commentary 
states that these last three aggregates are to be understood in the final statement “because they are 
associated with vedanà” (vedanàsampayuttattà).  Sv II 505.
9 Nàhu assàsa-passàso ñhita-cittassa tàdino.
Anejo santim àrabbha yaü kàlam akarã muni
Asallãnena cittena vedanaü ajjhavàsayi:
Pajjotass'eva nibbànaü vimokho cetaso ahåti.  DN II 157
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The Buddha's passing away is also, in these texts, the moment of his final liberation 
from suffering, his final entering of nibbàna which is free from suffering.  This is the so-
called parinibbàna.  Here this moment of dying (kàlam akarã) and of release (vimokho) 
is described along with the “bearing” or “enduring” (ajjhavàsayi) of vedanà.  
Whether or not the term vedanà has the same meaning here as it does in the 
Brahmajàlasutta, and whether or not it is playing the same role in the description of the 
soteriological process that we find in the Brahmajàlasutta are important questions.  To 
help us find answers to these questions we need to examine the context of these verses 
more closely.  The final parinibbàna of the Buddha takes place in the sixth recitation 
section (bhàõavàra) of the Mahàparinibbànasutta.  In the second recitation section, there 
is an episode which describes the Buddha falling sick which includes the following 
passage:
Now during the rainy season, a severe sickness arose in the Fortunate One, with 
sharp vedanà as if he were about to die.  But the Fortunate One bore them 
mindfully, with understanding and without being disturbed.10
The term vedanà here refers only to unpleasant sensations experienced in sickness. 
There are a number of places in the Nikàyas where the term vedanà is associated with 
sickness.  Generally speaking, it is not usually used in these contexts as part of a 
description of a soteriological process.  However, the two terms that we find here 
describing the manner in which the Buddha bears these vedanàs, sata (“mindful”) and 
sampajàna (“with understanding”), are both of vital importance in certain soteriological 
practices described in the Nikàyas.  They are of particular importance in the two suttas 
on the establishing of mindfulness, the Satipaññhànasuttas, and at other places in the 
Nikàyas where the practice of the establishing of mindfulness is discussed.
In the fourth recitation section, the Buddha takes what is to be his last meal.  After the 
meal he falls sick again, and the description here is almost identical with that given for 
his earlier illness, quoted above.  So at this significant juncture in the narrative, we again 
10 Atha kho Bhagavato vassåpagatassa kharo àbàdho uppajji, bàëhà vedanà vattanti màraõantikà.  Tà 
sudaü Bhagavà sato sampajàno adhivàseti aviha¤¤amàno. DN II 99
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find this combination of the bearing of vedanà, and of being sata (mindful) and 
sampajàna (with understanding).  
By the time Anuruddha's verses come, immediately after the passing away of the 
Buddha, the cumulative effect allows us to interpret the “bearing of sensations” as a 
soteriologically important element in the description of the last moments of the 
Enlightened One which are given in those verses.11
The Satipaññhànasutta
The four establishings of mindfulness (satipaññhànas) are amongst the most important of 
the soteriological practices described in the Nikàyas.  They figure in the summary of the 
Buddha's teaching known as the Bodhipakkhiyadhammas (factors leading to 
Enlightenment), which are found at numerous places in the Nikàyas.  There are two 
Satipaññhànasuttas in the Nikàyas, one in the Dãghanikàya, the other in the 
Majjhimanikàya, differing in that one of the sections is considerably expanded in the 
former.  The former is thus known as the Mahàsatipaññhànasutta (the Great 
Satipaññhànasutta).  They are the most detailed and comprehensive accounts of these 
practices in the Nikàyas.12  The soteriological aim of the establishing of mindfulness 
practices is described in unambiguous terms in the opening passage of the sutta (D II 
290):  they are for the experiencing (or realisation) of nibbàna (nibbànassa 
sacchikiriyàya).  The four establishings of mindfulness are then briefly given in a 
formulaic phrase which is applied to each of them.  The four are the observation of the 
body (kàyànupassanà), the observation of vedanà (vedanànupassanà), the observation of 
the mind (cittànupassanà) and the observation of mental phenomenon 
(dhammànupassanà).
The body of the sutta is divided into four sections, each treating one of the four 
establishings of mindfulness.  The section devoted to the observation of vedanà is 
relatively short, covering just one page, whereas the section on the observation of the 
body comes to seven pages and the one on the observation of mental contents sixteen 
11 These verses of Anuruddha also appear in the Saüyuttanikàya (SN I 2).
12 The references here will be to the Dãghanikàya version.
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pages.  The practice described is the knowing (pajànàti) by the bhikkhu of the type of 
vedanà that he is experiencing, according to certain categories.  When he is experiencing 
pleasant (sukha) vedanà, he knows that he is experiencing pleasant vedanà.  The same 
formula is given for unpleasant (dukkha) vedanà and for vedanà which is neither 
pleasant nor unpleasant (adukkhamasukha).  This three-fold formula is then given two 
more times, the first for each of the three kinds of vedanà which is associated with greed 
(sàmisa), and then for each of the three as not associated with greed (niràmisa).
The section on the observation of vedanà ends with a passage which is identical to the 
concluding passages for each section of the other three establishings of mindfulness, the 
only difference being that here we find the word vedanà whereas in the kàyànupassanà 
section we find the word kàya, in the cittànupassanà section we kind the word citta, etc. 
The practice described in this passage is not, therefore, specific to vedanà.
In the overall design of the sutta, the observation of vedanà does not receive any more 
emphasis than the three other practices.  There are, however, other places in the Nikàyas 
where the practice of satipaññhàna is given a special connection with vedanà.
The Satosutta (SN V 180):
The Satosutta gives a marked emphasis to the understanding of vedanà in connection 
with this practice.  This is one of the short suttas in the Satipaññhànasaüyutta, the section 
devoted to the four establishings of mindfulness in the Saüyuttanikàya.  The sutta begins 
with a phrase which introduces the two main elements of the practice, and then 
underlines the importance of this practice.  The two elements are then briefly described:
Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu should remain mindful and with full understanding.  This is 
my teaching to you.
And how, bhikkhus, is a bhikkhu mindful?  ...
And how, bhikkhus, is a bhikkhu possessed of full understanding?  Here, 
bhikkhus, the bhikkhu knows that vedanà arise, that they remain, and that they 
disappear.  He knows that thoughts arise, that they remain, and that they 
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disappear.  He knows that perceptions arise, that they remain, and that they 
disappear.13
The description of the bhikkhu who is mindful (sato) is the same as the description of the 
four establishings of mindfulness at the beginning of the Satipaññhànasuttas.14  The 
description of the bhikkhu who is possessed of full understanding (sampajàno) is not, 
however, found in those suttas, and it is here that vedanà plays an important role.  The 
practice of one who is possessed of full understanding is described firstly as knowing the 
characteristic of impermanence of vedanà, and then of thoughts (vitakka), and of 
perceptions (sa¤¤à).  Once again we find vedanà associated with the concept of 
impermanence in the description of a soteriological practice.  The Buddha is represented 
as describing these practices as “my teaching to you [i.e. to the bhikkhus]” (ayaü vo 
amhàkam anusàsanã).  There are numerous statements in the Nikàyas which represent 
the Buddha as stating that the main, indeed the sole, concern of his teaching is the 
soteriological.15  Here this teaching is said to be connected with the understanding of 
vedanà.
The short passage describing the arising, staying and passing away of vedanà, thoughts 
and perceptions occurs in a number of other places in the Nikàyas.  In the 
Acchariyabbhutadhammasutta of the Majjhimanikàya, ânanda, the Buddha's chief 
attendant, gives, in the presence of the Buddha, a list of the Buddha's “wonderful and 
marvellous qualities” (acchariyà abbhutadhammà).  These qualities are chiefly 
concerned with supernatural events which took place at the time of the birth of Gotama, 
and the description of them takes up most of the sutta.  At the end of ânanda's account, 
the Buddha says to ânanda that he should also remember another of his qualities, which 
he then gives in the following terms:
13 Sato bhikkhave bhikkhu vihareyya sampajàno, ayaü vo amhàkam anusàsanã.
Katha¤ca bhikkhave bhikkhu sato hoti. …
Katha¤ca bhikkhave bhikkhu sampajàno hoti.  Idha bhikkhave bhikkhuno vidità vedanà uppajjanti, vidità  
upaññhahanti, vidità abbhatthaü gacchanti.  Vidità vitakkà uppajjanti …  Vidità sa¤¤à uppajjanti …  SN V 
180-81.
14 D II 290 and MN I 56.
15 For example, “Bhikkhus, both formerly and now what I teach is suffering and the cessation of 
suffering.”  (Pubbe càhaü bhikkhave etarahi ca dukkhan c'eva pa¤¤àpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaü.  MN I 
140).
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Here, ânanda, the Tathàgata knows that vedanà arise, that they remain, and that 
they disappear.16
The same is said for perceptions (sa¤¤à) and thoughts (vitakka) as in the passage quoted 
above which describes a bhikkhu who is possessed of full understanding.  The passage is 
thus given a very marked emphasis in this sutta.  As Bhikkhu Bodhi has noted in his 
translation of this sutta, “[t]his statement seems to be the Buddha's way of calling 
attention to the quality he regarded as the true wonder and marvel.”17
The Cåëataõhàsaïkhayasutta  
In the Majjhimanikàya there are two suttas about the “destruction of craving” (taõhà-
saïkhaya), the 37th sutta of that collection, the Cåëataõhàsaïkhayasutta (the Shorter 
Discourse on the Destruction of Craving), and the 38th, the Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta (the 
Greater Discourse on the Destruction of Craving).  In both of these suttas, vedanà plays 
an important role in descriptions of the process of liberation.  In the first, the setting is a 
mythological one.  Sakka, the ruler of the gods, is represented as asking the Buddha to 
explain to him briefly (saïkhittena) how a bhikkhu is liberated by the destruction of 
craving.  The reply is given as follows:
Here, ruler of gods, a bhikkhu has heard that nothing is worth adhering to.  When 
a bhikkhu has heard that nothing is worth adhering to, he directly knows 
everything; having directly known everything, he fully understands everything; 
having fully understood everything, whatever vedanà he feels,whether pleasant or 
painful or neither painful-nor-pleasant, he abides observing impermanence in 
those vedanà, observing fading away, observing cessation, observing 
relinquishment. Observing thus, he does not cling to anything in the world. 
When he does not cling, he is not agitated.  When he is not agitated, he personally 
attains Nibbàna.  He understands:  “Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been 
16 Idh', ânanda, Tathàgatassa vidità vedanà uppajjanti, vidità upaññhahanti, vidità abbhatthaü gacchanti. 
MN III 124.
17 ¥àõamoli, Bhikkhu, and Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, Boston, Wisdom 
Publications, 1995, p.1132, note 1166.
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lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of 
being.”18
The formula given to describe the enlightened bhikkhu is a standard one used to describe 
an arahant.
The role of vedanà in this process is clearly of great importance.  Having fully 
understood all phenomena (sabbaü dhammaü), the bhikkhu observes four phenomena 
with regard to vedanà.  Firstly he is described as abiding observing impermanence with 
regard to vedanà (so tàsu vedanàsu aniccànupassã viharati).  He is thus applying one of 
the fundamental concepts of the thought world of the Nikàyas to vedanà.  He also abides 
observing fading away (viràga), cessation (nirodha) and reliquishment (pañinissagga) 
with regard to vedanà.  Vedanà is the basis for all of these observations.  The text goes 
directly from these observations to the description of the bhikkhu not clinging to 
anything in the world, and thus becoming liberated.
The significance of this passage is emphasized by being repeated twice further on in the 
sutta.  It is also found in a sutta in the Aïguttaranikàya19, indicating that it was 
considered to be of some importance by the compilers of these texts.
The Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta
The second of the pair of suttas on the destruction of craving, the 
Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta, also gives much emphasis to vedanà in its description of the 
process of liberation.  This remarkable sutta calls for a detailed analysis.
The passage relevant to the term vedanà occurs as part of a longer passage which begins 
by explaining the conditions for the conception of a child.  The period of the mother's 
18 Idha devànam inda bhikkhuno sutaü hoti:  sabbe dhammà nàlaü abhinivesàyà ti.  Eva¤-ce devànam 
inda bhikkhuno sutaü hoti:  sabbe dhammà nàlaü abhinivesàyà ti, so sabbaü dhammaü abhijànàti,  
sabbaü dhammaü parijànàti, sabbaü dhammaü pari¤¤àya yaü ka¤ci vedanaü vedeti, sukhaü và 
dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và, so tàsu vedanàsu aniccànupassã viharati, viràgànupassã viharati,  
nirodhànupassi viharati, pañinissaggànupassi viharati; so tàsu vedanàsu aniccànupassã viharanto... na 
ki¤ci loke upàdiyati, anupàdiyaü na paritassati, aparitassaü paccattaü yeva parinibbàyati, “Khãõà jàti,  
vusitaü brahmacariyaü, kataü karaõãyaü, nàparaü itthattàyàti” pajànàti. (MN I 251, also on p.254 and 
255.)
19 AN IV 88
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pregnancy, her giving birth to the child and her feeding it with her milk are then briefly 
described.  The text then goes on to explain two things which follow on from the growth 
of the child and the “ripening” (paripàka) of his sense organs (indriya).  The first is that 
the child plays with various toys and at various games.  We are even given some 
examples of these:  “with a toy windmill, with a toy cart, with a toy bow.”20  This whole 
passage is quite remarkable:  we are far from the abstractions of philosophers, but are 
dealing with concrete, everyday reality.
The other situation specified as following on from the child's growth and the 
development of his sense organs is his enjoyment of the five “strands of sense-pleasures” 
(kàmaguõa).  This leads into the sequence in which vedanà plays a key role.  The 
sequence is given twice.   Firstly we have a description of the process by which suffering 
arises, and then after that comes a description of the process by which suffering ceases, 
the process of liberation from suffering.  Each of these descriptions is six-fold in 
structure;  the first gives the following passage for the five physical senses and for the 
mind:
When he has seen a material shape through the eye, he feels attraction for 
agreeable material shapes, he feels repugnance for disagreeable material shapes; 
and he dwells without mindfulness aroused as to the body, with a mind that is 
limited; and he does not comprehend that freedom of mind and that freedom 
through intuitive wisdom as they really are, whereby those evil unskilled states of 
his are stopped without remainder.  Possessed thus of compliance and antipathy, 
whatever vedanà he feels--pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant--he 
delights in that vedanà, welcomes it and persists in cleaving to it.21
The person described in this passage dwells anupaññhita-kàya-sati (“without mindfulness 
aroused as to the body”).  This is the negative form of the word upaññhita-kàya-sati, 
upaññhita having the sense of “standing up ready, with attention fixed” (PED).  It is in 
this state that he develops attraction for the pleasant sense objects and repugnance for the 
20  MN I 266
21  So cakkhunà råpaü disvà piyaråpe råpe sàrajjati, appiyaråpe råpe byàpajjati, anupaññhitakàyasati ca 
viharati parittacetaso, ta¤-ca cetovimuttiü pa¤¤àvimuttiü yathàbhåtaü na-ppajànàti yatth'assa te pàpakà 
akusalà dhammà aparisesà nirujjhanti.  So evaü anurodhavirodhaü samàpanno yaü ka¤ci vedanaü 
vedeti, sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và, so taü vedanaü abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosàya 
tiññhati. MN I 266
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unpleasant.  This, then, is the base from which taõhà arises, the “thirst” which keeps the 
mind unbalanced and which is the cause of suffering (dukkha) as explained in the second 
Noble Truth.  But the passage goes further, probing deeper into this phenomenon.  
First comes another brief description of this condition:  so evaü anurodhavirodhaü 
samàpanno.  I.B. Horner translates this passage as “possessed thus of compliance and 
antipathy”, and notes that this phrase is explained in the Pali commentary as “attachment 
as well as hatred”.22  Thus it is a kind of summary of the preceding sentence with its 
description of one who feels attraction (sàrajjati) and repugnance (byàpajjati).  It is in 
this context that the text proceeds to make its important point about vedanà:
whatever vedanà he feels--pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant--he 
delights in that sensation, welcomes it and persists in cleaving to it.23
The passage continues with an explanation of the result of this:
From delighting in that vedanà, from welcoming it, from persisting in cleaving to 
it, delight arises; whatever is delight amid those vedanà, that is grasping; 
conditioned by grasping is becoming; conditioned by becoming is birth; 
conditioned by birth, old age and dying, grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and 
despair come into being.  Such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering.24
The latter part of this passage belongs to the standard pañicca-samuppàda formula.
The sutta continues with a passage which is also found in the Sàma¤¤aphalasutta of the 
Dãghanikàya, and which recurs in many suttas of the Majjhimanikàya.  It describes the 
development of a disciple from the moment he acquires confidence in the Buddha's 
teachings to his attainment of arahantship.  The sequence follows its standard course up 
22 I.B. Horner, The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings, London, Pali Text Society, 1954, vol. I, pp. 
322-3.
23  yam ka¤ci vedanaü vedeti, sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và, so taü vedanaü abhinandati  
abhivadati ajjhosàya tiññhati.  MN I 266
24  Tassa taü vedanaü abhinandato abhivadato ajjhosàya tiññhato uppajjati nandã, yà vedanàsu nandã tad-
upàdànam, tass'upàdànapaccayà bhavo, bhavapaccayà jàti, jàtipaccayà jaràmaranam 
sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupàyàsà sambhavanti, evam-etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa 
samudayo hoti. MN I 267
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until the description of the four jhànas.  From this point we return to the subject matter 
of the passage immediately preceding this sequence, that is to kàya-sati, vedanà and the 
paticca-samuppàda.  The sequence of psychological events is identical, but the sense is 
inverted, each sentence now being in the negative.  Thus instead of the phrase
... he feels attraction for agreeable material shapes...25
we find
... he does not feel attraction for agreeable material shapes...26
Awarenenss of the body (kàya-sati) is now upaññhita, (PED: “standing up (ready)”), 
whereas in the earlier passage it is anupaññhita.  This person no longer delights in vedanà 
(so taü vedanaü nàbhinandati); the delight (nandã) in vedanà ceases:
yà vedanàsu nandã sà nirujjhati...27
And from this point the reverse sequence of the pañicca-samuppàda is given, ending with 
the usual formula:
Thus this entire mass of suffering ceases.28
This is the goal of the Buddha's teaching, the cessation of suffering, and in this sutta it is 
related directly and in detail to a practice connected with the awareness of vedanà.
The Dãghanakhasutta
The Buddha's discourse to the wanderer Dãghanakha in the Majjhimanikàya, the 
Dãghanakhasutta, is of great significance for understanding the role of vedanà in the 
soteriological process.  It seems that the ancient commentators on these texts understood 
25 ... piyaråpe råpe sàrajjati.. MN I 266
26 ... piyaråpe råpe na sàrajatti... MN I 270
27  Ibid.
28  evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hoti,  Ibid.
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that vedanà is of great importance in this sutta, for they refer to it as the 
Vedanàpariggahanasutta, the Discourse on the Grasping of Sensation.29  The significance 
of the passage in which the soteriological process is described is underlined by some of 
the events in the narrative setting.   Immediately after the Buddha has finished his 
address to Dãghanakha, we are told that Sàriputta had been standing behind the Buddha 
while the discourse was going on.  Sàriputta is counted as one of the two chief disciples 
of the Buddha.  This important personage is shown as thinking favourably of the 
discourse, and while he is doing this “his mind was liberated from the àsavas 
(defilements) by not clinging.”30  In a number of places in the commentaries, it is related 
that this is the moment when Sàriputta became an Arahant, while listening to this 
discourse of the Buddha's on vedanà.
The first part of the passage on vedanà in this sutta is identical with a part of the section 
on vedanà in the Mahànidànasutta, examined above.  This is the Buddha's refutation of 
the first manner of regarding the self (atta) and vedanà, the identification of the self with 
vedanà.  As in the Mahànidànasutta passage, the Buddha here begins by stating that there 
are three vedanà, pleasant, painful and those which are neither painful nor pleasant. 
Further on he characterizes each of these vedanà with a list of adjectives.  For pleasant 
vedanà, for example, we find the following phrase (the Buddha addresses Dãghanakha as 
Aggivessana, which is probably his clan name):
Pleasant vedanà, Aggivessana, is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, 
subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away and ceasing.31
After this passage, the text of the Dãghanakhasutta departs from that of the 
Mahànidànasutta.  The next passage in the Dãghanakhasutta describes the process by 
which a “noble disciple” (ariyasàvaka) becomes enlightened with this knowledge:
Seeing thus, a well-taught noble disciple becomes disenchanted with pleasant 
vedanà, disenchanted with painful vedanà, disenchanted with neither-painful-nor-
pleasant vedanà.  Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate.  Through 
29 Sv II 418, III 882 and Ps II 862, IV 87, Mp I 92, 321, also DhA I 79; ThagA II 95
30 anupàdàya àsavehi cittaü vimucci  MN I 501
31 Sukhà pi kho Aggivessana vedanà aniccà saïkhatà pañiccasamuppannà khayadhammà vayadhammà 
viràgadhammà nirodhadhammà  (MN I 500)
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dispassion [his mind] is liberated.  When it is liberated there comes the 
knowledge:  “It is liberated”.  He understands:  “Birth is destroyed, the holy life 
has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to 
any state of being.”32
The final phrases of this passage are standard formulations for an enlightened person and 
are found throughout the Nikàyas.  The earlier part of the passage places great emphasis 
on vedanà in this description of a practice which results in liberation from suffering.
The Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta
Vedanà plays a rather different role in a description of the process of liberation in the 
Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta of the Majjhimanikàya.  Here an important passage on vedanà 
comes after the description of the process of liberation; it shows how the enlightened 
person responds to different vedanà.
This occurs as part of a long section which is a commentary on the first words of a short 
formula given near the beginning of the sutta:  “one should not neglect wisdom.”33  The 
text asks, “And how, bhikkhu, does one not neglect wisdom?”  Towards the end of the 
long passage which is the reply to this question comes the description of liberation, after 
a sequence in which a person comes to understand that the four “formless” (aråpa) states 
are conditioned (saükhata).  One of the standard formulas to describe the process of 
liberation follows this: 
He does not cling to anything in the world.  When he does not cling, he is not 
agitated.  When he is not agitated, he personally attains Nibbàna.  He 
understands:  “Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be 
done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being.”34
32 Evaü passaü ariyasàvako sukhàya pi vedanàya nibbindati, dukkhàya pi... nibbindaü virajjati, viràgà 
vimuccati, vimuttasmiü vimuttam - iti ¤àõaü hoti; khãõà jàti, vusitaü brahmacariyaü, kataü karaõãyaü 
nàparaü itthattàyàti pajànàti.  MN I 500
33 pa¤¤aü nappamajjeyya  MN III 239
34 na ki¤ci loke upàdiyati anupàdiyaü na paritassati aparitassaü paccattaü yeva parinibbàyati:  Khãõà 
jàti vusitaü brahmacariyaü, kataü karaõãyaü nàparaü itthattàyàti pajànàti.  MN III 244
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Then comes the passage in which the way in which the enlightened person just described 
experiences vedanà:
If he feels a pleasant vedanà, he understands: “It is impermanent; there is no 
holding to it; there is no delight in it.”  If he feels a painful vedanà, he 
understands: “It is impermanent; there is no holding to it; there is no delight in 
it.”  If he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant vedanà, he understands: “It is 
impermanent; there is no holding to it; there is no delight in it.”  If he feels a 
pleasant vedanà, he feels it detached.  If he feels a painful vedanà, he feels it 
detached.  If he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant vedanà, he feels it detached.35
Once again we find the association of impermanence, one of the key notions of the 
Nikàyas, and vedanà.  Another important idea which we have seen associated with 
vedanà  in the Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta is also found here, that of not clinging 
(anajjhosita).  And as in that sutta also, delight is not taken in vedanà (anabhinandita).
This significant passage on the “correct” way to respond to vedanà of different types is 
found in a number of other places in the Nikàyas.  Its importance is in this way 
underlined.  In one of the suttas of the Nidànasaüyutta36 and one of the suttas of the 
Khandhasaüyutta,37 it occurs, as it does in the Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta, after the “Birth is 
destroyed” (khãõà jàti) formula which indicates that the bhikkhu is fully liberated.   In 
one of the suttas of the fifth volume of the Saüyuttanikàya,38 it occurs after a description 
of a bhikkhu who has developed a series of meditational stages know as the four jhànas, 
the four “formless states” and the cessation of perception and sensation 
(sa¤¤àvedayitanirodha).  It also occurs in one of the suttas of the Vedanàsaüyutta, the 
section of the Saüyuttanikàya which is devoted to suttas on the topic of vedanà.39
The Chachakkasutta
35 So sukha¤ ce vedanaü vedeti, Sà aniccà ti pajànàti; Anajjhosità ti pajànàti; Anabhinandità ti pajànàti.  
Dukkha¤ ce vedanaü vedeti...  So sukha¤ ce vedanaü vedeti, visaüyutto naü vedeti; so dukkhaü ce 
vedanaü vedeti, visaüyutto naü vedeti, adukkhamasukha¤ ce vedanaü vedeti, visaüyutto naü vedeti. 
MN III 244.
36 SN II 82
37 SN III 126
38 SN V 319
39 SN IV 213
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In the Chachakkasutta of the Majjhimanikàya, vedanà plays a key role in a passage 
which first describes how one does not make an end of suffering,40 and which then goes 
on to describe how one does do this.  Making an end of suffering is equivalent to 
attaining the goal of liberation, so this passage is of great significance to our study.  The 
second part of this passage is as follows:
When one is touched by a pleasant vedanà, if one does not delight in it, welcome 
it, and remain holding to it, then the underlying tendency to craving does not lie 
within one.  When one is touched by painful vedanà, if one does not sorrow, 
grieve and lament, does not weep beating one’s breast and become distraught, 
then the underlying tendency to aversion does not lie within one.  When one is 
touched by a neither-painful-nor-pleasant vedanà, if one understands as it really 
is the arising and passing away of vedanà, its attraction and danger and the 
escape from it, then the underlying tendency to ignorance does not lie within one. 
Bhikkhus, that one shall here and now make an end of suffering by abandoning 
the underlying tendency to craving for pleasant vedanà, by abolishing the 
underlying tendency to aversion towards painful vedanà, by extirpating the 
underlying tendency to ignorance in regard to neither-painful-nor-pleasant 
vedanà, by abandoning ignorance and arousing knowledge--this is possible.41
In this passage, the soteriological process is described in terms of vedanà and the 
“underlying tendencies” or “(latent) dispositions” (CPD) (anusaya).  Certain types of 
anusayas are eradicated in relation to certain types of vedanà, and the result of this is the 
arising of knowledge (vijjà) and the end of suffering, that is, liberation.  
The Puttamaüsasutta of the Nidànasaüyutta
40 dukkhass' antakaro bhavissatãti n'etaü ñhànaü vijjati  MN II 285
41 So sukhàya vedanàya phuññho samàno nàbhinandati nàbhivadati nàjjhosàya tiññhati;  tassa ràgànusayo 
nànuseti.  Dukkhàya vedanàya phuññho samàno na socati na kilamati na paridevati na urattàëiü kandati  
na sammohaü àpajjati;  tassa pañighànusayo nànuseti.  Adukkhamasukhàya vedanàya phuññho samàno 
tassà vedanàya samudaya¤ ca atthaïgama¤ ca àdãnava¤ ca nissaraõa¤ ca yathàbhåtaü pajànàti; tassa 
avijjànusayo nànuseti.  So vata, bhikkhave, sukhàya vedanàya ràgànusayaü pahàya dukkhàya vedanàya 
pañighànusayaü pañivinodetvà adukkhamasukhàya vedanàya avijjànusayaü samåhanitvà avijjaü pahàya 
vijjaü uppàdetvà diññhe va dhamme dukkhassa antakaro bhavissatãti, ñhànam etaü vijjati.  MN III 286.
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There is a short passage in a sutta of the Nidànasaüyutta which gives a great deal of 
emphasis to vedanà in the soteriological process.
When the three vedanà are well understood, I declare that there is nothing further 
which the noble disciple has to do.42
The phrase “nothing further to be done” (natthi ki¤ci uttariü karaõãyaü) means that the 
noble disciple's goal of full liberation has been reached.
Later in this sutta the same passage recurs, firstly with the words “the three cravings”43 
replacing “the three vedanà”, and then with the words “name and form.”44  Thus 
according to this sutta's account, the full comprehension of vedanà is one of three ways 
of achieving full liberation.
The Vedanà-saüyutta
Third sutta, Pahànena
The Vedanàsaüyutta of the Saüyuttanikàya is perhaps the most important source of 
information in the Nikàyas on the term vedanà.  Many of its suttas describe aspects of 
the soteriological process.  The third sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta, the Pahànenasutta, 
puts great emphasis on the role of vedanà in its description of a practice of this type. 
The sutta begins with a passage which is a kind of summary of the passage looked at 
above in the Chachakkasutta of the Majjhimanikàya in which the soteriological process 
is explained in connection with the “underlying tendencies” (anusayas).  As in the 
Chachakkasutta, certain types of anusayas are eradicated in relation to certain types of 
vedanà, and it is said that the bhikkhu who eradicates these anusayas has made an end of 
suffering (antam akàsi dukkhassa  SN IV 205).
This description occurs in a prose passage at the beginning of the sutta.  This is followed 
by six lines of verse which repeat the same sentiment.  The sutta then ends with another 
42 tãsu vedanàsu pari¤¤àtàsu ariyasàvakassa natthi ki¤ci uttariü karaõãyanti vadàmi.  SN II 99.
43 tisso taõhà, SN II 100
44 nàmaråpa SN II 100
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four lines of verse which are of great importance for understanding the role of vedanà in 
the soteriological process.
But when a bhikkhu who is ardent
does not neglect complete understanding,
Then that wise man fully understands
Vedanà in their entirety.
Having fully understood vedanà
He is free from àsavas in this very life. 
Firm in Dhamma's ways, with the body’s breakup
The one who has knowledge cannot be reckoned.45
Here we find terms from the description of the practice of the four establishings of 
mindfulness associated with the full comprehension (pari¤¤à) of vedanà, and the result 
of this is described as full liberation.  The bhikkhu “does not let go of” (na ri¤cati) 
sampaja¤¤a (“complete understanding”), one of the qualities described in the opening 
passage of the Satipaññhànasuttas.  The term “ardent” (àtàpin) also appears in this part of 
the Satipaññhànasuttas, and we find it again in this sutta.  The bhikkhu thus has full 
comprehension of (parijànàti) all vedanàs, and he is wise (paõóita).  In the final two 
lines, the bhikkhu, having fully understood vedanà (So vedanà pari¤¤àya), is said to be 
free from the àsavas.  He is called “one who has knowledge” (vedagu) and at death he 
does not return to the finite world (saïkha).
Fifth sutta, the Daññhabbenasutta.
The last four lines of verse are repeated further on in the Vedanàsaüyutta:  they provide 
the concluding lines to the twelfth sutta of the collection, the âkàsasutta. The final two 
lines are found again in the fifth sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta, the Daññhabbenasutta. 
45 Yato ca kho bhikkhu àtàpã, sampaja¤¤aü na ri¤cati
Tato so vedanà sabbà, parijànàti paõóito
So vedanà pari¤¤àya, diññhe dhamme anàsavo
Kàyassa bhedà dhammaññho, saïkhaü nopeti vedagå ti.  SN IV 206
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This sutta describes another way in which a bhikkhu can “make an end of suffering” in 
connection with vedanà:
When a bhikkhu regards pleasant vedanà as suffering, painful vedanà as a barb, 
neutral vedanà as impermanence, such a one is called, bhikkhu, “rightly seeing”. 
He … has made an end of suffering.46
The logic of seeing pleasant vedanà as suffering is explained, as we have noticed, in 
another sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta (SN IV 216):  pleasant vedanà is a source of 
suffering because it is, like all compounded things (saïkhàras), subject to destruction, 
decay and change.
The Sallasutta.
The theme of unpleasant vedanà being a barb, mentioned in the Daññhabbenasutta, is 
elaborated upon in the next sutta, the Sallasutta.  The term barb occurs in a simile which 
likens a person who is not a noble disciple experiencing an unpleasant vedanà and as a 
consequence becoming agitated to a person who is pierced by two barbs.  The noble 
disciple, on the other hand, is pierced by only one barb:  he feels the unpleasant vedanà, 
but his mind does not suffer as a result.  The noble disciple is then described as not 
having aversion to unpleasant vedanà and thus eradicating the “underlying tendencies” 
(anusaya) associated with unpleasant vedanà; as not delighting in pleasant vedanà and 
thus eradicating the anusayas related to pleasant vedanà; and as understanding the 
impermanent nature of sensations which are neither pleasant nor unpleasant and thus 
eradicating the anusayas which are associated with them.
This is followed by a passage which we have encountered in the Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta of 
the Majjhimanikàya.
46 Yato kho bhikkhave bhikkhuno sukhà vedanà dukkhato diññhà honti, dukkhà vedanà sallato diññhà hoti,  
adukkhamasukhà vedanà aniccato diññhà hoti, ayaü vuccati bhikkhave bhikkhu sammaddaso... antam 
akàsi dukkhassà ti.  SN IV 207.
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If he feels a pleasant vedanà, he feels it detached.  If he feels a painful vedanà, he 
feels it detached.  If he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant vedanà, he feels it 
detached.47
Here the soteriological import of the practice described in this passage is made explicit 
and unambiguous by a concluding sentence which is not found in the 
Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta.  The Buddha is represented as stating
I say that this noble disciple is called “detached from birth, old age, death, grief, 
suffering, dejection and despair, detached from suffering”.  48
The phrasing of this sentence repeats the cadences of the previous passage which refer to 
the noble disciple as being detached from the various types of vedanà.  The detachment 
from suffering that is mentioned here is, in the terms of the Nikàyas, the state of 
liberation.
Vedanà and the four noble truths
The first sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta 
The first sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta is another which features vedanà in a description 
of soteriological practices.  The first sutta is significant in this respect in two ways.  It 
explains in four lines of verse how a bhikkhu becomes “free from craving” (nicchàta) 
and “fully liberated” (parinibbutta).  Firstly the bhikkhu is described with the following 
line:
Concentrated, fully understanding, aware is the disciple of the Buddha.49
The terms “fully understanding” (sampajàno) and “aware” (sato), are key terms in 
descriptions of one of the important soteriological practice described in the Nikàyas, the 
four establishings of mindfulness.
47 So sukha¤ ce vedanaü vedeti, visaüyutto naü vedeti; so dukkhaü ce vedanaü vedeti, visaüyutto naü 
vedeti, adukkhamasukha¤ ce vedanaü vedeti, visaüyutto naü vedeti.  SN IV 209.
48 Ayaü vuccati bhikkhave ariyasàvako visa¤¤uto jàtiyà jaràya maraõena sokehi paridevehi dukkhehi 
domanassehi upàyàsehi visa¤¤utto dukkhasmà ti vadàmi.  SN IV 210.
49 Samàhito sampajàno sato buddhassa sàvako.  SN IV 204.
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The second connection that this sutta has with soteriological practices occurs in the next 
lines.  Here we find “vedanà” used as a substitute for “suffering” (dukkha) in what is 
otherwise a rehearsal of the four noble truths.  In many places in the Nikàyas the Buddha 
is represented as summarising his teachings as the four noble truths.  They are stated in 
what is traditionally regarded as his first discourse, known as the 
Dhammacakkapavattanasutta (V I 10 and SN V 420).  In a passage which first appears in 
the second sutta of the Dãghanikàya, the Sàma¤¤aphalasutta, and which occurs 
subsequently in all of the remaining suttas of the first volume of the Dãghanikàya and in 
fifteen suttas of the Majjhimanikàya, the realisation of the four noble truths is described 
as the highest goal of a bhikkhu's practice.  In this passage it is equated with complete 
liberation.  The four noble truths are given in these suttas in the following terms:
He understands as it is “This is suffering”.  He understands as it is “This is the 
arising of suffering”.  He understands as it is “This is the cessation of suffering”. 
He understands as it is “This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering”.50
In this first sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta we find a parrallel to the four noble truths, with 
the word suffering (dukkha) replaced by the word vedanà.  The student of the Buddha, 
who has full understanding (sampajàna) and is aware (sata),
understands vedanà, and the arising of vedanà, and where they cease, and the 
path leading to (their) destruction.51
The next line of the sutta states that because of the ceasing of sensations, the bhikkhu is 
liberated.  
This first sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta is thus of fundamental importance for 
understanding the significance of vedanà in the soteriological process.  Vedanà is placed 
here in the context of what is regularly presented in the Nikàyas as the Buddha's most 
50 So “idaü dukkhan” ti yathàbhåtaü pajànàti, “ayaü dukkhasamudayo” ti yathàbhåtaü pajànàti, “ayaü 
dukkhanirodho” ti yathàbhåtaü pajànàti,  “ayaü dukkhanirodhagàminã pañipadà” ti yathàbhåtaü 
pajànàti.   DN I 83-84.
51 Vedanà ca pajànàti, vedanàna¤ca sambhavaü
Yattha cetà nirujjhanti, magga¤ca khayagàminaü.  SN IV 204.
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important statement concerning suffering and the way out of suffering, that is the four 
noble truths.
Group of four suttas in second chapter of the Vedanàsaüyutta
Further into the Vedanàsaüyutta, in its second chapter, there is a group of four suttas 
which follow the same model as the first sutta, that is, they would each be a presentation 
of the four noble truths except that the term suffering is replaced by sensation.52  These 
suttas are all in prose, differing thus from the first sutta.  The central passage of these 
four suttas is identical.  Firstly, the following questions are asked:
What is vedanà?  What is the arising of vedanà?  What is the ceasing of vedanà? 
What is the path leading to the ceasing of vedanà?53
Here we have a passage which follows the pattern in which the four noble truths are 
enunciated.  In reply to the first question comes the following phrase:
There are these three vedanà, ânanda:  pleasant, painful and neutral vedanà.54
On one level, this may seem an unusual choice as a substitute for dukkha, especially the 
pleasant (sukha) vedanà and the vedanà which is neither painful nor pleasant 
(adukkhamasukha).  This thought appears to have occurred to some of those listening to 
the Buddha's discourses, for there is a sutta in the Vedanàsaüyutta which deals with this 
question.  Here a bhikkhu is represented as asking the Buddha how the Buddha's phrase 
“whatever is felt is suffering”55 relates to the three vedanàs, pleasant, painful and neither 
painful nor pleasant.
The bhikkhu's noticing of the apparent discrepancy between the two teachings is praised 
by the Buddha.  He then goes on to point out that all compounded things (saïkhàras) are 
52 These are suttas number 15, 16, 17, and 18 (SN IV  219-23).
53 Katamà nu kho bhante vedanà, katamo vedanàsamudayo, katamo vedanànirodho, katamà 
vedanànirodhagàminã pañipadà. (SN IV 219-20)
54 Tisso imà ânanda vedanà, sukhà vedanà dukkhà vedanà adukkhamasukhà vedanà.  SN IV 220.
55 yaü ki¤ci vedayitaü taü dukkhasmiü SN IV 216, also found at MN III 208 and SN II 53, and cf. SN IV 
205, lines 3-4.
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impermanent (anicca), subject to destruction (khayadhamma), decay (vayadhamma), 
fading away (viràgadhamma), ceasing (nirodhadhamma) and change 
(vipariõàmadhamma), and that it is for this reason that he declared that everything that is 
felt is suffering.  Thus we are allowed to conclude that vedanàs which are pleasant and 
neutral also fall into this category of compounded things, and are also suffering.  In this 
respect vedanàs of all kinds are a suitable substitute for the first noble truth of suffering 
in this passage which follows the model of the four noble truths.
The answers to the next two questions, “What is the arising of vedanà?” and “What is the 
ceasing of vedanà?” is connected with the place of vedanà in the pañicca-samuppàda.  In 
the pañicca-samuppàda, vedanà is said to exist because of contact (phassapaccayà 
vedanà).  Here a similar locution is used for the explanation of the arising of vedanà:
From the arising of contact is the arising of vedanà.56
The explanation of the ceasing of vedanà in these four suttas of the Vedanàsaüyutta is 
identical to the description of the ceasing of vedanà in the reverse statement of the 
pañicca-samuppàda.  In both we find the phrase “From the ceasing of contact is the 
ceasing of vedanà” (phassanirodhà vedanànirodho SN IV 220).
The response to the fourth question, “What is the path leading to the ceasing of 
vedanà?”, is exactly the same as the standard description of the fourth noble truth, the 
path leading to the ceasing of suffering:  it is the noble eightfold path (ariya aññhaïgika 
magga).  Thus in these four suttas of the Vedanàsaüyutta the most important 
soteriological teachings of the Nikàyas are given in terms of vedanà.
Group of three suttas in the third chapter of the Vedanàsaüyutta
Further on again into the Vedanàsaüyutta, in its third and final chapter, there is a group 
of three suttas (numbers 23, 24 and 25) which resemble the four that we have just looked 
at, except that in the middle of the presentation of the four “truths” of vedanà, the arising 
of vedanà, etc., there is a fifth element added.  This comes after “the arising of vedanà” 
56 Phassasamudayà vedanàsamudayo.  SN IV 220.
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(vedanàsamudaya), and is “the path leading to the arising of vedanà” 
(vedanàsamudayagàminã pañipadà).  These three suttas have the same pattern as the four 
of the second chapter, in that they are in a question and answer structure.  The reply to 
the question “What is the path leading to the arising of vedanà” is given with one word: 
“craving” (taõhà, SN IV 233).  Taõhà is of course a key term in the descriptions of 
soteriological practices that we find in the Nikàyas.  In the classical expositions of the 
four noble truths, in what is represented as the Buddha's first discourse, for example (SN 
V 421), or in the Mahàsatipaññhànasutta (D II 308), craving is equated with the arising of 
suffering (Idaü kho pana bhikkhave dukkhasamudayam ariyasaccaü, yàyaü taõhà... SN 
V 241), and the complete cessation of craving is said to be the cessation of suffering 
(Idaü kho pana bhikkhave dukkhanirodham ariyasaccaü, yo tassà yeva taõhàya 
asesaviràganirodho... SN V 241).
The Pubbe¤àõasutta and the phrase “pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuü udapàdi”
The statements concerning vedanà that are found in these suttas are emphasised in a 
significant manner in the second sutta of this group, the Pubbe¤àõasutta, the 24th sutta of 
the Vedanàsaüyutta.  The Buddha is represented as saying that before his enlightenment 
(pubbe me bhikkhave sambodhà), the questions that we find in the other suttas had 
occurred to him, that is, “What is vedanà?”, etc.  He then relates that the responses as 
given in the other suttas occurred to him.  Finally, each of the elements of these passages 
are given in the following form:
At the thought, bhikkhus, “This is vedanà”, --in things not heard of before there 
arose in me vision, there arose in me knowledge, insight arose, wisdom arose, 
light arose.57
Passages which are parallel to this one appear in a few other places in the Nikàyas.  It 
seems that this locution is reserved for important utterances.  It appears, for example, in 
the Buddha's first discourse, with “This is vedanà”, etc., replaced by “This suffering”, 
etc.  It also appears in a sutta of the Dãghanikàya in which the Buddha is represented as 
57 Imà vedanà ti me bhikkhave pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhum udapàdi, ¤àõaü upapàdi, pa¤¤à 
udapàdi, vijjà udapàdi, àloko udapàdi.  SN IV 233.
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relating an account of the life of a former Buddha by the name of Vipassin.  In this sutta, 
the phrase comes after Vipassin's discovery of the pañicca-samuppàda, which is 
represented as the moment of his enlightenment.  Here the passage begins, “At the 
thought “Arising, arising”...” (Samudayo samudayo ti...  DN II 33).  This sequence is 
repeated in seven suttas of the first chapter of the Nidànasaüyutta, which is the section 
of the Saüyuttanikàya concerned with the pañicca-samuppàda (suttas 4 to 10, SN II 5-
10.)  The first six of these suttas deals with the realisation of the pañicca-samuppàda by 
six former Buddhas, and thus their enlightenment.  After their realisation of each causal 
link in the pañicca-samuppàda comes the passage found in the account of the Buddha 
Vipassin's experience just mentioned.  The seventh sutta uses the same terms to 
describe, in the first person, the experience of Gotama the Buddha.
This same passage appears in a short sutta of the Satipaññhànasaüyutta of the 
Saüyuttanikàya, introduced by each of the four establishings of mindfulness.  Thus for 
the first we find “At the thought, bhikkhus, “This is the observation of the body with 
regard to the body”, --in things not heard of before there arose in me vision...” (Ayaü 
kàye kàyànupassanà ti me bhikkhave pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhum udapàdi... 
SN V 178).  The practices of the four establishings of mindfulness are, as we have seen, 
of great importance amongst the soteriological practices of the Nikàyas.  This formula, 
then, seems to be used primarily in connection with realisations of great soteriological 
significance.  Its use here in the 24th sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta serves to underline the 
significance of the practice of knowing vedanà in the same way that suffering is known 
in the description of the four noble truths.
Aïguttaranikàya sutta, AN I 176-77 (“Vediyamànassa ... idaü dukkhanti pa¤¤àpemi”)
In all there are nine suttas in the Vedanàsaüyutta which present vedanà in the same 
terms as suffering is presented in the four noble truths.58  There is another sutta of great 
interest on this topic in the Aïguttaranikàya.  The passage which is of interest to our 
enquiry begins with a statement of the first part of one of the standard presentations of 
the pañicca-samuppàda formula found in the Nikàyas.  At the term vedanà, however, it 
takes a turn which is different from its usual enunciation:
58 Numbers 1, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25 and 28.
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Conditioned by contact is vedanà.  Now to him who has feeling, monks, I make 
known:  This is suffering.  I make known:  This is the arising of suffering.  I 
make known:  This is the cessation of suffering.  I make known:  This is the 
practice that leads to the cessation of suffering.59
This passage also links vedanà and the four noble truths, but in a manner which is quite 
different to the manner in which this is done in the suttas of the Vedanàsaüyutta looked 
at above.  After the statement of the cause of vedanà, instead of the next “link” in the 
pañicca-samuppàda, “conditioned by vedanà is craving” (vedanàpaccayà taõhà), we find 
a phrase which begins with the present participle of the verb vediyati, a verb which is 
related to vedanà.
This passage seems to be saying that the feeling of vedanà is a preliminary requirement 
for a person to be taught one of the key soteriological doctrines of the Nikàyas, that is the 
doctrine of the four noble truths.  
Other contexts in which vedanà is presented in the four noble truths formula
Returning now to the presentations of vedanà in a manner akin to that in which suffering 
is presented in the four noble truths which we noticed in the Vedanàsaüyutta, we must 
note here that there are other contexts in which we find vedanà presented in this manner. 
In these contexts it finds its place alongside a number of items which are given in the 
same four-fold pattern.  There are several suttas in the Nidànasaüyutta in which this 
occurs.60  The other items in this case are the other members of the pañicca-samuppàda, 
with the exception of avijjà.61  So in these suttas, vedanà is given no special emphasis.  It 
takes its place alongside ten other members of the pañicca-samuppàda, all of which are 
given in the pattern in which suffering is given in the exposition of the four noble truths. 
For example, we find “old-age-and-death” in the following presentation in sutta 13:
59 ...phassapaccayà vedanà.  Vediyamànassa kho panàhaü bhikkhave idaü dukkhan ti pa¤¤àpemi, ayaü 
dukkhasamudayo ti pa¤¤àpemi, ayaü dukkhanirodho pa¤¤àpemi, ayaü dukkhanirodhagàminã pañipadà ti  
pa¤¤àpemi.  AN I 176-77
60 Suttas 13, 14, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 65 and 82-93.
61 The Nidànasaüyutta is made up of suttas on the theme of the pañicca-samuppàda.
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They know old-age-and-death, they know the arising of old-age-and-death, they 
know the cessation of old-age-and-death, they know the path leading to the 
cessation of old-age-and-death.62
This then is repeated for the ten following members of the pañicca-samuppàda, the final 
member, “ignorance” (avijjà), being omitted.  In the Sammàdiññhisutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya, the same pattern with an added question and answer passage for each 
member (“What is old-age-and-death”, etc., (Katamaü pan'àvuso jaràmaraõaü, etc., 
MN I 49)), is found for all the members of the pañicca-samuppàda, including avijjà, and 
with the term “food” (àhàra) added at the beginning.
Similarly, there are several suttas in the Khandhasaüyutta of the Saüyuttanikàya (suttas 
50, 56, and 57), as well as two in other parts of the Saüyuttanikàya (SN III 257-58 and 
SN IV 386-87), which present each of the five aggregates which make up a person (the 
pa¤cakkhandha) in the same four-fold pattern in which suffering is presented in the 
exposition of the four noble truths.  Vedanà is one of these aggregates, along with matter 
(råpa), perceptions (sa¤¤à), volitional activities (saïkhàra) and consciousness (vi¤¤àõa). 
So in these suttas as well, vedanà is not given any special emphasis which would 
distinguish it from the other aggregates.
There is one sutta in the Aïguttaranikàya in which the treatment of vedanà parallels that 
seen in the above passages:
And when the noble disciple thus knows vedanà, their origin, variety, fruit, 
ending, and the steps leading thereto;  he knows this penetrative holy life as 
vedanà's end.63
Here we have the same pattern in which suffering is presented in the exposition of the 
four noble truths with two more items added:  the noble disciple also knows the variety 
(vemattata) of vedanàs and the result (vipàka) of vedanàs.  The soteriological 
62 jaràmaraõam pajànanti, jaràmaraõasamudayam pajànanti, jaràmaraõanirodhapajànanti,  
jaràmaraõanirodhagàminiü pañipadaü pajànanti.  SN II 15
63 Yato ca kho bhikkhave ariyasàvako evaü vedanà pajànàti, evaü vedanànaü nidànasambhavaü 
pajànàti, evaü vedanànaü vemattataü pajànàti, evaü vedanànaü vipàkaü pajànàti, evaü 
vedanànirodhaü pajànàti, evaü vedanànirodhagàminipañipadaü pajànàti, so imaü nibbedhikaü 
brahmacariyaü pajànàti vedanànirodhaü.  AN III 412-13.
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significance of knowing all of these is underlined by the final phrase in which this 
practice is describe as being the “mode of living of Brahma” (brahmacariya).  Elsewhere 
in the Canon, brahmacariya is described as being “for completely making an end of 
suffering” (sammà dukkhassa antakiriyàya  Vin.i.12).  The PED gives as part of its 
definition of this term the following phrase:  “in Buddhist sense the moral life, holy life, 
religious life, as way to end suffering....”
The sutta in which this passage appears also has the same formula repeated for a number 
of other phenomena.  These are sense pleasure (kàmà), perception (sa¤¤à), the àsavas 
(defilemts), karma (Pali kamma), and suffering (dukkha) (A III 410-17).  So as with the 
suttas looked at above in which we find a similar treatment of vedanà alongside other 
members of the pañicca-samuppàda and of the five aggregates, vedanà is not being 
emphasised in any special way here.
The significance of the treatment of vedanà is appreciated by the consideration of the 
wider context.  The treatment of vedanà in the four-fold pattern that we find in the 
Vedanàsaüyutta does not occur for any of the other members of the pañicca-samuppàda, 
nor for any of the other aggregates.  Nowhere in the Nikàyas are they treated in this 
manner in isolation from the other members.  Vedanà is unique amongst these terms in 
being presented on its own in the formulation that is associated with the four noble 
truths.  
Conclusion
The passages studied in this chapter clearly give great emphasis to vedanà in their 
descriptions of soteriological processes.  As far as I am aware, none of these passages 
have been grouped together and examined by those who have written on these texts. 
This survey shows that Goenka’s emphasis on vedanà in his meditation teachings have a 
firm basis in the texts of the Nikàyas.
When drawing conclusions from any study of passages in the Nikàyas, however, it is 
important to bear in mind the disparate nature of these texts.  R. Gethin’s comments, 
quoted in the introduction to this thesis, are worth repeating here: 
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We are faced not so much with a single finished canvas as with a bewildering 
array of sketches and detailed studies which it is impossible to take in at once. 
Their subject is seen from different angles and in various aspects;  it is viewed 
from near and afar.64
There are of course many suttas in the Nikàyas which make no mention of the term 
vedanà.  This is not to say, however, that these suttas contradict the hypothesis that the 
correct understanding of vedanà is an important element in the path to liberation.  The 
following chapter pursues this theme further in an investigation of the term vedanà as it 
is used in certain important causal schemas found in these texts.
64 Gethin, 1992, p.20.
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Chapter Two:  Vedanà and the pañicca-samuppàda
A number of modern writers on the Pali texts have made remarkable comments about the 
importance of the role of the term vedanà in the descriptions of various causal sequences 
in the Nikàyas.  Thus D. Kalupahana in his study of causality in Buddhism:
... up to the point of feeling or sensation one is governed by the causal pattern. 
But immediately after that begins deliberate activity, which can lead one either to 
subjection to the objective order of things, that is, to enslavement to things of the 
world, or to freedom from bondage to such things through the elimination of ego-
consciousness.1
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, Nyanaponika has also given great emphasis to 
vedanà in this context.  Here he translates vedanà as “Feeling”:
Through actual experience it can thus be confirmed that the ever-revolving round 
of Dependent Origination (pañicca-samuppàda) can be stopped at the point of 
Feeling, and that there is no inherent necessity that Feeling is followed by 
Craving.  Here we encounter Feeling as a key factor on the path of liberation …1
Bhikkhu Bodhi also lays great stress on the crucial role of vedanà (again translated as 
“feeling”):
… a relationship of conditionality, unlike a necessitarian one, allows for a margin 
of freedom in responding to the condition.  The place in the sequence of 
conditions where that margin takes on the greatest importance is the link between 
feeling and craving.  It is at that brief moment when the present resultant phase 
has come to a culmination in feeling, but the present causal phase has not yet 
begun, that the issue of bondage and liberation is decided.  If the response to 
feeling is governed by ignorance and craving, the round continues to revolve; if 
1 Thera Nyanaponika, Contemplation of Feeling, Kandy, Buddhist Publication Society, 1983, p.2.
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the response replaces craving with restraint, mindfulness and methodical 
attention, a movement is made in the direction of cessation.2
Having made these striking observations on the place of vedanà in certain causal 
sequences, it is surprising that none of these writers has looked in detail at the use of this 
term in such contexts in the Nikàyas.  This chapter examines the use of the term vedanà 
in causal sequences such as the pañicca-samuppàda in the Nikàyas.
The pañicca-samuppàda is an important concept in the Nikàyas.  In one of the suttas of 
the Majjhimanikàya it is equated with the dhamma (the teaching of the Buddha) itself:
He who sees the pañicca-samuppàda sees the dhamma, he who sees the dhamma 
sees the pañicca-samuppàda.3
An obvious place to begin our investigations of the textual accounts of the pañicca-
samuppàda is the Nidàna-saüyutta of the Saüyuttanikàya.  This important section of the 
canon groups together suttas which deal with the concept of “cause” (nidàna).  The first 
sutta, in reply to the question “what is the pañicca-samuppàda?”, gives the following 
statement, without any elaboration:
...conditioned by ignorance are the karma-formations; conditioned by the karma-
formations is consciousness; conditioned by consciousness is psycho-physicality; 
conditioned by psycho-physicality are the six (sensory) spheres; conditioned by 
the six (sensory) spheres is contact; conditioned by contact is vedanà; 
conditioned by vedanà is craving; conditioned by craving is grasping; 
conditioned by grasping is becoming; conditioned by becoming is birth; 
conditioned by birth, ageing and dying, grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and 
despair come into being  Such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering.4
2 Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, The Mahànidàna Sutta and its Commentaries, 
Kandy, Buddhist Publication Society, 1984, p.11-12.
3 Yo pañicca-samuppàdaü passati so dhammaü passati, yo dhammaü passati so pañicca-samuppàdaü 
passati.  MN I 191
4 Avijjà-paccayà saïkhàrà, saïkhàra-paccayà vi¤¤àõaü, vi¤¤àna-paccayà nàma-råpaü, nàma-råpa-
paccayà saëàyatanà, saëàyatana-paccayà-phasso, phassa-paccayà vedanà, vedanà-paccayà taõhà, taõhà-
paccayà upàdànaü, upàdàna-paccayà bhavo, bhava-paccayà jàti-paccayà jarà-maraõaü soka-parideva-
dukkha-domanass’upàyàsà sambhavanti.  SN II 1-2
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This sequence of twelve “links” is found in this form in many suttas of all four Nikàyas. 
A wide variety of translations and interpretations have been applied to these terms.  The 
term saïkhàra, for instance, can be found in modern translations as any of the following: 
impressions, conformations, formations, disposition, aggregates, mental activities, 
volitional acts, composite-unity, pre-natal forces, co-operating forces, synthesis, karmic 
form-energy and affirmations5.   As A.L. Basham has noted, this series has been 
“commented on again and again by ancient and modern scholars, and perhaps not fully 
understood by anybody”.6  I do not intend to provide a commentary on this series here. 
Rather I will attempt to elucidate the role of just one of the terms of the sequence, 
vedanà.  This will of course entail some discussion of the terms in its immediate vicinity, 
and some comments on the series as a whole.  I will also attempt to place the discussion 
found in the suttas on vedanà and the pañicca-samuppàda in the broader context of the 
teachings of the Nikàyas.  As R. Gethin has put it, “In their own terms, the Nikàyas teach 
but two things:  dukkha [“suffering”] and the cessation of dukkha.”  And he adds, 
significantly, that “in the Nikàyas the processes and means that bring about the cessation 
of dukkha are conceived of primarily in terms of spiritual practice and development.”7 
With reference to the pañicca-samuppàda, Gethin has some relevant comments upon 
which I will elaborate in this chapter:  “... in Buddhist thought discussion of pañicca-
samuppàda... is not pursued as an end in itself but subordinated to the notion of the 
spiritual path...”8
An important aspect of the presentation of the pañicca-samuppàda quoted above is that 
not one of the terms of the sequence is given more emphasis than any other term.  There 
are many suttas, however, which highlight one term or another, and there are quite a 
number of suttas which throw light on the term vedanà and on its place in the series.
5  See David M. Williams, “The Translation and Interpretation of the Twelve Terms in the 
Pañiccasamuppàda”, Numen, vol.XXI, 1974, p.40.
6  A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was India, Calcutta, Rupa, 1991, p. 271.
7  R. Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening, Leiden Brill, 1992, p.18.
8  Ibid., p.19.
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The Mahànidànasutta
When turning to the Dãghanikàya in our investigation of the pañicca-samuppàda, the 
Mahànidànasutta (the Great Discourse on Causation) provides an obvious starting point. 
Rhys Davids, in the introduction to his historic 1910 translation of this sutta made the 
following comments:
The doctrine of pañicca-samuppàda--that all dhammà (phenomena physical and 
mental) are pañiccasamuppannà (happen by way of cause) finds in the following 
Suttanta the fullest exposition accorded to it throughout the Piñakas.9
This discourse is occasioned by some comments on the pañicca-samuppàda by ânanda, 
the Buddha’s attendant.  ânanda claims that the pañicca-samuppàda appears clear to 
him, and the Buddha reprimands him for underestimating its significance before 
proceeding with his exposition.  This response could well serve as a warning to any 
exegetist working on this series.
The sutta continues with the Buddha giving an outline of the series, first in the manner of 
a catechism, and then in the standard version which is used in the first sutta of the 
Nidàna-saüyutta, quoted above.  There is, however, an important difference:  three of 
the twelve terms of the Nidàna-saüyutta sequence are missing.  They are avijjà, 
saïkhàra and saëàyatana.  These “omissions” do not, however, affect the place of the 
term vedanà in the sequence; the terms preceding and following vedanà remain the 
same.  As in the first sutta of the Nidàna-saüyutta, the first two presentations of the 
pañicca-samuppàda series in this sutta do not lay emphasis on any particular term or 
terms of the series.  All are presented in a uniform, undifferentiated manner.
The sutta continues with a third presentation of the pañicca-samuppàda series in a third 
format.  And on this occasion a strong emphasis is given to the vedanà link.  This third 
presentation proceeds by giving a short explanation of each term in the series.  The usual 
progression of terms is followed, beginning with jàti, up until vedanà.  From vedanà, 
however, the description of the causal sequence turns back on itself to again describe the 
9  T.W. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, vol.ii, London, Pali Text Society, 1977, p.42.
41
relationship between taõhà and vedanà.  This now leads into a new sequence of 
causation.  In the standard pañicca-samuppàda series, the existence of upàdàna is 
dependent on taõhà.  Instead, in this passage, the next phrase is “taõhaü pañicca 
pariyesanà” (“craving conditions seeking”), which in turn gives rise to the following 
series:
seeking conditions acquisition, acquisition conditions decision-making, decision-
making conditions lustful desire, lustful desire conditions attachment, attachment 
conditions appropriation, appropriation conditions avarice, avarice conditions 
guarding of possessions, and because of guarding of possessions there arise the 
taking up of stick and sword, quarrels, disputes, arguments, strife, abuse, lying 
and other evil unskilled states.10
The text then continues with a reiteration of the new series in reverse order, in an 
expanded formula which emphasizes the dependence of each element of the series upon 
the preceding element.  Finally we come back to the term taõhà.  And at this point a 
statement is made concerning the importance of the role of vedanà in the scheme of these 
sequences.  In Pali it reads as follows:
Iti kho ânanda ime dve dhammà dvayena vedanàya eka-samosaraõà bhavanti.11
This phrase has presented some difficulties for translators over the years.  T.W. Rhys 
Davids felt the need to include a few words in square brackets in his translation, in an 
attempt to make the meaning more clear.
“So, now, ânanda, these two aspects [of craving] from being dual become united 
through the sensation [which conditions them].12
Bhikkhu Bodhi, in his 1985 translation, offers a slightly different emphasis: 
10 pariyesanaü pañicca làbho, làbhaü pañicca vinicchayo, vinicchayaü pañicca chanda-ràgo, chanda-
ràgaü pañicca ajjhosànaü, ajjhosànaü pañicca pariggaho, pariggahaü pañicca macchariyaü, 
macchariyaü pañicca àrakkho, àrakkhàdhikaraõaü daõóàdàna-satthàdàna-kalaha-viggaha-vivàda-
tuvaütuva-pesu¤¤a-musàvàdà aneke pàpakà akusalà dhammà sambhavanti.  DN II 58-59
11  DN II 61
12 T.W. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, London, Pali Text Society, 1977, vol. ii, p.52.
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Therefore, ânanda, these two phenomena, being a duality, converge into a unity 
in feeling.13
The phrase “vedanàya eka-samosaraõà” puts strong emphasis on the term vedanà.  The 
term samosaraõa is a rather uncommon one.  The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English 
Dictionary notes that it means “coming together, meeting, union, junction”.  A.K. 
Warder, in his Introduction to Pali, recommends that in order to elucidate key terms, the 
student should work  “if possible from concrete everyday language... to the less obvious 
dialogues of the philosophers.”14  In a Saüyuttanikàya sutta we find a passage where this 
term is used in just such an everyday context.  
Just as, brethren, in a peaked house all rafters whatsoever go together to the peak, 
slope to the peak, join [samosaraõa] in the peak, and of them all the peak holds 
chief place.15
This vivid image gives an impression of the emphasis being placed on the term vedanà. 
Vedanà links the two sequences which are the subject of this section of the sutta.  By 
viewing the two sequences side by side (fig. 1), we can see that both taõhà and vedanà, 
amongst other terms, are common to them.  And yet the above statement identifies 
vedanà as the point where the two come together.  This pointed emphasis on vedanà will 
be more fully appreciated when we come to look at suttas which explore this junction in 
more detail.  The current text, at this point, returns to its exposition of the standard 
pañicca-samuppàda series.
13 Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, The Mahànidàna Sutta and its Commentaries, 
Kandy, Buddhist Publication Society, 1984, p.12.
14 A.K. Warder, Introduction to Pali, London, Pali Text Society, 1984, p.xi.
15 Seyyathà pi bhikkhave kåñàgàrassa yà kàci gopànasiyo sabbà tà kåñaïgamà kåñaninnà kåñasamosaraõà 
kåtaü tàsam aggam akkhàyati. SN III 156.
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Fig. 1
Mahànidànasutta:
1st sequence 2nd sequence
consciousness (vi¤¤àõa) consciousness (vi¤¤àõa)
name-and-form (nàma-råpa) name-and-form (nàma-råpa)
contact (phassa) contact (phassa)
vedanà vedanà
craving (taõhà) craving (taõhà)
grasping (upàdàna) seeking (pariyesanà)
becoming (bhava) acquisition (làbha)
birth (jàti) decision-making (vinicchaya)
old-age and death, etc. (jarà-maraõaü…) lustful desire (chanda-ràgo)
attachment (ajjhosàna)
appropriation (pariggaha)
avarice (macchariya)
guarding of possessions (àrakkha)
taking up of stick and sword, etc. 
(daõóàdàna-satthàdàna …)
Following this exposition, the remainder of the sutta is not directly concerned with the 
pañicca-samuppàda, but one term from the series is given some further attention in a 
long passage which discusses various “soul theories”;  this is our term vedanà. This part 
of the sutta has been examined in detail in the first chapter of this thesis.
The Brahmajàlasutta
The Dãghanikàya is counted as the first book amongst the collections of suttas of the Pali 
canon.  Its first sutta, the  Brahmajàlasutta, lays strong emphasis on vedanà and discusses 
it in relation to the pañicca-samuppàda.  The main body of the sutta is an exposition of 
sixty-two of the views or philosophies (diññhis) which were prevelant in the Buddha’s 
day, and their relationship to the Buddha’s realization.  Following this detailed 
exposition, which occupies some twenty-six pages in the Pali Text Society edition,16 is a 
16  DN I 13-38.
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section which the editors of that edition have headed as the “Summary”17.  Each of the 
sixty-two views are here stated three times, grouped in their various categories (or rather 
the holders of these views are listed as proclaiming their views), qualified in a different 
way each time.  Finally, all of these view-holders are listed in relation to the pañicca-
samuppàda, which is here stated for the first time, in a shortened version.  Thus, the 
sixty-two diññhã are presented in five “rounds”: firstly with their particulars detailed, and 
then three times in the “summary” and finally with reference to the pañicca-samuppàda. 
The first four rounds, in fact, bring us closer and closer to the final presentation, and 
what we see here is a kind of evolution of the pañicca-samuppàda.
The relationship of the various views to the Buddha’s realization in the first round is 
expressed in the following terms: 
This, bhikkhus, the Tathàgata understands: These viewpoints thus grasped and 
adhered to will lead to such-and-such destinations in another world. This the 
Tathàgata knows, and more, but he is not attached to that knowledge.  And being 
thus unattached he has experienced for himself perfect peace, and having 
understood as they really are the arising and passing away of vedanà, their 
attraction and danger and the escape from them, the Tathàgata is liberated 
without remainder.18
This passage appears in identical form thirteen times, as a foil to the various and 
manifold doctrines.  In the previous chapter we noted the important role that vedanà 
plays in this passage.
The repeated passage of the second round presents some problems of translation and 
interpretation (Maurice Walshe comments that the difficulty of translating Pali is 
sometimes considerable, “even when one thinks one knows the meaning!”19):
17  DN I 39-45.
18 Tayidaü bhikkhave Tathàgato pajànàti: “Ime diññhiññhànà evaü-gahità evaü-paràmaññhà evaü-gatikà 
bhavissanti evam-abhisamparàyà ti.” Ta¤ ca Tathàgato pajànàti, tato ca uttaritaraü pajànàti, ta¤ ca 
pajànanaü na paràmasati, aparàmasato c’assa paccattaü yeva nibbuti vidità, vedanànaü samudaya¤ ca 
atthagama¤ ca assàda¤ ca àdãnava¤ ca nissaraõa¤ ca yathà-bhåtaü viditvà anupàdà vimutto, bhikkhave, 
Tathàgato.  DN I 16-17.
19  Ibid., p. 534.
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Tatra, bhikkhave, ye te samaõa-bràhmaõà sassata-vàdà sassataü attàna¤ ca 
loka¤ ca pa¤¤àpenti catuhi vatthåhi, tad api tesaü bhavataü samaõa-
bràhmaõànaü ajànataü apassataü vedayitaü taõhà-gatànaü paritasita-
vippanditam eva.20
This passage is repeated thirteen times, each time in relation to a different group of 
samaõa-bràhmaõas and their respective diññhis.
T.W. Rhys Davids and Walshe offer slightly different interpretations through their 
translations. Rhys Davids, whose translation of the Dãghanikàya was the work of a 
pioneer, proposes the following:
Of these, brethren, those recluses and Brahmans who are Eternalists, who in four 
ways maintain that the soul and the world are eternal... that opinion of theirs is 
based only on the personal sensations, on the worry and writhing consequent 
thereon, of those venerable recluses and Brahmans, who know not, neither 
perceive, and are subject to all kinds of craving.21
Walshe gives:
Thus, monks, when those ascetics and Brahmins who are Eternalists proclaim the 
eternity of the self and the world in four ways, that is merely the feeling of those 
who do not know and see, the worry and vacillation of those immersed in 
craving.22
The key word in the current context is vedayitaü, and the key issue is whether or not it 
can be equated with the term vedanà of the pañicca-samuppàda.  Its role in the sentence 
also needs to be considered, and through this consideration I find myself at variance with 
both of the above renderings.  The PED gives vedayita as the past participle of the verb 
vedeti, which is explained in a separate entry as having a twofold meaning:  
20 DN I 39
21 Dialogues of the Buddha, volume I, The Pali Text Society, London, 1977, pp. 52-53.
22 Op. cit., p. 87.
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either intellectually “to know” (cp. veda), or with reference to general feeling “to 
experience” (cp. vedanà).  For the present tense two bases are to be distinguished, 
viz. ved, used in both meanings; and vediy … used only in meaning of 
“experience”.23  
Vedayita is closely related to the second form, and thus to the second part of the twofold 
meaning, which this dictionary compares to the pañicca-samuppàda term vedanà.
Childers’ Dictionary of the Pali Language,24 an older work but one still held in high 
repute (first published in 1875; “old but still important”, comments Warder25) approaches 
this term from a different angle, but reaches a similar conclusion.  Under the definition of 
vidati, which is given as “to know, to ascertain”, we read that “there is a curious form 
“vediyati”, often contracted to vedeti, which is used in the sense “to feel, experience”.” 
And further on:  “from “vediyati” we have the participle of the perfect passive, neut. 
“vedayitaü”, sensation, feeling.”  The PED gives in its entry for “vedayita” only its 
meaning as an adjective, but here we find it as a noun.  In Pali, as Warder has pointed 
out, “the distinction between “substantives” and “adjectives” is not absolute, a good 
many words being used in both functions”.26  He gives vedayita as a neuter noun 
meaning “sensation, experience” in the vocabulary of this book.  
It is as a noun that we can find similarity between this word and the vedanà link of the 
pañicca-samuppàda.  Rhys Davids, one of the editors of the PED, gives in his translation 
of the passage under examination, the adjectival meaning of vedayitaü, which he renders 
as “based... on the personal sensations”.  Walshe has it as the noun, which seems to be 
clearer in the context of the sentence:  surely it relates directly, as an accusative  noun, to 
the preceding nouns in the genitive.  These samaõa-bràhmaõas are being described as 
“ajànataü apassataü” (not knowing, not seeing) of “vedayitaü”, in contrast to the 
Tathàgata who has properly understood (“yathàbhåtaü viditvà”) the characteristics of 
vedanà, as described in the previous round.  
23 T.W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, (editors), The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary, The 
Pali Text Society, London, 1986, p.648.
24 Robert Caesar Childers, A Dictionary of the Pali Language, Kegan Paul and Co., London, 1974.
25 Introduction to Pali, p.383.
26 Ibid., p.62.
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The final nominative in this sentence is the compound “paritasita-vipphanditaü” (Rhy 
David’s “worry and writhing”), and this relates to the immediately preceding compound 
noun in the genitive (“taõhà-gatànaü”).  This genitive is an attribute of the genitive 
“samaõa-bràhmaõànaü” found earlier in the sentence.  As a rule attributes immediately 
follow the word to which they relate, but here we find the nominative vedayitaü between 
the main group of genitive nouns and this one.  In Pali, according to Warder, “departures 
from the usual word order in prose indicates emphasis, strong emotion”.27  Thus we find 
the term taõhà (“craving”) thrown into relief, and it is this term, central to the Buddha’s 
exposition of his realization in inummerable suttas, which follows the term vedanà in the 
pañicca-samuppàda series.
Maurice Walshe’s translation of this phrase seems to be gaining more credibility as we 
proceed.  There is, however, one important aspect in which I feel it is lacking, and where 
Rhys Davids seems to come closer to what the real meaning may be.  Walshe gives equal 
weight to the two words not in the genitive in this phrase (vedayitaü and paritasita-
vipphanditaü):
“that is merely the feeling of those..., the worry and vacillation of those...”
Yet it seems that they perform quite different roles in the sentence.  Vedayitaü is 
grammatically subordinate to the two present participles which qualify samaõa-
bràhmaõnànaü, namely ajànataü apassataü. “What is felt” is what they do not know or 
see.  On the other hand, the nominative paritasita-vipphanditaü relates to the whole 
clause, with an idiomatic relationship to the nouns in the genitive.  Warder explains this 
idiom thus:
A construction with a possessive genitive is very often equivalent to an English 
construction with the verb “to have”.  (In Pali “to have” is hardly ever expressed 
by a verb but almost always by the genitive case.)... idaü assa hoti, literally “of 
him there is this”, “he has this”.28
27 A.K Warder, Introduction to Pali, London, Pali Text Society, 1984, p.43, footnote 1.
28 Ibid., p. 56.
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So the two words vedayitaü and paritasita-vipphanditaü are in a definite sequence, 
together with the intervening compound in the genitive (taõhà-gatànaü).  If we equate 
the phrase paritasita-vipphanditaü (“worry and vacillation”) with domanassa 
(“distress... mental pain... unpleasant state of mind” (PED)), which appears as one of the 
defining terms for dukkha (“suffering”) in the pañicca-samuppàda, then we have the 
kernal of the pañicca-samuppàda expressed in this round of explanation of the invalidity 
of the sixty-two diññhis.  The samaõa-bràhmaõas, not knowing, not seeing vedanà, 
involved in craving (taõhà-gatà), acquire this suffering.  What we see here then, is an 
adumbration of the significant central section of the pañicca-samuppàda:  vedanà—
craving (taõhà)—suffering (dukkha).
The third “round” is presented with a similar summarized version of the sixty-two views 
presented in groups, each of which is qualified in the same terms.  This time we find the 
phrase “tad api phassa-paccayà” at the end of each group of views, which Walshe gives 
as “that is conditioned by contact”. This is the first usage in this sutta of the term 
“paccaya” (“condition” or “cause”), the term which connects the “links” in the standard 
presentation of the pañicca-samuppàda.  Both here and in the standard version of the 
pañicca-samuppàda the term paccaya is declined in the ablative case, indicating cause, a 
usage common in philosophical statements.29
This term is compounded with the word phassa (contact).  The significance of the term 
here is its place in the pañicca-samuppàda, immediately preceding the term vedanà, 
which has been the basis of the elaborations of the first two rounds.  So we take one step 
back in the pañicca-samuppàda after the foreshadowing of the forward part of the chain 
in the preceding round.  We are witnessing a kind of working out of the pañicca-
samuppàda, an evolutionary process that we do not see in the many standard 
presentations of the pañicca-samuppàda given in the Nikàyas.
In the fourth round the wording becomes more emphatic.  This categorical statement 
follows each of the groups of diññhis which are arranged in the same way as they are in 
the previous two rounds:
29 Warder, 1984, p. 89.
49
... te vata a¤¤atra phassà pañisaüvedissantãti n’etaü ñhànaü vijjati.30
For this Walshe gives:
That all of these (Eternalists and the rest) should experience that feeling without 
contact is impossible.31
And Rhys Davids in a similar vein:
That they should experience those sensations without contact, such a condition of 
things could not be.32
Both of them capture the emphatic nature of the idiom “n’etaü ñhànaü vijjati” (“this is 
impossible”, “it is not the case”).  More significantly, both of them use a similar choice 
of words to express the verb pañisaüvedissanti.  The root of this verb (pañi-saü-vid) is 
defined by Warder as meaning “feel, experience”, and the PED uses the same words in 
its entry for pañisaüvedeti (as well as “undergo” and “perceive”). Yet both of our 
translators choose to use a verb and an object to render this verb:  “experience that 
feeling” (Walshe) and “experience those sensations” (Rhys Davids).  “Feeling” and 
“sensation” are two words that both of them commonly use to translate the Pali term 
vedanà.  This term can be construed as being related to the root vid of the verb in 
question.  Rhys Davids and Walshe have both chosen to extrapolate the noun vedanà 
from the verb pañi-saü-vid, and in doing so they have connected this passage with the 
pañicca-samuppàda, of which vedanà is one of the key terms.
Each of the successive rounds of the Brahmajàlasutta moves closer and closer to the final 
form of the pañicca-samuppàda.  The emphatic 
... te vata a¤¤atra phassà pañisaüvedissantãti n’etaü ñhànaü vijjati
30 DN I 43.
31 Op. cit., p. 89.
32 Op. cit., p. 53.
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of this round can be read in this light as adumbrating the phassa-paccayà vedanà link of 
the pañicca-samuppàda  Moreover, this phrase implies that there can be no vedanà 
without phassa.  This looks forward to the further elaboration of the pañicca-samuppàda, 
not found in this sutta, in which it is stated that
phassa-nirodhà vedanà-nirodho.33
That is “with the cessation of contact, sensations cease”.
The fifth and final round is much shorter than any of the preceding ones.  All of the 
theorisers are listed in one sentence which ends with the following phrase in Walshe’s 
translation:
…they experience these feelings (pañisaüvedenti) by repeated contact through 
the six sense-bases; feeling conditions craving; craving conditions clinging; 
clinging conditions becoming; becoming conditions birth; birth conditions ageing 
and death, sorrow, lamentation, sadness and distress.34
Rhys Davids and Walshe again translate pañisaüvedenti with verb and object.  Walshe 
continues with his “experience these feelings”. They are somewhat vindicated by the 
phrase which immediately follows this verb (“tesaü vedanà-paccayà taõhà”), which 
Rhys Davids translates in an accurate, literal manner, which reads however rather 
clumsily:  “To them on account of the sensations arises craving …”  The verb pañi-saü-
vid is thus directly linked with the term vedanà, of which the word “sensations” is a 
translation.  And from there the rest of the pañicca-samuppàda unfolds, as found 
verbatim in many other passages of the Pali canon.
The phrase preceding the term pañisaüvedenti is also of much interest in our study of the 
evolution of the pañicca-samuppàda in this sutta:
... chahi phassàyatanehi phussa phussa pañisaüvedenti...
33 Found, amongst many other places, at DN II 35.
34  ... sabbe te chahi phassàyatanehi phussa phussa pañisaüvedenti, tesaü vedanà-paccayà taõhà, taõhà-
paccayà upàdànaü, upàdàna-paccayà bhavo, bhava-paccayà jàti-paccayà jarà-maraõaü soka-parideva-
dukkha-domanass’upàyàsà sambhavanti.  DN I 45.
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It is the compound phassàyatanà which commands our attention.  The phassa is the 
same “contact” which played such an important role in the previous two rounds. 
âyatana is a new term for this sutta and is found immediately preceding phassa in the 
standard setting of the pañicca-samuppàda as saëàyatana.  Saë is a variant form of the 
word cha, which we find here in the Brahmajàlasutta in the instrumental case, meaning 
“six”.  The word àyatana literally means “sphere” or “region”, and the six àyatana refer 
to the six spheres of perception, that is the five physical senses and the mind, and their 
corresponding objects: eye and visual objects; ear and sound; nose and odour; tongue and 
taste; body and touch; and mind and objects of the mind, that is thoughts of all kind.  The 
compound is related to the verb pañisaüvedenti by the use of an instrumental case ending 
(phassàyatanehi).  Thus we see foreshadowing of the section of the pañicca-samuppàda 
which precedes the term vedanà:  saëàyatana—phassa—vedanà.
We see in this passage an exposition of the pañicca-samuppàda in a manner quite unlike 
the standard formula which we find in so many suttas35.  The usual setting is to indicate 
avijjà (ignorance) as the base of the “this entire mass of suffering” (etassa kevalassa 
dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo), and then upwards through saïkhàra, vi¤¤àõaü, nàma-
råpa, saëàyatana, phassa, vedanà, and from there onwards as we find it in this passage of 
the Brahmajàlasutta.  Instead we find that the furthest back that the workings of 
dependent origination are expounded is some kind of combination of phassa and 
saëàyatana.  The effect of this is to highlight the vedanà link of the pañicca-samuppàda: 
“phussa phussa pañisaüvedenti”, repeatedly or continuously experiencing vedanà, which 
results in taõhà (craving) and ultimately in dukkha. This emphasis on vedanà in the last 
round harks back to the first round, in which the Buddha’s enlightenment is described in 
terms of his understanding of the characteristics of vedanà.  
The entire sutta is a kind of lead-up to this “first, partial, exposition of dependent 
origination (pañicca-samuppàda) in the Canon”36, in which we see various elements of it 
in embryonic form.  And, as we have seen, a great deal of emphasis is given to vedanà 
and to terms related to it (vedayita and pañisaüvedeti) in the description of this process.  
35 For example, in the first fifteen sutta of the second volume of the Samyutta-nikaya.
36 Walshe, op. cit., p. 543, note 88.
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The Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta
The pañicca-samuppàda forms the subject matter of a number of suttas of the 
Majjhimanikàya.  One of the most interesting of these is the well-known 
Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta (the Great Discourse on the Destruction of Craving).  In the 
first portions of the sutta, we find several statements of the standard, twelve-member 
pañicca-samuppàda formula, in which each link is presented in an undifferentiated 
manner, no one member being emphasised more than another.  The later part of the sutta, 
which places great emphasis on the term vedanà in its description of a soteriological 
practice, has been examined in the first chapter of this thesis.  The following passage is 
the point at which the description of a certain way of reacting to vedanà leads into the 
cycle of suffering that is the pañicca-samuppàda:
…whatever vedanà he feels--pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant--
he delights in that sensation, welcomes it and persists in cleaving to it.  …  From 
delighting in that vedanà, from welcoming it, from persisting in cleaving to it, 
delight (nandã) arises; whatever is delight amid those vedanà, that is grasping; 
conditioned by grasping is becoming; conditioned by becoming is birth; 
conditioned by birth, old age and dying, grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and 
despair come into being.  Such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering.37
The terminology is exactly the same as that used in the standard exposition of the 
pañicca-samuppàda, except that in place of “craving” (taõhà) we here find the term 
nandã, “joy, enjoyment, pleasure, delight” (PED).
The statement of the contrary state of affairs, when “mindfulness of the body” (kàya-
sati) is in place (upaññhita), places similar emphasis on vedanà.  The person described no 
longer delights in vedanà38; the delight (nandã) in vedanà ceases:
37  yam ka¤ci vedanaü vedeti, sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và, so taü vedanaü abhinandati  
abhivadati ajjhosàya tiññhati  … Tassa taü vedanaü abhinandato abhivadato ajjhosàya tiññhato uppajjati  
nandã, yà vedanàsu nandã tad-upàdànam, tass’upàdànapaccayà bhavo, bhavapaccayà jàti, jàtipaccayà 
jaràmaranam sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupàyàsà sambhavanti, evam-etassa kevalassa 
dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti. MN I 266-7
38 so taü vedanaü nàbhinandati  MN I 270
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yà vedanàsu nandã sà nirujjhati...39
And from this point the reverse sequence of the pañicca-samuppàda is given, ending with 
the usual formula “Thus this entire mass of suffering ceases.”40
The centrality of vedanà to this process has been commented upon by Bhikkhu Bodhi. 
At the phrase “he does not delight in that vedanà,”41 he notes in his translation, that 
“[t]his statement reveals that the chain of dependent origination is broken at the link 
between feeling and craving.  …  if one does not delight in feeling, craving will not have 
the opportunity to arise and set off reactions of like and dislike that provide further fuel 
for the round, and thus the round will come to an end.”42
The point of departure for the Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta is the opinion of a certain 
bhikkhu named Sàti on the nature of vi¤¤àõa (“consciousness”) and the Buddha’s 
rebuttal of this opinion.  David Kalupahana has summarized this part of the sutta in the 
following manner:
This discourse contains the famous “Sàti’s heresy”, namely, the assumption that, 
to explain the possible continuity of human life after death, there ought to be a 
mysterious psychic agent that remains unchanged.  The Buddha’s application of 
the principle of dependent arising (pañicca-samuppàda) to account for any form 
of continuity is highlighted.43
The Buddha states that vi¤¤àõa is “generated by conditions” (pañiccasamuppanna).  He 
further indicates that there are six types of vi¤¤àõa, each of which is conditioned by one 
of the six senses (manas, the mind, is counted as one of these) and the object with which 
it comes in contact.  Thus for visual consciousness:
39 MN I 270
40 evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hoti.  MN I 270
41 so taü vedanaü nàbhinandati  MN I 270
42 MLDB, pp.1232-3, note 414
43  David J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy, continuities and discontinuities, Honolulu, 
University of Hawaii Press, 1992, p.272.
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If consciousness arises because of the eye and material shapes, it is known as 
visual consciousness.44
The Nidàna-saüyutta, sutta 43, SN II 72
The first part of this account of the nature of the different kinds of vi¤¤àõa plays an 
important role in a number of suttas which deal with parts of the pañicca-samuppàda and 
in which vedanà is highlighted as an important link in the causal sequence.  The 43rd 
sutta of the Nidàna-saüyutta displays this sequence in its most basic form.  First comes 
the description of consciousness that we encountered in the Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta:
Visual consciousness arises because of eye and material shapes...45
The union of these three is described as “contact” (phassa).46  In the standard formulation 
of the pañicca-samuppàda, “contact” leads to vedanà.  Here also we find the usual phrase 
describing this connection:
from the condition of contact is vedanà.47
After this comes a statement of the next link, with the usual phrasing:
from the condition of vedanà is craving.48
Here, though, the sequence is broken off.  Instead of the four terms which usually follow 
“craving” (taõhà) (upàdàna, etc.) the passage ends abruptly with a short concluding 
phrase:
This, bhikkhus, is the arising of suffering.49
44 Cakkhu¤-ca pañicca råpe ca uppajjati vi¤¤àõaü, cakkhuvi¤¤àõan-t’eva saïkhaü gacchati.  MN I 259
45 Cakkhuü ca pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü  SN II 72
46 tiõõaü saïgati phasso  SN II 72
47 phassapaccayà vedanà
48 vedanàpaccayà taõhà.
49 Ayaü kho bhikkhave dukkhassa samudayo. SN II 72
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The same sequence is then repeated for the five remaining sense faculties.
This brief description of the arising of suffering (dukkha) is of great significance in 
understanding the place of vedanà in the scheme of things in these texts.  The arising of 
dukkha is equated here with the central crux of the pañicca-samuppàda.  The pañicca-
samuppàda is in fact reduced to three elements:  phassa, vedanà, and taõhà.  The arising 
of the first of these comes about in an involuntary manner.  The meeting of eye, material 
shape and visual consciousness is a mechanical process over which the individual does 
not have any control.  To appreciate the full significance of the remaing two elements, 
we have to turn to the second section of the sutta, in which the Buddha teaches, as he 
announces in the first lines of the sutta, the disappearance (atthaïgama) of dukkha.
The “atthaïgama” section begins in an identical manner to the first section on the arising 
(samudaya) of dukkha.  After the phrase “from the condition of vedanà is craving” 
(vedanàpaccayà taõhà), however, we find the following:
From the complete cessation of craving comes the cessation of grasping...50
This leads into the so-called pañiloma (reverse order) statement of the remainder of the 
pañicca-samuppàda, in which the cessation (nirodha) of one member of the sequence is 
said to be the cause for the cessation of the next.  This culminates in the cessation of 
dukkha, its disappearance (atthaïgamo).  The turning point is thus taõhà, which is 
dependent on vedanà.  This re-formulation of the pañicca-samuppàda, to include 
elements from the usual anuloma (“forward order”) exposition as well as the pañiloma 
exposition in one sequence, is quite striking.  A phrase very similar to that which usually 
begins the pañiloma version--Avijjàya tveva asesaviràganirodhà (“from the complete 
cessation of ignorance...” )--is here found in the middle of the causal sequence, with the 
word “craving” (taõhà) substituted for “ignorance” (avijjà).  So the process which is 
described as leading to suffering in the first half of the sutta does not necessarily lead to 
suffering, for the same process also begins the sequence found in the second half.  The 
key to the stopping of one process and the starting of the other must therefore be found 
amongst those terms which constitute the “turning point”:
50 Tassàyeva taõhàya asesaviràganirodhà upàdànanirodho... SN II 72
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from the condition of vedanà is craving;  from the complete cessation of craving 
comes …51
We will look again at this Nidànasaüyutta sutta in the next section of this chapter, which 
takes as its point of depature two causal sequences described in the Chachakkasutta of 
the Majjhimanikàya.
The Chachakkasutta.
Throughout the Nikàyas we find the pañicca-samuppàda presented as a kind of list, in 
which no one member is given any more emphasis than any other.  There are, however, 
many suttas where some members of this sequence appear in contexts which highlight 
certain features of the sequence.  The Chachakkasutta of the Majjhimanikàya is one such 
sutta.  We have already noticed in the previous chapter that this sutta gives emphasis to 
vedanà in a description of a soteriological process.  There are two features which 
indicate that this sutta is to be regarded as especially important.  The Buddha is 
represented as speaking the following phrase in the opening lines:
Bhikkhus, I shall teach you the Dhamma that is good in the beginning, good in 
the middle, and good in the end, with the right meaning and phrasing;  I shall 
reveal a holy life that is utterly perfect and pure, that is, the six sets of six.52
The description of the Dhamma (the Buddha’s teaching) and the “holy life” 
(brahmacariya) that occurs in this passage is found in many places in the suttas.  It is, 
however, only here that it introduces one of the Buddha’s discourses.  Here it is, in fact, 
identified with the discourse.  
The closing lines of this sutta also indicate that it is of special importance.  It is related 
there that while this discourse was being spoken, the minds of sixty bhikkhus became 
51 vedanàpaccayà taõhà; tassàyeva taõhàya asesaviràganirodhà... SN II 72
52 Dhammaü vo, bhikkhave, desissàmi àdikalyàõaü majjhe kalyàõaü, pariyosànaü kalyàõaü sàtthaü 
sabya¤janaü kevalaparipuõõaü parisuddhaü brahmacariyaü pakàsessàmi, yadidaü cha chakkàni.  MN 
III 280
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liberated from the àsavas (defilements).53  There are only a few other suttas in the 
Nikàyas which end with formulas which are similar to this.  Amongst them are those 
suttas which are considered by the tradition to be the second and third discourses of the 
Buddha.54
There are two important passages in the Chachakkasutta which are related to the place of 
vedanà in the pañicca-samuppàda and which recur in many other suttas in the Nikàyas. 
The first of these includes three of the elements which occur sequentially in the middle 
part of the pañicca-samuppàda.  They are contact (phassa), vedanà, and craving (taõhà). 
The following  passage introduces this section of the discourse:
The six internal bases should be understood.  The six external bases should be 
understood.  The six classes of consciousness should be understood.  The six 
classes of contact should be understood.  The six classes of vedanà should be 
understood.  The six classes of craving should be understood.55
These six groups of six, the chachakka of the title of the sutta, are then explained in more 
detail.  The six internal bases are explained as the five senses and the mind. The six 
external bases are the objects of these senses, that is, forms, sounds, odours, etc., and 
objects of the mind.  The six types of consciousness are those that arise when each of the 
senses comes in contact with its respective external object, and when the mind comes in 
contact with a thought.  Each of these types of consciousness is said to be dependent 
(pañicca) upon the sense organ and its object.  The six types of contact are said to be the 
meeting (saügati) of each of the sense organs, their respective object, and the resultant 
consciousness.  From each of these six types of contact result the six types of vedanà. 
And from each of these six types of vedanà comes the six types of craving.  When this 
“sixth six” is described, we have the whole sequence:
53 imasmiü kho pana veyyàkaraõasmiü bha¤¤amàne saññhimattànaü bhikkhånaü anupàdàya àsavehi  
cittàni vimucciüsu  MN III 287
54 SN III 68 and SN IV 20
55 Cha ajjhattikàni àyatanàni veditabbàni, cha bàhiràni àyatanàni veditabbàni, cha vi¤¤àõakàyà 
veditabbà, cha phassakàyà veditabbà, cha vedanàkàyà veditabbà, cha taõhàkàyà veditabbà.  MN III 280
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Dependent on eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises;  the meeting of the three 
is contact;  with contact as condition there is vedanà;  with vedanà as condition 
there is craving.56
This passage is repeated for each of the remaining four senses and their objects, and for 
the mind and mental objects.  It is clear that this passage focuses on the central portion of 
the pañicca-samuppàda;  the position of vedanà, immediately preceding craving, is thus 
highlighed.
This passage appears imbedded in three suttas of the Nidànasaüyutta, and these same 
three suttas are found again, repeated without any change, in the Saëàyatanasaüyutta. 
Before we examine these suttas in detail, let us note that the fact that they appear in the 
Nidànasaüyutta makes it clear that this passage is related to the pañicca-samuppàda 
sequence, for the Nidànasaüyutta is made up of suttas which have as their subject the 
pañicca-samuppàda.
Suttas 43, 44 and 45 of the Nidànasaüyutta57 are the same, respectively, as suttas 106, 
107 and 113 of the Saëàyatanasaüyutta,58 and all of them contain the causal sequence 
found in the Chachakkasutta which is quoted above.  The first sutta in each group has the 
title “Suffering” (Dukkha), and in it the Chachakkasutta sequence, repeated for each of 
the five sense doors and for the mind, is followed by the brief phrase “This, bhikkhus, is 
the arising of suffering.”59  The first noble truth is, of course, expressed by the single 
word dukkha (“suffering”), and it is the escape from this suffering which is the goal of 
the Buddha’s teaching.  Understanding the nature of suffering is essential for this task, so 
the description found in this sutta, in only a few words, of the human predicament, is of 
great interest.  The process which we first saw described in the Chachakkasutta is here 
thrown into sharp relief, and within this process, vedanà plays a key role.
The second half of the sutta describes the “disappearance of suffering” (dukkhassa 
atthagamo).  In this section the sequence as quoted above from the Chachakkasutta is 
56 Cakkhu¤ ca pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü, tiõõaü saügati phasso, phassapaccayà vedanà, 
vedanàpaccayà taõhà.  MN III 282
57 SN II 71-75
58 SN IV 86-88, 90-91
59 Ayaü kho bhikkhave dukkhassa samudayo, SN II72 = SN IV 86
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again found, but after the term “craving” (taõhà), it is stated that there is the cessation 
(nirodha) of craving, and this leads into a statement of the cessation version of the 
pañicca-samuppàda (as found at SN II 1-2 and at many other places in the Nikàyas), 
from the term taõhà onwards.
The second sutta in this group of three, in both the Nidànasaüyutta and the 
Saëàyatanasaüyutta, is called “the World” (Loka), and it begins with a statement by the 
Buddha that he will teach the arising (samudaya) and the disappearance (atthagama) of 
the world.  The first part of the sutta, which describes the arising of the world, begins 
with the passage quoted above from the Chachakkasutta, but after the term “craving” 
(taõhà), it proceeds to the phrase “with craving as condition there is clinging” 
(taõhàpaccayà upàdànaü) and follows on with the remainder of the pañicca-samuppàda 
in its usual form.  The second half of the sutta is identical to the second half of the 
previous sutta.  We thus find here a more thorough combination of the sequence from the 
Chachakkasutta and the pañicca-samuppàda.
In the Nidànasaüyutta, the third sutta in this group follows on immediately from the 
previous two, but in the Saëàyatanasaüyutta four other suttas intervene between the 
second and the third suttas of this group.  The two suttas also have different titles in the 
different collections:  in the Nidànasaüyutta it is called, after the name of the place 
where it was delivered, ¥àtika;  in the Saëàyatanasaüyutta it is called “Listening” 
(upassuti), for reasons which will become clear.  Otherwise, these two suttas are 
identical.  The central part of these suttas is identical to the second sutta of each group, 
“The World”.  It is only the “frame” which is different.  A short narrative is added at the 
end of the sutta60, in which it is said that a certain bhikkhu was standing nearby listening 
to this sutta.  The Buddha notices him, and asks him if he heard this discourse on the 
Dhamma (dhammapariyàya).  When he answers in the affirmative, the Buddha tells him 
that he should memorize, master, and bear in mind the discourse.  He tells him that it is 
connected with his welfare (atthasaühito), and related to the fundamentals of leading a 
good life (àdibrahmacariyako).  Similar words of emphasis occur after only three other 
suttas in the Nikàyas.61  We thus find the combination of the sequence from the 
Chachakkasutta and the pañicca-samuppàda highlighted here in a significant manner.
60 SN II 75 = SN IV 91
61 MN III 192, 200 and AN IV 166
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We find, thus, the short sequence from the Chachakkasutta, which features the term 
vedanà in a central position, emphasised in various ways.  Firstly there is the repetition 
of these suttas in which it appears.  It is common to find material from one Nikàya 
repeated in another.62  As far as I can tell, however, the repetition of entire suttas in 
different books within one Nikàya is rare.  This is what we find here, with the same 
suttas found in two places within the Saüyuttanikàya.  And secondly, the 
Chachakkasutta passage is emphasised in the third sutta in these groups by the framing 
story.
The first Chachakkasutta sequence and the Saëàyatanasaüyutta
There are two suttas in the Saëàyatanasaüyutta which feature the sequence from the 
Chachakkasutta in a version which stops short at the term vedanà:
Dependent on eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises;  the meeting of the three 
is contact;  with contact as condition there is vedanà.63
The first of these two suttas is introduced by the phrase “I will show you, bhikkhus, a 
teaching for the comprehension of all attachment,”64 and the second, in a similar vein, by 
the phrase “I will show you, bhikkhus, a teaching for the exhausting of all attachment.”65 
Even though the sequence has been abbreviated, vedanà keeps its place in these suttas 
which teach the comprehension and exhausting of all attachment. 
The second Chachakkasutta sequence
As mentioned above, the Chachakkasutta of the Majjhimanikàya contains two elements 
which are related to the place of vedanà in the pañicca-samuppàda, and which are found 
repeated, sometimes in slightly different guises, in many other places in the Nikàyas. 
We now move on to the second of these, which is closely related to the first.  As with the 
62 As noted by K.R. Norman in Pali Literature, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1983, p.50 and p.55.
63 Cakkhu¤ ca pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü, tiõõaü saügati phasso, phassapaccayà vedanà. 
SN IV 32-33.
64 Sabbupàdànapari¤¤àya vo bhikkhave dhammaü desissàmi  SN IV 32
65 Sabbupàdànapariyàdànàya vo bhikkhave dhammaü desissàmi  SN IV 33
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first passage, this one is repeated for each of the five sense doors and their objects, and 
for the mind and mental objects:
Bhikkhus, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises;  the 
meeting of the three is contact;  with contact as condition there arises [a feeling] 
felt (vedayitaü) as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant.66
In this passage it is not vedanà which exists with contact as its cause, as in the first 
passage; instead it is vedayita, be it pleasant, painful or neutral, which arises (uppajjati). 
As we have seen in the first part of this chapter, the term vedayita is closely related to 
vedanà:  its sense is usually “what is felt or experienced”, or simply “feeling, 
experience”.
This passage leads into a passage which shows two ways of responding to vedanà which 
is pleasant, unpleasant or neither pleasant nor unpleasant.  The first does not allow an 
end to be made of suffering;  the second, which we examined in the previous chapter, 
does allow the process of liberation to take place.  So here we see the term vedayita 
taken up by the term vedanà.
The second Chachakkasutta sequence and the Mahàsaëàyatanikasutta, MN 149
This second sequence from the Chachakkasutta is also found in the sutta which follows 
on from it in the Majjhimanikàya, the Mahàsaëàyatanasutta.  It appears, though, in a 
somewhat different shape:
Bhikkhus, when one does not know and see the eye as it actually is, when one 
does not know and see forms as they actually are, when one does not know and 
see eye-consciousness as it actually is, when one does not know and see eye-
contact as it actually is, when one does not know and see as it actually is [the 
feeling] felt (vedayitaü) as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant that 
arises with eye-contact as condition, then one is inflamed by lust for the eye, for 
66 Cakkhu¤ ca, bhikkhave, pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü, tiõõaü saügati phasso;  
phassapaccayà uppajjati vedayitaü sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và.  MN III 285
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forms, for eye-consciousness, for eye-contact, for [the feeling] felt as pleasant or 
painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant that arises with eye-contact as condition.67
Here the items in the sequence are presented in the form of a list, rather than in a 
sentence which details the causal connections between the various items.  It is not said, 
for instance, that eye-consciousness is dependent upon (pañicca) the eye and forms;  nor 
is it said that contact (phassa) is the meeting (saügati) of the eye, forms and eye-
consciousness.  There is, however, one aspect of the causal nature of this sequence as 
presented in the Chachakkasutta which is retained, even in the list-like setting of this 
sutta:  that is the connection between “contact” and vedayita.  Instead of finding simply 
“that which is felt as pleasant, painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant” after “contact”, 
we find the following phrase:
... [the feeling] felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant that 
arises with eye-contact as condition ...68
After the passage from the Mahàsaëàyatanasutta quoted above comes a phrase which 
indicates that for the person who is in the state of being inflamed by lust for eye, forms, 
etc., craving increases (taõhà ... pavaóóhati).  Thus, if we take vedayita as equivalent to 
vedanà, we have here a restatement of the central section of the pañicca-samuppàda in 
which vedanà plays an important role, that is, “conditioned by contact is vedanà; 
conditioned by vedanà is craving” (phassapaccayà vedanà, vedanàpaccayà taõhà).
This passage is repeated for the remaining sense doors and their respective objects, and 
for the mind and mental objects, and is then followed by a reverse statement of each of 
these, that is, when one knows and sees eye, forms, etc., then one is not inflamed with 
passion for them, and consequently craving is given up (taõhà .. pahãyati).
The second Chachakkasutta sequence and the Saëàyatanasaüyutta
67 Cakkhuü, bhikkhave, ajànaü apassaü yathàbhåtaü, råpe ajànaü apassaü yathàbhåtaü, 
cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü ajànaü apassaü yathàbhåtaü, cakkhusamphassaü ajànaü apassaü yathàbhåtaü, yam 
p’ idaü cakkhusamphassapaccayà uppajjati vedayitaü sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và, tam 
pi ajànaü apassaü yathàbhåtaü ...  cakkhusmiü sàrajjati råpesu sàrajjati  ...  MN III 287
68 idaü cakkhusamphassapaccayà uppajjati vedayitaü sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và  MN 
III 287
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This second sequence from the Chachakkasutta also plays an important role in one of the 
largest saüyuttas of the Saüyuttanikàya, the Saëàyatanasaüyutta (SN IV 1-204).  This 
saüyutta takes up about half of the fourth book of the Saüyuttanikàya, the 
Saëàyatanavagga.  The second Chachakkasutta sequence occurs in 67 of the 207 suttas of 
the Saëàyatanasaüyutta.69  One of these suttas is traditionally regarded as the Buddha’s 
third discourse.70
The second Chachakkasutta sequence is treated in a variety of ways in the 
Saëàyatanasaüyutta.  In a number of places, the sequence is combined with an exposition 
of the Nikàyas’ three characteristics of existence, that is, impermanence (anicca), 
suffering (dukkha), and not-self (anatta).  The 43rd sutta of the saüyutta, for example, 
includes the following passage, which is repeated for each of the sense doors and for the 
mind:
All, bhikkhus, is impermanent.  And what all is impermanent?  The eye, 
bhikkhus, is impermanent.  Forms are impermanent.  Eye consciousness is 
impermanent.  Eye-contact is impermanent.  That which is felt (vedayitaü) as 
pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant, which arises with eye-contact 
as condition, is impermanent.71
This sutta is then repeated with “painful” (dukkha) replacing “impermanent”, and is then 
repeated again with “not-self” (anatta).  Thus the second Chachakkasutta sequence is 
combined with some of the central themes of the Nikàyas.  Similar combinations of this 
sequence with the “three characteristics” are found in suttas 76-7872 and 146-14873 of this 
saüyutta.
Question-and-answer sequence
69 Suttas number 24-26, 28-59, 62, 76-82, 84-86, 89-91, 99-102, 146-49, 151, 159-66, and 194.
70 Number 28, also at Vin I 34
71 Sabbam bhikkhave aniccaü, ki¤ca bhikkhave sabbaü aniccaü.  Cakkhum bhikkhave aniccaü.  Råpà 
aniccà.  Cakkhuvi¤¤àõam aniccaü.  Cakkhusamphasso anicco.  Yam pidaü cakkhusamphassapaccayà 
uppajjati vedayitaü sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkham asukhaü và, tam pi aniccaü.  SN IV 28
72 SN IV 48-49
73 SN IV 33-35
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The second Chachakkasutta sequence also appears a number of times in this saüyutta in 
combination with another sequence which also plays an important role in other places in 
the Nikàyas.  This sequence, which is in a question-and-answer format, provides some 
clarification of the “three characteristics”.  The combination of these two sequences first 
appears in the 32nd sutta of this saüyutta:
“Bhikkhus, what do you think?  Is the eye permanent or impermanent?”
“Impermanent, venerable sir.”
“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”
“Suffering, venerable sir.”
Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: 
“This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?”
“No, venerable sir.”74
These questions are then put in connection with forms, eye-consciousness, eye-contact, 
and “that which is felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant, which arises 
with eye-contact as condition”75;  the answers are always the same.  All of this is then 
repeated for the remaining sense doors and their objects, and for the mind and mental 
objects.  This entire sequence is also found in suttas 62, 86, 89, and 149 of the 
Saëàyatanasaüyutta.
In this passage, vedayita (“feeling” or “experience”), which arises dependent on sense-
door-contact or mind-door-contact, plays an important role, coming as it does as the final 
member of each sequence.
The question and answer sequence in which all of this is set is also used in other contexts 
in the Nikàyas.  Most notably, it figures in analyses of the five aggregates 
(pa¤cakkhandha), which, in these texts, are said to constitute a human being, namely, 
74 Taü kim ma¤¤atha bhikkhave cakkhuü niccaü và aniccaü và ti.
Aniccaü bhante.
Yam panàniccaü dukkhaü và taü sukhaü và ti.
Dukkhaü bhante.
Yam panàniccaü dukkhaü vipariõàmadhammaü kallaü nu taü samanupassituü  Etam mama eso ham 
asmi eso me attà ti.
No hetam bhante.  SN IV 24-25
75 yam pidaü cakkhusamphassapaccayà uppajjati vedayitaü sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkham asukhaü 
và.  SN IV 25
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body (råpa), vedanà, perception (sa¤¤à), saïkhàras, and consciousness (vi¤¤àõa).  The 
opening section of the Mahàvagga of the Vinaya is a long narrative which covers the 
Buddha’s awakening, and the events which followed it;  the discourse which it records as 
the second discourse of the Buddha, sometimes called the Anattalakkhaõasutta, includes 
this question and answer sequence,76 repeated for each of the five aggregates.  This same 
passage also appears several times in the Majjhimanikàya,77 and in many suttas of the 
Saüyuttanikàya, including 22 of the 158 suttas of the Khandhasaüyutta,78 which is the 
section of the Saüyuttanikàya which treats the five aggregates.  Thus this question-and-
answer formula plays an important role in the exposition of key concepts of Nikàyas, 
amongst which we surely must include the notion of “feeling” or “experience” (vedayita) 
which arises dependent upon contact at each of the sense-door and the mind.  We can 
also note that the “vedayita” of the sequence found in the Saëàyatanasaüyutta overlaps 
with the vedanà of the five aggregates found in the same question-and-answer passages 
in the Khandhasaüyutta, as these two terms are closely related.
The Nandakovàdasutta:  a part of the second Chachakkasutta sequence and the question-
and-answer sequence combined
There is another sutta in the Majjhimanikàya, the Nandakovàdasutta, in which we find 
the first part of the second sequence from the Chachakkasutta which we have been 
discussing, in combination with the question-and-answer formula.  Thus it is established 
that the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness, as well as the other sense doors and the mind, 
together with their objects and the resultant consciousness, are impermanent, suffering, 
and not to be considered as “I” or “mine”.  Instead of proceeding, however, to eye-
contact and then to “that which is felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-
pleasant, which arises with eye-contact as condition”, this passage takes a different turn. 
The following view is expressed:
... would anyone be speaking rightly who spoke thus:  “These six internal bases 
are impermanent and subject to change, but the pleasant, painful, or neither-
painful-nor-pleasant [feeling] that I experience (pañisaüvedemi) in dependence 
76 Vin I 14
77 MN I 138, 282; III 19-20
78 SN III 49, 67, 88, 94, 104-5, 118, 120, 125, 138, 148, 152, 181-87
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upon (pañicca) the six internal bases is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not 
subject to change?”79
The answer is, of course, no.  The phrase “I experience” is a translation of 
pañisaüvedemi.  From the passage which follows on from this one and which explains 
the reason for the answer in the negative, it is clear that pañisaüvedemi is here being 
taken as a verbal equivalent of vedanà:
... each vedanà arises in dependence upon its corresponding condition, and with 
the cessation of its corresponding condition, the vedanà ceases.80
Thus the term vedanà in this passage takes up the phrase “I experience pleasure, etc.” of 
the previous one.  This sequence, beginning with the statement of the mistaken view of 
what one experiences, is then repeated for the six external sense bases (bàhirà àyatanà), 
that is, forms, noises, smells, etc.
The dependent nature of vedanà is strongly emphasised in the above passage.  This 
dependence is further emphasised in the two similies which accompany these passages:
Now would anyone be speaking rightly who spoke thus:  “While this oil-lamp is 
burning, its oil, wick and flame are impermanent and subject to change, but its 
glow is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change”?81
Now would anyone be speaking rightly who spoke thus:  “The root, trunk, 
branches, and foliage of this great tree standing possessed of heartwood are 
impermanent and subject to change, but its shadow is permanent, everlasting, 
eternal, not subject to change”?82
79 ... yo nu kho evaü vadeyya:  Cha kho ‘me ajjhattikà àyatanà, ya¤ ca kho cha ajjhattike àyatane pañicca 
pañisaüvedemi sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và, taü niccaü dhuvaü sassataü 
avipariõàmadhammanti, --sammà nu kho so, bhaginiyo, vadamàno vadeyyàti?  ...  MN III 273
80 Tajjaü tajjaü, bhante, paccayaü pañicca tajjà tajjà vedanà uppajjanti. Tajjassa tajjassa paccayassa 
nirodhà tajjà tajjà vedanà nirujjhanti.  MN III 273
81 yo nu kho, bhaginiyo, evaü vadeyya:  Amussa telapadãpassa jhàyato telam pi aniccaü 
vipariõàmadhammaü vattã pi aniccaü vipariõàmadhammaü accã pi aniccaü vipariõàmadhammaü, yà ca 
khvàssa àbhà sà niccà dhuvà sassatà avipariõàmadhammà ti, --sammà nu kho so, bhaginiyo, vadamàno 
vadeyyàti?  MN III 273
82 yo nu kho, bhaginiyo, evaü vadeyya:  Amussa mahato rukkhassa tiññhato sàravato målam pi aniccaü 
vipariõàmadhammaü khandho pi aniccaü vipariõàmadhammaü sàkhàpalàsam pi aniccaü 
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The substanceless nature of vedanà is also highlighted in these similies:  like the glow 
from a lamp and the shadow of a tree, their existence is dependent on other factors.
The Nandakovàdasutta thus has as its starting point the sequence that we first noticed in 
the Chachakkasutta, although here we find it in a list-like setting.  Rather than moving 
from eye-consciousness to eye-contact, and from there to “that which is felt as pleasant 
or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant, which arises with eye-contact as condition”, 
however, this sutta emphasises the dependence of vedanà on the sense doors and on their 
respective objects, and on the mind and mental objects.
The Chachakkasutta sequences and passages featuring the term “nibbindati”
Both of the sequences from the Chachakkasutta which include the terms vedanà and 
vedayita along with other terms from the pañicca-samuppàda are found in a setting 
which plays an important role in many places in the Nikàyas.  We see the first sequence 
in this setting in the Chachakkasutta itself, with the first sentence of the following 
passage repeated for each of the other sense doors and their objects, and for the mind and 
mental objects:
Seeing thus, bhikkhus, a well-taught noble disciple becomes indifferent to 
(nibbindati) the eye, indifferent to forms, indifferent to eye-consciousness, 
indifferent to eye-contact, indifferent to vedanà, indifferent to craving.  ...  Being 
indifferent, he becomes dispassionate.  Through dispassion [his mind] is 
liberated.  When it is liberated, there comes the knowledge:  “It is liberated.”  He 
understands:  “Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be 
done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being.”83
vipariõàmadhammaü, yà ca khvàssa chàyà sà niccà dhuvà sassatà avipariõàmadhammà ti, --sammà nu 
kho so, bhaginiyo, vadamàno vadeyyàti?  MN III 274
83 Evaü passaü bhikkhave sutavà ariyasàvako cakkhusmimpi nibbindati, råpesu pi nibbindati,  
cakkhuvi¤¤àõe pi nibbindati, cakkhusamphasse pi nibbindati, vedanàya pi nibbindati, taõhàya nibbindati.  
...  Nibbindaü virajjati, viràgà vimuccati, vimuttasmiü vimuttaü iti ¤àõaü hoti:  Khãõàjàti, vusitaü 
brahmacariyaü, kataü karanãyaü, nàparaü itthattàyàti pajànàti.  MN III 286-7
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This passage comes as the conclusion to the Chachakkasutta, and follows on from the 
exposition of the two sequences discussed above.  In two of the suttas of the 
Saëàyatanasaüyutta a similar passage follows on immediately from a statement of a part 
of the first Chachakkasutta sequence in a form which makes clear its relation to the 
pañicca-samuppàda:
Dependent on the eye and object arises eye-consciousness.  The union of these 
three is contact.  Dependent on contact is vedanà.  So seeing, the well-taught 
noble disciple becomes indifferent to (nibbindati) the eye, to forms, to eye-
consciousness, to eye-contact, and to vedanà.  Being indifferent, he becomes 
dispassionate.  Through dispassion [his mind] is liberated.84
 
There are 28 suttas in the Saëàyatanasaüyutta which have the second sequence from the 
Chachakkasutta in this setting, in the following form:
So seeing, bhikkhus, the well-taught noble disciple becomes indifferent to 
(nibbindati) the eye, to forms, to eye-consciousness, to that which is felt 
(vedayitaü) as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant, which arises 
with eye-contact as condition.85
The remaining senses and their objects, and the mind and mental objects, are presented 
in the same way.  This is then followed by the formula which describes the process of 
liberation, as in the Chachakkasutta.
Amongst these 28 suttas of the Saëàyatanasaüyutta, this passage provides the conclusion 
to all five of the suttas which feature the “three characteristics” question-and-answer 
formula discussed above.86  Another of these suttas with the second sequence in the 
84 Cakkhu¤-ca pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü, tiõõaü saïgati phasso, phassapaccayà vedanà.  
Evam-passaü bhikkhave sutavà ariyasàvako cakkhusmimpi nibbindati, råpesu pi nibbindati,  
cakkhuvi¤¤àõe pi nibbindati, cakkhusamphasse pi nibbindati, vedanàya pi nibbindati.  Nibbindaü 
virajjati, viràgà vimuccati.  SN IV 32-34
85 Evam passaü bhikkhave sutavà ariyasàvako cakkhusmimpi nibbindati, råpesu pi nibbindati,  
cakkhuvi¤¤àõe pi nibbindati, cakkhusamphasse pi nibbindati, yam pidam cakkhusamphassapaccayà 
uppajjati vedayitaü sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và tasmiü pi nibbindati.  SN IV 20 and 
passim.
86 suttas 32, 62, 86, 89, and 149
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above setting is the one which is considered to be the Buddha’s third discourse, the 
âdittasutta (“On fire”).87  
As with the question-and-answer formula, this formula with the verb nibbindati (“he 
becomes indifferent to”) is found in connection with other key concepts of the Nikàyas. 
In particular, it is used in combination with the five aggregates in the Majjhimanikàya88 
and in many places in the Khandhasaüyutta of the Saüyuttanikàya.  In this way, these 
sequences which we first find in the Chachakkasutta are placed amongst the central 
concerns of the Nikàyas.
There is another sutta in which this nibbindati formula is applied to the three vedanàs, 
pleasant, painful, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant.  This is the Dãghanakhasutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya,89 which has been examined in some detail in the first chapter.
The Anàthapiõóikovàdasutta,  MN 143
The above analysis of the two sequences from the Chachakkasutta gives an overview of 
the place of vedanà in such causal sequences, and of their relationship to the pañicca-
samuppàda.  We also saw that there are many suttas in the Nikàya in which we find 
passages which have much in common with the sequences found in the Chachakkasutta. 
There are, however, a number of sequences which are left out of this kind of 
classification, and which also include the term vedanà.  The Anàthapiõóikovàdasutta of 
the Majjhimanikàya contains such a sequence.  In it we find the following passage 
repeated numerous times:
Then, householder, you should train thus:  “I will not cling to the eye, and my 
consciousness will not be dependent on the eye”.  Thus you should train.90
This same phrase is then repeated for the remaing senses and for the mind.  After that it 
is repeated for the objects of the senses and of the mind.  Then it is repeated for 
87 SN IV 20
88 MN I 139 and MN III 20
89 MN I 500
90 Tasmàtiha te, gahapati, evaü sikkhitabbaü:  Na cakkhuü upàdiyissàmi,na ca me cakkhunissitaü 
vi¤¤àõaü bhavissati.  Evaü hi te, gahapati, sikkhitabbaü.  MN III 259
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consciousness (vi¤¤àõa) associated with each of the senses and with the mind, beginning 
with eye-consciousness (cakkhu-vi¤¤àõa).  Then it is repeated for contact associated 
with each of the senses and with the mind, beginning with eye-contact (cakkhu-
samphassa).  After that it is repeated for vedanà which is born from the contact at each 
of the sense doors and the mind, beginning with vedanà born of eye-contact (cakkhu-
samphassajà vedanà).  
Thus far the sequence of terms is the same as that found in the Mahàsaëàyatanasutta of 
the Majjhimanikàya91 and in many of the suttas of the Saëàyatanasaüyutta which we 
have looked at above, except that instead of having as its last element “that which is felt 
as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant that arises with eye-contact as 
condition,”92 we now have “vedanà born of eye-contact” (cakkhu-samphassajà vedanà). 
In both cases, these phrases are repeated for the other sense doors and for the mind.  The 
terms in all of these suttas are presented as a list.  The only term which is stated to be 
causally dependent on the previous item in the list is vedanà, or vedayita, which is 
dependent on contact.
We have noticed that in some suttas this basic sequence extends further, to include the 
term that follows vedanà in the pañicca-samuppàda, that is, craving (taõhà).93  Here in 
the Anàthapiõóikovàdasutta, further items are added to the list, but in this case they are 
not directly related to the pañicca-samuppàda.  After “vedanà born of eye-contact” 
(cakkhu-samphassajà vedanà), comes a list of six elements (dhàtu), namely, earth, water, 
fire, wind, space (àkàsa) and consciousness.  Then comes a listing of the five aggregates, 
followed by the four formless jhànas, and by other groups.
Conclusion
This detailed study of the role of vedanà in causal sequences found in the Nikàyas shows 
that there are indeed passages in which this term is given marked emphasis, and that the 
striking statements quoted at the beginning of this chapter from the writings of 
91 MN III 287
92 yam p’ idaü cakkhusamphassapaccayà uppajjati vedayitaü sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü 
và, MN III 287, etc.
93 At MN III 280-82;  SN II 71-75;  SN IV 86-88, 90-91.
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Kalupahana, Nyanaponika and Bhikkhu Bodhi do have a basis in the texts, especially 
when taken in conjunction with the passages explored in the first chapter of this thesis. 
In causal sequences of different kinds we find vedanà being given an important role.  As 
far as I know, this thesis is the first study to explore this question in any detail.  
72
Chapter Three:  Physical and mental aspects of vedanà
Most modern commentators on the Pali texts take vedanà to be a purely mental 
phenomenon.  The meditation teacher S.N. Goenka, however, emphatically stresses the 
physical nature of vedanà (“sensations”):
Equanimity must be practised at the level of bodily sensations in order to make a 
real change in one’s life.  At every moment sensations are arising within the 
body.  Usually the conscious mind is unaware of them, but the unconscious mind 
feels the sensations and reacts to them with craving and aversion.  If the mind is 
trained to become fully conscious of all that occurs within the physical structure 
and at the same time to maintain equanimity then the old habit of blind reaction is 
broken.  …
There are two aspects of the human phenomenon:  material and mental, body and 
mind.  One must observe both.  But one cannot actually experience the body 
without awareness of what arises in the body, that is, sensation.  Similarly, one 
cannot observe the mind separately from what arises in the mind, that is, thought. 
As one goes deeper in experiencing the truth of mind and matter, it becomes clear 
that whatever arises in the mind is also accompanied by a physical sensation. 
Sensation is of central importance for experiencing the reality of both mind and 
body, and it is the point at which reactions start.  In order to observe the truth of 
oneself and to stop generating mental defilements, one must be aware of 
sensations and remain equanimous as continuously as possible.1
The recent studies of S. Hamilton have also focused on the importance of the body in 
descriptions of the human phenomenon in the Pali texts:
As my description of the operating of the khandhas has shown, there is no idea of 
one being a body with a detachable psychological appendage:  the body is 
intrinsic to the operating of the cognitive apparatus as a whole, which includes 
1 S.N. Goenka, The Discourse Summaries, Talks from a Ten-day Course in Vipassana Meditation, Igatpuri, 
India, Vipassana Research Institute, 1997, pp.47-48.
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the complexities of one’s emotional, appetitive, intellectual, psychological, 
aesthetic--and so on--make-up.2
Hamilton devotes very little space, however, to analysis of passages on vedanà.  This 
chapter is a study of descriptions mental and physical aspects of vedanà found in the 
Nikàyas.
In a sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta, the Buddha is represented as saying that vedanà can be 
understood according to a number of different classifications.  The first of these states 
that “there are two vedanàs ... in [the Buddha’s] way of expounding.”3  The text 
continues:
And what, bhikkhus, are the two vedanàs?  They are bodily and mental vedanàs. 
These, bhikkhus, are called “the two vedanàs.”4
Later in the same sutta five vedanàs are discussed:
And what, bhikkhus, are the five vedanàs?  They are the faculties (indriya) of 
pleasure, pain, happiness, unhappiness, and indifference.5
No further information is given here concerning this manner of classifying vedanà, but 
we find a series of three suttas in the fifth volume of the Saüyuttanikàya which reveals 
that this manner of classifying is also connected with the physical and mental aspects of 
vedanà.  In two of these suttas, these five faculties are equated with the commonly found 
three-fold classification of vedanà:
Now, bhikkhus, the faculty of pleasure and the faculty of happiness should be 
regarded as pleasurable vedanà.  Likewise the faculty of pain and the faculty of 
unhappiness should be regarded as unpleasant vedanà.  Likewise the faculty of 
2 Sue Hamilton, Early Buddhism:  a New Approach.  The I of the Beholder, Richmond, Surry, Curzon, 
2000, p.217-8.
3 dve pi mayà vedanà vuttà pariyàyena, SN IV 231
4 Katamà ca bhikkhave dve vedanà.  Kàyikà ca cetasikà ca, imà vuccanti bhikkhave dve vedanà.  SN IV 
231
5 Katamà ca bhikkhave pa¤cavedanà.  Sukhindriyaü dukkhindriyaü somanassindriyaü 
domanassindriyam upekkhindriyaü imà vuccanti bhikhave pa¤cavedanà.  SN IV 231
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indifference should be regarded as vedanà which is neither pleasant nor 
unpleasant.6
In all three of these suttas the first and second faculties (sukhindriya and dukkhindriya) 
are identified with bodily pleasure and bodily pain (kàyikaü sukhaü, kàyikaü dukkhaü); 
the second and third (somanassindriya and domanassindriya) with mental pleasure and 
mental pain (cetasikaü sukhaü, cetasikaü dukkhaü);  and the fifth (upekhindriya) is 
identified with that which is neither pleasant nor unpleasant at either the bodily level or 
the mental level (kàyikaü và cetasikaü và neva sàtaü nàsàtaü).7
The physical aspect of vedanà 
Sabbàsavasutta passage
I wish to concentrate firstly on some passages which are primarily concerned with the 
physical aspect of vedanà.  To begin, let us look at a group of passages which are 
thematically related to the passages from the Mahàparinibbànasutta which we noticed in 
the first chapter of this thesis.  There the Buddha was described as “enduring” 
(adhivàseti) harsh vedanà in his final illness.  The second sutta of the Majjhimanikàya 
can be taken as the locus classicus for the related passages.  This is the Sabbàsavasutta in 
which àsavas (defilements) are classified according to the way in which they are to be 
abandoned (pahàtabbà).  The fourth of the seven types described are àsavas that are to 
be abandoned by enduring (àsavà adhivàsanà pahàtabbà).8  The description of this 
process runs as follows:
Here a bhikkhu, reflecting wisely, bears cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and 
contact with gadflies, mosquitoes, wind, the sun, and creeping things;  he endures 
ill-spoken, unwelcome words and arisen bodily vedanà that are painful, racking, 
sharp, piercing, disagreeable, distressing, and menacing to life.9
6 Tatra bhikkhave yaü ca sukhindriyaü yaü ca somanassindriyaü sukhà sà vedanà daññhabbà.  Tatra 
bhikkhave yaü ca dukkhindriyaü yaü ca domanassindriyaü dukkhà sà vedanà daññhabbà.  Tatra 
bhikkhave yadidaü upekhindriyam adukkhamasukhà sà vedanà daññhabbà.  SN V 210 and 211
7 SN V 209-11
8 MN I 7,10
9 Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu pañisaïkhà yoniso khamo hoti sãtassa uõhassa jigacchàya pipàsàya óaüsa-
makasa-vàtàtapa-siriüsapasamphassànaü, duruttànaü duràgatànaü vacanapathànaü, uppannànaü 
sàrãrikànaü vedanànaü dukkhànaü tippànaü kharànaü kañukànaü asàtànaü amanàpànaü 
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The Pali word used to describe these vedanàs as “bodily” is sàrãrika, an adjective 
derived from the noun sarãra, meaning “body”.  The term kàyika, which also means 
bodily, and which is used in the passages quoted above which describe the bodily and 
mental aspects of vedanà, is thus not used here.  According to this passage, then, certain 
àsavas, which are not specified, as indeed they are not for any of the methods of 
“abandoning” which are described in this sutta, are abandoned when the bhikkhu endures 
severely painful bodily vedanà.
Bodily vedanà in the context of the practice of the satipaññhànas
The Sabbàsavasutta passage in the Kàyagatàsatisutta
Passages very similar to this occur in two other suttas of the Majjhimanikàya.  The 
contexts in which these passages appear in these suttas are of considerable interest for 
this study.  The first sutta is the Kàyagatàsatisutta, the discourse on mindfulness of the 
body.  The first part of this sutta10 is the same as the section of the Satipaññhànasutta 
which describes the observation of the body (kàyànupassanà).  The concluding section 
of the sutta is a description of ten benefits which can be expected from the practice of 
mindfulness of the body.  The second of these is very similar to the passage quoted 
above from the Sabbàsavasutta.
There is, however, an interesting distinction between these passages.  In the 
Sabbàsavasutta, the enduring of painful bodily vedanà is said to be a means of 
abandoning a certain type of àsava.  In the Kàyagatàsatisutta, the enduring of painful 
bodily vedanà is achieved by means of other practices.  The dual role of enduring painful 
vedanà can be seen to be paralleled by some of the descriptions of vedanà which we 
noted in the first chapter.  In that chapter, many examples were given of the role that 
vedanà plays in certain soteriological processes;  and, as we saw, vedanà also plays a 
role in a description of a person who has achieved his or her soteriological goal which 
occurs a number of times in the Nikàyas.  In the Majjhimanikàya, this description of a 
liberated person occurs in the Dhàtuvibhangasutta:
pàõaharànaü adhivàsakajàtiko hoti.  MN I 10
10 MN III 89-92
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If he feels a pleasant feeling, he understands: “It is impermanent; there is no 
holding to it; there is no delight in it.”  ...  If he feels a pleasant feeling, he feels it 
detached ...11
In the Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta, of course, the context is broader.  In the Kàyagatàsatisutta, 
one who practises mindfulness of the body as described in the sutta is able to endure 
painful bodily vedanà.  The passage from the Dhàtuvibhaïgasutta describes a person 
who is detached from vedanà which is pleasant, unpleasant and neither pleasant nor 
unpleasant.  There is also no indication whether these vedanàs are bodily or mental. 
There is, however, a broad similarity in the intent of these two passages:  the result of 
spiritual practice is described in terms of vedanà.
The Sabbàsavasutta passage in the Dantabhåmisutta
The other sutta of the Majjhimanikàya in which we find the passage which includes the 
description of a bhikkhu who endures painful bodily vedanà is the Dantabhåmisutta. 
Here as well the context is of great significance.  The middle section of this sutta12  is 
made up of a long description of the stages through which an elephant trainer takes a 
wild forest elephant in order to train it, and of a comparison of this with the way in which 
the Buddha trains a disciple.  The Buddha’s training is part of a description which 
appears in a number of suttas in the Nikàyas, including all but one of the suttas of the 
first volume of the Dãghanikàya.13  L. Schmithausen calls it the “stereotyped detailed 
description of the Path to Liberation”.14
The standard pattern of this description is however interrupted in a manner which is not 
found in any of its other rehearsals.  After the stage of overcoming the five “hindrances” 
(nãvaraõa, namely craving (abhijjhà), aversion (vyàpàda), sloth and torpor 
11 So sukha¤ ce vedanaü vedeti, Sà aniccà ti pajànàti; Anajjhosità ti pajànàti; Anabhinandità ti pajànàti.  
…  So sukha¤ ce vedanaü vedeti, visaüyutto naü vedeti ….   MN III 244.
12 MN III 132-136
13 MN, eg. No. 27 = I 179 ff.; No. 51 = I 344 ff.;  no.60 = I 412 f.; etc.;  DN eg. I 62 ff., 171 ff., 206 ff., 
etc.; AN eg. 3.58 and 59 = I 163 ff.;  4.198 = II 208 ff.; 5.75 and 76 = III 92 f. and 100; etc.
14Lambert Schmithausen, “On Some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of “Liberating Insight” and 
“Enlightenement” in Early Buddhism”, in Klaus Bruhn und Albrecht Wezler (eds.), Studien zum Jainismus 
und Buddhismus (Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf), Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1981, p.204.
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(thãnamiddha), agitation (uddhaccakukkucca) and doubt (vicikicchà)) is described, 
instead of proceeding to a description of the four jhànas, as is usually the case, the text 
continues with the standard description of the four establishings of mindfulness.  There 
then follows a short passage on the advantages of the practice of the four establishings of 
mindfulness, and soon after the stereotyped detailed description is resumed from the 
description of the second jhàna up to the realisation of the four noble truths and the 
destruction of the àsavas.  After this comes the passage quoted above from the 
Sabbàsavasutta, which includes the description of the bhikkhu who endures painful 
bodily vedanàs.
We can thus establish a connection between the Kàyagatàsatisutta and the 
Dantabhåmisutta.  Both of them contain in their concluding sections the passage which 
includes the description of a person who endures painful bodily vedanàs.  And both of 
them give importance to the practice of the establishings of mindfulness.  In the case of 
the former, only the first of the four establishings of mindfulness is given, the 
observation of the body (kàyànupassanà), but that is given with all the detail that we find 
in the two Satipaññhànasuttas.  In the latter, all of the four establishings of mindfulness 
are mentioned, but only in the summary formula which is found in the introductory 
section of the Satipaññhànasuttas.  There seems, therefore, to be a connection between 
these two practices, the practice of enduring painful bodily vedanà and the practice of the 
establishings of mindfulness.
Sabbàsavasutta passage and the Mahàparinibbànasutta
In the first chapter of this thesis attention was drawn to a passage in the 
Mahàparinibbànasutta in which the Buddha is described as enduring (adhivàseti) vedanà. 
Now during the rainy season, a severe sickness arose in the Fortunate One, with 
sharp vedanà as if he were about to die.  But the Fortunate One bore them 
mindfully, with understanding and without being disturbed.15
15 Atha kho Bhagavato vassåpagatassa kharo àbàdho uppajji, bàëhà vedanà vattanti màraõantikà.  Tà 
sudaü Bhagavà sato sampajàno adhivàseti aviha¤¤amàno. DN II 99
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In this passage, vedanà is not described as being bodily vedanà.  But nevertheless there 
are two important connections with the Sabbàsavasutta passage.  The first is that vedanà 
in both passages is connected in some way with illness.  The final illness of the Buddha 
is being described in the Mahàparinibbànasutta.  The vedanà here is màraõantika, or 
associated with maraõa, death.  In the Sabbàsavasutta passage, amongst the adjectives 
describing unpleasant bodily vedanà we find the term pàõa-hara, which literally means 
“taking away life” (PED, sv).  In both of these passages, this vedanà is endured patiently.
The other important theme that these passages have in common is their association with 
the practice of the four establishings of mindfulness.  The Buddha is described in this 
passage from the Mahàparinibbànasutta with two of the key terms from the explanation 
of this practice, sata (mindful) and sampajàna (with understanding).  As we have just 
seen, there are two suttas in the Majjhimanikàya, the Kàyagatàsatisutta and the 
Dantabhåmisutta, which contain in their concluding sections the passage from the 
Sabbàsavasutta, and which give importance to the practice of the establishings of 
mindfulness.
Sabbàsavasutta passage and three suttas from the Saüyuttanikàya
There is a passage which appears in two suttas of the Saüyuttanikàya which combines 
elements of the Sabbàsavasutta passage and the Mahàparinibbànasutta passage in a 
significant manner:
Now at that time the Fortunate One’s foot was pierced by a stone splinter.  Sorely 
indeed did the Fortunate One feel it, grievous the vedanà he suffered in the body, 
keen and sharp, acute, unpleasant and unwelcome.  But he endured all this 
mindfully, clearly aware and without becoming distressed.16
The context in both cases is similar to that of our passage from the 
Mahàparinibbànasutta:  something has happened to cause the Buddha unpleasant vedanà. 
And the last sentence in each passage is the same:  the Buddha bears the vedanà with 
16 Tena kho pana samayena Bhagavato pàdo sakalikàya khato hoti.  Bhåsà sudaü Bhagavato vedanà 
vattanti sàrãrikà vedanà dukkhà tibbà kharà kañukà asàtà amanàpà.  Tà sudaü Bhagavà sato sampajàno 
adhivàseti aviha¤¤amàno.  SN I 27 and SN I 110
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mindfulness and understanding.  In this passage, though, the vedanà is described in a 
different way:  it appears here as it does in the Sabbàsavasutta, except that the final 
attribute, “taking away life” (pàõahara) is missing.  In the present discussion, the point 
to note is that the vedanà in this passage which bears close resemblence to the 
Mahàparinibbànasutta passage is specified as being bodily (sàrãrika) vedanà.  
In the first of these Saüyuttanikàya suttas, it is then reported that the middle section of 
this passage was repeated six times by six divine beings (devatàs), in connection with six 
different attributes of the Buddha.  This middle section covers the key points that we 
have been discussing:
He endures, mindful and discerning, the vedanàs that have arisen in his body, 
keen and sharp, acute, unpleasant and unwelcome, and he is not distressed.17
The practice of the establishing of mindfulness in connnection with  bodily vedanà is 
thus given particular emphasis here.
These elements are again combined in a sutta in the Anuruddhasaüyutta of the 
Saüyuttanikàya.  The bhikkhu Anuruddha is here described as being seriously ill.  Some 
bhikkhus come to visit him, and ask how it is that the painful, bodily vedanà that have 
arisen18 do not take hold of his mind and remain (cittaü na pariyàdàya tiññhanti).  He 
replies that it is because his mind is well established in the four establishings of 
mindfulness.  So once again we find bodily vedanà associated with the four establishings 
of mindfulness.  In this context we may recall that it was Anuruddha who is described as 
uttering the verses which follow the passing away of the Buddha in the 
Mahàparinibbànasutta, which we looked at in the first chapter of this thesis.  These 
verses refer to the Buddha’s enduring of vedanà:  “With undisheartened mind he endured 
sensation.” 19
All of these passages highlight the role of bodily vedanà in connection with the practice 
of the establishing of mindfulness.
17 samuppannà sàrãrikà vedanà dukkhà tibbà kharà kañukà asàtà amanàpà, sato sampajàno adhivàseti  
aviha¤¤amàno.  SN I 28
18 uppannà sàrãrikà dukkhà vedanà  SN V 302
19 Asallãnena cittena vedanaü ajjhavàsayi  DN II 157
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Bodily vedanà in other contexts
The Sabbàsavasutta passage and two suttas from the Aïguttaranikàya
The passages that we have been examining so far have been concerned with bodily 
vedanà and the establishing of mindfulness.  There are, however, several passages in the 
Nikàyas which deal with bodily vedanà in other contexts.  The passage quoted above 
from the Sabbàsavasutta, which includes the notion of enduring painful bodily vedanà, 
appears a number of times in the Aïguttaranikàya.20  One of these occurrences is 
particularly noteworthy.  In this sutta, a course of action is outlined which leads to ten 
desired states.  The sixth of these desired states is that described in the passage quoted 
from the Sabbàsavasutta.  The practice which is said to be the means of achieving each 
of these states is a kind of summary, albeit in a very generalized form, of some of the 
most important soteriological practices found in the Nikàyas:
... he should be one who fufils the moral habits, who is intent on mental 
tranquillity within, whose meditation is uninterrupted, who is endowed with 
vision, a cultivator of empty places.21
The last of the ten benefits which come from this practice, as listed in this sutta, is 
liberation (vimutti) which is free from the àsavas.  The enduring of bodily vedanà thus 
finds itself amongst the most significant concepts and practices of the Nikàyas.
Another noteworthy occurrence of the last section of our Sabbàsavasutta passage, the 
section which describes the bearing of bodily vedanà, occurs in the âtappasutta of the 
Aïguttaranikàya.22  In this sutta three “grounds” (ñhàõa) on which energy is to be exerted 
are described.  The first two of these are also found in descriptions of “right effort” 
(sammàvàyàma) as part of the noble eight-fold path and “right exertion” 
(sammappadhàna) as part of the thirty-seven factors leading to enlightenment 
(bodhipakkhiyadhamma).  These are the effort to not allow evil states (dhammas) to arise 
20 AN II 118, 143, 153;  III 163, 389; AN V 132
21 sãlesvev’ assa paripårakàrã ajjhattaü cetosamatham anuyutto aniràkatajjhàno vipassanàya samanàgato 
bråhetà su¤¤àgàrànaü  AN V 131
22 AN I 153
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and the effort to cause good states to arise.  The third ground on which to apply effort, as 
described in this sutta, is for the bearing of painful bodily vedanà which has arisen. The 
description here is identical with the description of painful vedanà found in the 
Sabbàsavasutta passage quoted above.  Here this passage is placed alongside items which 
figure prominently in the most important enumerations of soteriological practices found 
in the Nikàyas.  The last sentence of the sutta underlines the high value placed upon 
these practices:
Now when a bhikkhu exerts himself on these three grounds, he is called 
“strenuous, wise, mindful, and for making a complete end of suffering”.23
The bhikkhu here is described with one of the key terms from the practice of the 
establishing of mindfulness, sata.  And he is also described as being one who is “for 
making a complete end of suffering” (sammà dukkhassa antakiriyàya), one of the 
descriptions of the goal of the Buddha’s teaching.  So the bearing of painful bodily 
vedanà is here placed at the heart of the central concerns of the Nikàyas.
Bodily vedanà in the Vedanàsaüyutta
Our passage from the Sabbàsavasutta speaks of vedanà which is “arisen” (uppanna), 
“bodily” (sàrãrika), “painful” (dukkha) and “taking away life” (pàõahara).  These same 
words are used to describe vedanà in the verse section of one of the suttas of the 
Vedanàsaüyutta, the section of the Saüyuttanikàya devoted to suttas dealing with 
vedanà.  This is the Pàtàlasutta.  The prose section of this sutta is also of great interest 
for our study of bodily vedanà.  The word pàtàla in the title of this sutta means cliff or 
abyss, and we are told that here it is a term for painful bodily vedanà.24  An ordinary 
person who has not heard the Buddha’s teaching (assutavà puthujjano) is described as 
becoming very upset when he comes into contact with painful bodily vedanà.  It is said 
of him that he has not come out of the abyss (pàtàle na paccuññhàsi), that he has not 
found safe ground (gàdha¤ca najjhagà).  The “noble disciple who has heard (sc. the 
23 Ayaü vuccati bhikkhave bhikkhu àtàpã nipako sato sammà dukkhassa antakiriyàyà ti.  AN I 153
24 sàrãrikànaü kho etam bhikkhave dukkhànaü vedanànaü adhivacanaü yad idaü pàtàloti  SN IV 206
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Buddha’s teaching)” (sutavà ariyasàvako) on the other hand, does not become upset in 
similar circumstances;  he has come out of the abyss and found safe ground.
The verses which follow this prose passage repeat the main points of the prose, but add 
some terminology which is also found in the Sabbàsavasutta.  As well as being “bodily” 
and “painful”, vedanà is now also “arisen” and “taking away life”.  Furthermore, in the 
verse section, vedanà is described as being either “endured” (adhivàseti) or not endured, 
again using the same terminology as the Sabbàsavasutta.
Thus there are a large number of important passages in the Nikàyas which place marked 
emphasis on the physical aspect of vedanà.
Mental aspect of vedanà
There are far fewer references in the Nikàyas to vedanà which is explicity mental 
(cetasika) than to vedanà which is explicitly bodily.   
The Cåëavedallasutta
Perhaps the most notable reference occurs in a passage in the Cåëavedallasutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya in which the term saïkhàra (“formations”) is being discussed.25  The lay 
disciple Visàkha questions the bhikkhunã Dhammadinnà as to the number of saïkhàras. 
She replies that there are three:  saïkhàra of the body (kàyasaïkhàra), saïkhàra of 
speech (vacãsaïkhàra), and saïkhàra of the mind (cittasaïkhàra).  He then enquires as 
to the nature of these three, and is told that breathing in and out is a saïkhàra of the 
body, that initial application of thought and sustained application of thought 
(vitakkavicàra) together is a saïkhàra of speech, and that perception (sa¤¤à) and vedanà 
together is a saïkhàra of the mind (sa¤¤à ca vedanà ca cittasaïkhàro).  Visàkha then 
asks for the reasons for these classifications.  For the third saïkhàra, Dhammadinnà tells 
him that perception and vedanà are both mental (cetasika), that these two phenomena are 
25 MN I 301
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“bound to the mind” or “dependent on the mind” (cittapañibaddha), and for this reason 
they are classed as a saïkhàra of the mind.26
Curiously, however, it is in this same sutta that we find a definition of vedanà which 
states that there can be either a physical or mental aspect to vedanà:
Friend Visàkha, whatever is felt bodily or mentally as pleasant and soothing is 
pleasant vedanà.27
This is then repeated for unpleasant (dukkha) vedanà, and for vedanà which is neither 
pleasant nor unpleasant (adukkhamasukha).
Are we dealing here with a logical inconsistency in the texts, or is there another 
explanation?  The fact that in the first passage vedanà is classed as a phenomenon 
(dhamma) which is “bound to the mind” or “dependent on the mind” (cittapañibaddha) 
does not rule out the possibility of vedanà also being related to the body in some way. 
Another possible explanation is that certain types of vedanà may be related to the body. 
This at least is S. Hamilton’s view of the situation.  In connection with the passage just 
quoted from the Cåëavedallasutta,28 she notes that vedanà “is experienced (vedayitaü) 
either bodily or mentally”29.  She goes on to comment that “this analysis refers to 
different types of feeling and does not mean that all feelings have both physical and 
mental aspects”.30
The Mahàvedallasutta
Other passages in the Nikàyas which allow us to conceive of vedanà in terms which are 
primarily mental are even less conclusive.  In the Mahàvedallasutta, which is the 
companion sutta to the Cåëavedallasutta, whence we have drawn the above passages, we 
find further clues as to the status of vedanà.  In particular, we find vedanà closely 
26 Sa¤¤à ca vedanà ca cetasikà ete dhammà citta-pañibaddhà, tasmà sa¤¤à ca vedanà ca cittasaïkhàro ti 
MN I 301
27 Yaü kho àvuso Visàkha kàyikaü và cetasikaü và sukhaü sàtaü vedayitaü ayaü sukhà vedanà.  MN I 302
28 MN I 302
29 S. Hamilton, Identity and Experience, London, Luzac Oriental, 1996, p.43;  emphasis is Hamilton’s.
30 Ibid., p.44
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associated with certain mental faculties.  In the Cåëavedallasutta we saw vedanà 
associated with perception (sa¤¤à), and these two described as “bound to the mind” 
(cittapañibaddha).  In the Mahàvedallasutta we come across the following passage:
Vedanà, perception, and consciousness, friend -- these states are conjoined, not 
disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the others in 
order to describe the difference between them.  For what one feels, that one 
perceives; and what one perceives, that one cognizes.31
Vedanà here seems to be classed as a purely mental phenomenon.  Again, however, we 
find our view on this matter modified by other information from the same sutta.  In the 
passage immediately preceding the one just quoted, the three phenomena--perception 
(sa¤¤à), consciousness (vi¤¤àõa) and vedanà--are described in different terms.  Part of 
these descriptions do little to clarify the meanings of the terms:  they merely give the 
verbal forms related to each noun.  For vedanà, for example, we find the Pali phrase 
vedeti vedetãti kho àvuso, tasmà vedanà ti vuccati.32  We could translate this as “ “one 
feels, one feels,” friend, therefore it is called “feeling.” “  For consciousness (vi¤¤àõa) 
we find “ “one cognizes, one cognizes,” friend,  therefore it is called “consciousness” “;33 
and for perception (sa¤¤à) “ “one perceives, one perceives”, therefore it is called 
“perception.” “34 
The examples given after each of these etymological explanations, however, may throw 
some light on the subject.  The example given for consciousness is as follows:
One cognizes:  “[This is] pleasant”;  one cognizes:  “[This is] painful;  one 
cognizes: [This is] neither-painful-nor-pleasant”.35
The difference with the example given for vedanà is slight but significant:
31 Yà c’àvuso vedanà yà ca sa¤¤à ya¤-ca vi¤¤àõaü ime dhammà saüsaññhà no visaüsaññhà, na ca labbhà 
imesaü dhammànaü vinibbhujitvà nànàkaraõaü pa¤¤àpetuü.  Yaü h’àvuso vedeti taü sa¤jànàti, yaü 
sa¤jànàti taü vijànàti, tasmà ime dhammà saüsaññhà no visaüsaññhà, na ca labbhà...  MN I 293
32 MN I 293
33 vijànàti vijànàtãti kho àvuso, tasmà vi¤¤àõan ti vuccati  MN I 292
34 sa¤jànàti, sa¤jànàtãti kho àvuso, tasmà sa¤¤à ti vuccati  MN I 293
35 sukhan ti pi vijànàti, dukkhan ti pi vijànàti, adukkhamasukhan ti pi vijànàti.  MN I 292
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One feels pleasure, one feels pain, one feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure.36
In the case of consciousness, the object experienced--pleasure, pain, etc.--is followed by 
“ti” in the Pali, indicating that the object is actually only thought of, or conceptualized. 
In the case of vedanà, there is a direct experience of the object.  The text does not 
elaborate on this point, but one could suppose that this direct experiencing could take 
place at either the mental or the physical level, or both.
Vedanà and the term nàmaråpa
Some more clues as to the mental or physical nature of vedanà can be found in an 
examination of the term nàmaråpa.  The standard definition of this term in the Nikàyas 
includes the term vedanà as a part of nàma.  In the Sammàdiññhisutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya, for example, we find the following passage:
Vedanà, perception, volition, contact, and attention--these are called nàma.  The 
four great elements and the material form derived from the four great elements--
these are called råpa.37
This seems to place vedanà squarely in the field of mental events, and to contrast it with 
things of a physical nature.  Indeed one sometimes finds nàma translated as “mentality” 
in this context, and råpa as “physicality” or “materiality”.  It is possible, however, that 
these translations have been influenced by usages of the terms nàma, råpa and 
nàmaråpa which are later than those found in the four (mainly) prose Nikàyas.  These 
terms have a complex history.  The literal meaning of nàma is “name”.  By the time of 
the early commentarial literature, in the context of the five aggregates (khandhas), the 
term is regularly used to refer to the “four immaterial (aråpino) aggregates”38--vedanà, 
perception (sa¤¤à), saïkhàra, and consciousness (vi¤¤àõa)--which is contrasted with the 
aggregate of matter (råpa).  Some of this early commentarial literature has canonical 
status, such as the Niddesa, which is a commentary on parts of the Suttanipàta.  Thus the 
36 sukham pi vedeti, dukkham pi vedeti, adukkhamasukham pi vedeti.  MN I 293
37 Vedanà sa¤¤à cetanà phasso manasikàro, idaü vuccat’àvuso nàmaü; cattàri ca mahàbhåtàni catunna¤ 
ca mahàbhåtànaü upàdàya råpaü, idaü vuccat’àvuso råpaü.  MN I 53
38 cattàro aråpino khandhà, Nd1 435 = Nd2 339
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commentaries take nàmaråpa as a designation of the five aggregates, which together are 
given as a description of the functioning of an individual person.
In the four prose Nikàyas, however, the term nàmaråpa is not used as a designation of 
the five aggregates.  The above passage, for instance, is taken from a sutta of which the 
purpose is in part to explain each of the members of the dependent origination schema 
(pañicca-samuppàda).  Now in this series, consciousness (vi¤¤àõa) is said to give rise to 
nàmaråpa.39  According to the commentarial classification, though, consciousness, as 
one of the five aggregates, is a part of nàmaråpa.  
And while we do find other elements in the above definition of nàma which are from the 
aggregates without råpa--that is perception (sa¤¤à), and in some places volition (cetanà) 
is equated with the saïkhàras40--there are some elements which are extraneous to this 
group.  The most significant of these in the present discussion is the term “contact” 
(phassa).  Contact is usually understood in the Nikàyas to have both a physical and a 
mental aspect.  Indeed in the same sutta in which the above passage is found, six types of 
contact are listed, corresponding to the five physical senses and the mind.41  So we find 
“contact of the body” (kàyasamphassa) alongside “contact of the mind” 
(manosamphassa), as well as “contact of the eye” (cakkhusamphassa), etc.  The term 
vedanà may well not be intended here in a purely mental sense.  Vedanà, and nàma, may 
well include here physical as well as mental events.
39 vi¤¤àõasamudayà nàmaråpasamudayo, eg. MN I 53
40 eg. SN III 60
41 MN I 52
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Vedanà:  mind and body
We come now to look at those passages in the Nikàyas which are explicitly concerned 
with both the mental and the physical aspect of vedanà.  The most significant of these is 
found in the Sallasutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta.  The soteriological significance of this 
sutta has already been referred to in the first chapter of this thesis.  Here we will examine 
in detail what it has to say on the mental and physical aspects of vedanà.  The theme, as 
announced in the opening lines, is the difference between an “ordinary person who has 
not heard (sc. the Buddha’s teaching)” (assutavà puthujjano) who feels pleasant, painful 
and neither-pleasant-nor-painful vedanà, and a “noble disciple who has heard (sc. the 
Buddha’s teaching)” (sutavà ariyasàvako) who feels pleasant, painful and neither-
pleasant-nor-painful vedanà.  The explanation of this is given firstly in terms of painful 
vedanà.  The ordinary person who is “touched” (puññho) by painful vedanà is upset by 
this experience.  We are told that he feels two vedanàs, bodily (kàyika) and mental 
(cetasika).42  This is likened to a man whom people pierce with one arrow, and whom 
they then pierce with a second arrow.  The noble disciple, on the other hand, when 
touched by painful vedanà, is not upset.  We are told that he feels one vedanà, which is 
bodily, and that he does not feel a mental vedanà.43  Accordingly, the simile in this 
passage is of a man whom people pierce once with an arrow, but who is not pierced by 
them a second time.  This view on the relationship between bodily vedanà and mental 
vedanà is not expressed in these terms at any other place in the Nikàyas.  This passage in 
the Vedanàsaüyutta is a clear description of a close relationship between physical and 
mental vedanà which has a bearing on the status of the noble disciple (ariyasàvaka). 
These two sentences could perhaps provide a key to the understanding of this 
relationship in the Nikàyas.  Moreover, they occur in a sutta which is significant from the 
soteriological point of view as well, as shown in the first chapter.
42 so dve vedanà vediyati kàyika¤ ca cetasika¤ ca  SN IV 208
43 so ekaü vedanaü vediyati kàyikaü, na cetasikaü   SN IV 209
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A study of passages which have a bearing on the Sallasutta passage:  the 
Kakacåpamasutta (MN 21)
These phrases may be unique in the Nikàyas, but the theme of this passage is an 
important one which is found echoed in many places.  Leaving aside for a moment the 
question of the mental and physical aspects of vedanà, let us take a look at some of the 
passages which have a bearing on the Sallasutta passage.
The best known description in the Nikàyas of a person whose mind is unaffected by 
physical discomfort is found in the Kakacåpamasutta of the Majjhimanikàya.  The simile 
of the saw, from which this sutta takes its title, is also referred to in another 
Majjhimanikàya sutta as we will see below, as well as in a verse of the Theragàthà.44  It 
comes at the end of the sutta:
Bhikkhus, even if bandits were to sever you savagely limb by limb with a two-
handled saw, he who gave rise to a mind of hate towards them would not be 
carrying out my teaching.45
This is the classic statement of the case of one who experiences physical pain but is not 
affected by it at the mental level.  Or, put in the terms of the Sallasutta, one could say 
that this person feels one vedanà, which is bodily, and he does not feel a mental vedanà.
The context of this dramatic statement is much more mundane than the statement itself. 
The sutta is about people who become upset over relatively minor matters.  Firstly we 
hear of a bhikkhu who becomes angry and displeased and “raises a dispute”46 with others 
when they speak dispraise of the bhikkhunãs (nuns) with whom he associates.  The 
Buddha is represented as telling this bhikkhu that he should abandon any desires and any 
thoughts based on the household life, and that he should remain with a mind of loving-
kindness (mettacitta).  The Buddha also tells this bhikkhu that he should practice in the 
same way if the bhikkhunãs with whom he has been associating are give a blow with the 
hand, with a clod, with a stick, or with a knife.  And he should practice in the same way 
44 Thag. 445
45 Ubhatodaõóakena ce pi bhikkhave kakacena corà ocarakà aïgamaïgàni okanteyyuü, tatràpi yo mano padåseyya 
na me so tena sàsanakaro.  MN I 129
46 PED for adhikaraõam pi karoti.
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if he himself is spoken to in a dispraising way, or if he is given a blow with the hand, 
with a clod, with a stick, or with a knife.  In this last instance, the bhikkhu is in effect, in 
the spirit of the Sallasutta, being told that he should feel only one unpleasant vedanà, the 
bodily, and not the mental:  his mind should be unaffected by physical discomfort.
Later in the sutta the Buddha tells the bhikkhus of the kinds of speech that they may have 
addressed to them, and he tells them what their reaction should be:
When others address you, their speech may be timely or untimely; when others 
address you, their speech may be true or untrue;  when others address you, their 
speech may be gentle or harsh; when others address you, their speech may be 
connected with good or with harm;  when others address you, their speech may 
be spoken with a mind of loving-kindness or with inner hate.  Herein, bhikkhus, 
you should train yourself thus:  “Our minds will remain unaffected, and we shall 
utter no evil words;  we shall abide compassionate for their welfare, with a mind 
of loving-kindness, without inner hate.  ...”47
And to further emphasise the point, the Buddha gives the simile of the saw, quoted 
above.  After this, however, he returns to the topic of speech:
“Bhikkhus, if you keep this advice on the simile of the saw constantly in mind, do 
you see any course of speech, trivial or gross, that you could not endure?”  -- 
“No, venerable sir”.48
The last verb in the Buddha’s phrase is familiar to us from passages that we looked at 
earlier in this chapter.  Adhivàseti, meaning “he bears” or “he endures”, is used in 
conjunction with painful vedanà in the passage that we first noticed in the 
Sabbàsavasutta, and which recurs in many places in the Nikàyas.  It is also found at 
47 Kàlena và bhikkhave pare vadamànà vadeyyuü akàlena và;  bhåtena và bhikkhave pare vadamànà 
vadeyyuü abhåtena và;  saõhena và bhikkhave pare vadamànà vadeyyuü pharusena và;  atthasaühitena 
và bhikkhave pare vadamànà vadeyyuü anatthasaühitena và;  mettacittà và bhikkhave pare vadamànà 
vadeyyuü dosantarà và.  Tatràpi kho bhikkhave evaü sikkhitabbaü:  Na c’eva no cittaü vipariõataü 
bhavissati na ca pàpikaü vàcaü nicchàressàma hitànumkampã ca viharissàma...  MN I 126-27
48 Ima¤ ca tumhe bhikkhave kakacåpamaü ovàdaü abhikkhaõaü manasikareyyàtha, passatha no tumhe 
bhikkhave taü vacanapathaü aõuü và thålaü và yaü tumhe nàdhivàseyyàthàti.  -- No h’etaü bhante. 
MN I 129
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significant junctures in the Mahàparinibbànasutta, again in connection with vedanà. 
Here, though, it is used in connection with speech which one hears which is in some way 
unpleasant.  This provides an interesting connection with the other sutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya in which the simile of the saw appears, the Mahàhatthipadopamasutta.  
A study of passages which have a bearing on the Sallasutta passage:  the 
Mahàhatthipadopamasutta (MN 28)
This discourse is represented as being given not by the Buddha, but by one of his leading 
disciples, Sàriputta.  In it we find the following passage:
So then, if others abuse, revile, scold, and harass a bhikkhu, he understands thus: 
“This painful vedanà born of ear-contact has arisen in me.  This is dependent, not 
independent.  Dependent on what?  Dependent on contact.”  Then he sees that 
contact is impermanent, that vedanà feeling is impermanent, that perception is 
impermanent, that formations are impermanent, and that consciousness is 
impermanent.  And his mind ... acquires confidence, steadiness and decision.49
Again we have an instance of speech which is to be endured.  Here, however, the 
analysis of this phenomenon is taken to another level.  The bhikkhu of this passage 
understands that from the contact (samphassa) of this speech, an unpleasant vedanà has 
arisen.  This is the crucial step;  the speech itself is not analysed, but its effect on the 
hearer.  The nature of this vedanà is then further examined:  it is understood to be 
dependent upon contact.  The bhikkhu then “sees” (passati) that the contact is 
impermanent and that the vedanà is impermanent.  Thus one of the key notions of the 
Nikàyas, with which these texts characterize all phenomena, is brought in at this juncture 
in the bhikkhu’s thought process.  It is not said, however, that he experiences this as a 
thought:  rather, he “sees” (passati) these elements as impermanent.  This verb implies a 
direct experience of the phenomenon, rather than a conceptualization of it.  The other 
mental aggregates (that is perception (sa¤¤à), the saïkhàras, and consciousness 
49 Ta¤-ce àvuso bhikkhuü pare akkosanti paribhàsanti rosenti vihesenti, so evaü pajànàti: Uppannà kho 
me ayaü sota-samphassajà dukkhà vedanà, sà ca kho pañicca no appañicca, kiü pañicca:  phassaü 
pañicca.  So: phasso anicco ti passati, vedanà aniccà ti passati, sa¤¤à aniccà ti passati, saïkhàrà aniccà ti  
passati, vi¤¤ànaü aniccan ti passati.  Tassa ... cittaü pakkhandati pasãdati santiññhati adhimuccati.  MN I 
185-86
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(vi¤¤àõa)) are also seen as impermanent.  As a result of this process, the bhikkhu’s mind 
becomes calm.  Sàriputta then quotes the simile of the saw.
Using the simile of the Sallasutta, we could say that the bhikkhu of this sutta is pierced 
by only one arrow.  There is the unpleasant vedanà which comes about from having 
heard offensive speech, but, by the use of wisdom, he is able to keep his mind calm, that 
is, there is no unpleasant mental vedanà.  This interpretation, however, is only possible if 
we understand the vedanà which comes from the contact of hearing (sotasamphassajà 
vedanà) as being bodily vedanà.  
Now the sense of hearing is normally understood to operate independently of the body, 
except of course for the involvement of the parts of the body which make up the ear.  It 
is usually understood as being largely a mental process, especially the process of hearing 
words which are understood as offensive.  That this process involves the body in some 
way can be explained by interpreting the vedanà that is associated with hearing as having 
an aspect that is related to the body.
 
On the topic of bearing offensive speech, we may recall that this is associated with the 
bearing of painful bodily vedanà in the passage from the Sabbàsavasutta which we 
looked at above:
he endures ill-spoken, unwelcome words and arisen bodily vedanà that are 
painful, racking, sharp, piercing, disagreeable, distressing, and menacing to life.50
The “two vedanàs” of the Sallasutta passage
The above passages from the Kakacåpamasutta and the Mahàhatthipadopamasutta show 
that the distinction that is made in the Sallasutta between a person who feels two vedanàs 
when he or she feels a painful vedanà, that is, both bodily and mental, and a person who 
feels only the bodily vedanà on this occasion, echoes an important theme in the Nikàyas. 
The association of this theme with the analysis of vedanà into its physical and mental 
aspects puts the discourse onto a different level.  The simile of the saw is a striking 
50 duruttànaü duràgatànaü vacanapathànaü, uppannànaü sàrãrikànaü vedanànaü dukkhànaü 
tippànaü kharànaü kañukànaü asàtànaü amanàpànaü pàõaharànaü adhivàsakajàtiko hoti.  MN I 10
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image which is used by the Buddha to make the bhikkhus whom he is teaching realize 
the importance of not becoming upset by adverse events.  The analysis of vedanà into 
mental and physical aspects, on the other hand, gives this process another dimension: 
now it can be understood without reference to the specific circumstances of the outside 
event.  
The passage which follows these lines that we have been looking at from the Sallasutta 
are a description of a soteriological process in which vedanà plays a key role.  This 
passage was pointed out in the first chapter.  To briefly recapitulate, the noble disciple is 
described as not having aversion to unpleasant vedanà and thus eradicating the 
“underlying tendencies” (anusaya) associated with unpleasant vedanà; as not delighting 
in pleasant vedanà and thus eradicating the anusayas related to pleasant vedanà; and as 
understanding the impermanent nature of sensations which are neither pleasant nor 
unpleasant and thus eradicating the anusayas which are associated with them.  In the 
context of this sutta, it is clear that in all of these cases the vedanà that is being referred 
to is vedanà at the physical level.  Vedanà is here the first of the “barbs”, the physical 
barb, and the noble disciple does not experience the barb of mental vedanà which an 
ordinary person (puthujjana) does on this occasion.  In this way he allows the 
soteriological process to take place.  
Emphasis on bodily aspect of vedanà in the âkàsasutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta
The importance given to the physical aspect of vedanà in the Sallasutta may come as 
some surprise to a reader of these texts who is accustomed to the commentarial 
classification of vedanà as one of the four “immaterial” (aråpino) aggregates” which are 
contrasted with the aggregate of matter.  
It is not, however, the only place in the Nikàyas where the “bodily” (kàyika) aspect of 
vedanà is emphasised.  The twelfth sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta, the âkàsasutta, is of 
great interest in this respect.  The sutta begins with a simile:  just as various types of 
winds blow in the sky, from various directions, of various strengths, etc., so various 
types of vedanà, that is pleasant vedanà, painful vedanà, and vedanà which is neither 
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pleasant nor painful, arise in this body (imasmiü kàyasmiü).51  This simile, which is 
given first in prose, is then given again in verse.  The wording for our key terms is 
almost identical:  
tathevimasmiü pi kàyasmiü, samuppajjati vedanà
sukhadukkhasamuppatti, adukkhamasukkhà ca yà.52
So again we are told that vedanà arises “in this body” (imasmiü pi kàyasmiü).
These statements are then followed by four lines of verse which conclude the sutta, and 
which also occur as the final lines of another sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta, the 
Pahànenasutta.53  The last two lines we also find as the final lines of the Daññhabbenasutta 
of the Vedanàsaüyutta.54  We have already examined these lines in the first chapter, 
because they put great emphasis on the role of vedanà in the soteriological process.  The 
wise person (paõóita) is said to have full comprehension of (parijànàti) all vedanàs, and, 
having fully understood vedanà (so vedanà pari¤¤àya), to be free from the àsavas.  He is 
called “one who has knowledge” (vedagu), and at death he does not return to the finite 
world (saïkha).  
There are hardly any statements in the Nikàyas which give as much importance to 
vedanà in the description of a soteriological process as these which are found here, in 
this sutta which also contains one of the clearest statements of the physical aspect of 
vedanà.
The thirteenth sutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta , also called the âkàsasutta, repeats the prose 
section of the preceeding sutta, so that the information that this sutta gives is that 
“vedanàs arise in this body”.   The fourteenth sutta of the collection, the âgàrasutta,55 
also gives this information, but it uses a different simile to illustrate the point.  Here, the 
various vedanà which arise in the body are compared to the various visitors who come to 
stay at a rest house:  they may come from different directions, and they may be of 
51 imasmiü kàyasmiü vividhà vedanà uppajjanti, sukhà pi vedanà, dukkhà pi vedanà,  adukkhamasukhà pi  
vedanà uppajjanti.  SN IV 218
52 SN IV 218
53 SN IV 206
54 SN IV 207
55 SN IV 219
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various castes, nobles (khattiyas), bràhmans, etc.  The central concern of these two suttas 
is therefore simply to highlight the fact that vedanà arises in the body.  The soteriological 
dimension of the first âkàsasutta is not found in these suttas.
Emphasis on bodily aspect of vedanà in the Gela¤¤asutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta
There is another sutta in the Vedanàsaüyutta which gives some information on the 
relationship between vedanà and the body.  This is the seventh sutta of the collection, the 
Gela¤¤asutta.  The first part of the sutta is concerned with describing a bhikkhu who is 
aware (sato) and who has complete understanding (sampajàno).  These are key terms 
from the description of the practice of the establishing of mindfulness (satipaññhàna). 
The remainder of the sutta presupposes that the bhikkhu is possessed of these qualities. 
The sutta continues,
Now, bhikkhus, as that bhikkhu dwells aware, with complete understanding, 
earnest, ardent, strenuous, there arises in him vedanà that is pleasant, and he thus 
understands:  “There is arisen in me this pleasant vedanà.  Now that is dependent, 
not without cause.  Dependent on what?  Dependent on this very body.56
The relationship between vedanà and the body is given here in somewhat different terms 
than it is in the âkàsasutta.  Vedanà is here described as being dependent (pañicca) upon 
the body.  In this section pleasant vedanà is being discussed.  Further on in the sutta 
there is a parallel section dealing with painful vedanà and one dealing with vedanà 
which is neither pleasant nor painful.  The ramifications of vedanà being dependent on 
the body are now taken up:
“Now this body is impermanent, compounded, arisen owing to something.  It is 
owing to this impermanent body, which has so arisen, that pleasant vedanà has 
arisen as a consequence, and how can that be permanent?”57
56 Tassa ce bhikkhave bhikkhuno evaü satassa sampajànassa appamattassa àtàpino pahitattassa viharato 
uppajjati sukhà vedanà, so evam pajànàti, Uppannà kho me ayaü sukhà vedanà, sà ca kho pañicca no 
apañicca, kim pañicca, imaü eva kàyam pañicca.  SN IV 211
57 ayaü kho pana kàyo anicco saïkhato pañicca samuppanno, aniccaü kho pana saïkhatam pañicca 
samuppannaü kàyam pañicca uppannà sukhà vedanà kuto niccà bhavissatãti.  SN IV 211
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Again, as we have seen in many places in the Nikàyas, vedanà is associated with the key 
notion of impermanence.  This leads to the bhikkhu taking up a specific practice for 
which the body and vedanà are the base.  This leads in turn to the abandoning of the 
“underlying tendencies” (anusaya) in relation to the body and to vedanà:
Thus he dwells contemplating impermanence in body and pleasant vedanà, he 
dwells contemplating their transience, their waning, their ceasing, the giving of 
them up.  As he thus dwells contemplating impermanence in body and pleasant 
vedanà, contemplating their transience ... the underlying tendency to lust for body 
and pleasant vedanà is abandoned.58
In the Chachakkasutta of the Majjhimanikàya, one who abandons the anusayas is said to 
make an end of suffering.59  So we have here a very strong emphasis on vedanà and its 
relation to the body in the context of the description of a soteriological process.
This sutta has parallels with passages from other suttas in the Nikàyas, but there are also 
important aspects in which it is unique.  The fact that it describes vedanà as being 
dependent (pañicca) on the body is particularly noteworthy.  In the dependent origination 
sequence, vedanà is said to be dependent--and a closely related word, paccaya, is used--
on contact (phassa).  One of the passages from the Mahàhatthipadopamasutta that we 
looked at above is based on this vedanà-phassa link, and its similarity to and difference 
from our Gela¤¤asutta passage are striking.  Let us look at them side by side.  Here is the 
passage from the Gela¤¤asutta:
There is arisen in me this pleasant vedanà.  Now that is dependent, not without 
cause.  Dependent on what?  Dependent on this very body.  Now this body is 
impermanent.60
And now those from the Mahàhatthipadopamasutta:
58 So kàye ca sukhàya ca vedanàya aniccànupassã viharati, vayànupassã viharati, viràgànupassã viharati,  
noridhànupassã viharati, pañinissaggànupassã viharati, tassa kàye ca sukhàya ca vedanàya 
aniccànupassino viharato vayànupassino viharato viràgànupassino viharato nirodhànupassino viharato 
pañinissaggànupassã viharato yo kàye ca sukhàya ca vedanàya ràgànusayo so pahãyati.  SN IV 211-12.
59 dukkhass’ antakaro bhavissati  MN III 286
60 Uppannà kho me ayaü sukhà vedanà, sà ca kho pañicca no apañicca, kim pañicca, imaü eva kàyam 
pañicca,  ayaü kho pana kàyo anicco...   SN IV 211
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he understands thus:  “This painful feeling born of ear-contact has arisen in me. 
This is dependent, not independent.  Dependent on what?  Dependent on 
contact.”  Then he sees that contact is impermanent, that feeling is impermanent 
...61
The second example forms part of a brief narrative:  we are given the hypothetical 
situation of a bhikkhu who is insulted, and we are shown the best way for him to deal 
with this.  In the Gela¤¤asutta, on the other hand, the situation is not specified;  the 
teachings here apply universally:  we are shown how to make use of pleasant, painful, 
and neither-pleasant-nor-painful vedanà to abandon “underlying tendencies” (anusaya). 
And we are told that the way to do this is firstly by understanding the relationship of 
vedanà with the body.
The significance of the phrase “So kàyapariyantikaü vedanaü vediyamàno ... ” in the 
Gela¤¤asutta
The bodily aspect of vedanà is referred to again in the Gela¤¤asutta.  The following Pali 
phrase appears in the concluding paragraphs:
So kàyapariyantikaü vedanaü vediyamàno Kàyapariyantikaü vedanaü 
vediyàmãti pajànàti.  SN IV 213
This phrase has elicited varying responses from translators over the years.  Let us briefly 
survey their translations.  (Some of these translations are of this phrase as it appears in 
other suttas).  C.A.F. Rhys Davids arrived at the following, though it is difficult to see 
how she did so:  
When he feels a feeling that his powers have reached their limit, he knows that he 
feels such a feeling.62
61 so evaü pajànàti: Uppannà kho me ayaü sota-samphassajà dukkhà vedanà, sà ca kho pañicca no 
appañicca, kiü pañicca:  phassaü pañicca.  So: phasso anicco ti passati, vedanà aniccà ti passati, sa¤¤à 
aniccà ti passati, saïkhàrà... vi¤¤ànaü...  MN I 185-86.
62 C.A.F. Rhys Davids, The Book of the Kindred Sayings, London, Pali Text Society, vol. II, 1922, p.58 (on 
SN II 83).
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F.L. Woodward translated this phrase a number of times.  On the earlier occasions he 
seems to have been influenced by C.A.F. Rhys Davids’ interpretation, giving, for 
example:  
When he feels a feeling that his bodily endurance has reached its limit, he knows 
that he so feels.63
On the last occasion that he translated it, however, he gives:  
When he feels a feeling limited by body, he knows that he so feels.64
He adds a footnote to this translation, stating that he is “not sure” that his earlier 
translation is right.  He refers in this footnote to the Pali commentary on this text, which 
explains kàyapariyantikaü as kàyaparicchinnaü, which Woodward translates as 
“confined to the limits of the body ...”
The earlier translations seem to belong to a type which K.R. Norman refers to as 
“intuitive” translations.65  The translators have chosen their renderings because they 
believed that they have understood the entire passage, without looking closely enough at 
the individual words and phrases.  In this case they seem to have been influenced by the 
fact that a few lines further on, the state after death (kàyassa bhedà uddhaü) of the 
bhikkhu, who is the subject of this passage, is described.  The phrase kàyapariyantikaü 
vedanaü, however, is not related to death or dying.  The word pariyantika is given in the 
PED as a term which is used at the end of compounds, meaning “ending in, bounded or 
limited by”.  In Sanskrit the cognate word paryanta seems to be used in a similar sense: 
Monier-Williams gives “bounded by”, “extending as far as”.66  The translation that 
Woodward later arrived at appears, therefore, to be closer to what the meaning of the Pali 
may be.  R. Gombrich in a recent article paraphrases this phrase as “... if he has a 
63 F.L. Woodward, The Book of the Kindred Sayings, London, Pali Text Society, vol. IV, 1927, p.143. 
64 F.L. Woodward, The Book of the Gradual Sayings, London, Pali Text Society, vol.II, 1933, p.210.
65 K.R. Norman, A Philological Approach to Buddhism, London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
1997, p.9.
66 M. Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1899, s.v.
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sensation co-extensive with his body ..., he feels it as such...”.67  It seems clear that the 
phrase kàyapariyantikaü vedanaü is giving a great deal of emphasis to the bodily aspect 
of vedanà.  Vedanà is here being identified with the body. 
There are, however, two translations which have appeared since Woodward revised his 
original opinion on this phrase which seem to revert to the older, inaccurate 
interpretation.  ¥aõamoli, whose translation of this passage was published after his death 
from the draft that he left, gives:
When he feels feeling of the body ending, he understands:  “I feel feeling of the 
body ending.”68
And Nyanaponika, in 1983, gives, in a similar vein:  
When having painful feelings endangering the body, he knows: “I have painful 
feelings endangering the body.”69
The translators who failed to arrive at a correct translation of this phrase were no doubt 
influenced by the context in which we find it;  the text which follows this phrase a little 
later in the passage is concerned with what happens after death (kàyassa bhedà).  It could 
also be, however, that they were reluctant to identify vedanà with the body because they 
were influenced by the commentarial interpretation of vedanà as one of the formless 
aggregates (aråpino khandhà).
Not all of the translations of the phrase kàyapariyantikaü vedanaü that we have looked 
at here are taken from translations of the Gela¤¤asutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta.  This 
phrase appears in a number of other places in the Nikàyas.  The distribution of these 
appearances is of considerable interest.  It occurs once in the Majjhimanikàya,70 once in 
the Aïguttaranikàya,71 and four times in the Saüyuttanikàya.  Within the 
67 R. Gombrich, “The Buddha and the Jains”, Asiatische Studien, XLVIII, 4, 1994, p.1092.
68 ¥aõamoli, ed. Phra Khantipalo, A Treasury of the Buddha’s Discourses from the Majjhima-nikaya 
(Middle Collection), vol.ii, Wisemans Ferry, N.S.W., Wat Buddha-Dhamma, no date, p.64.
69 Nyanaponika, Contemplation of Feeling, Kandy, Buddhist Publication Society, 1983, p.19.
70 MN III 244-5
71 AN II 198
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Saüyuttanikàya, it appears firstly in the Nidànasaüyutta,72 the main section of the 
second volume, devoted to texts dealing with the schema of dependent origination 
(pañiccasamuppàda); then in the Khandhasaüyutta,73 the main section of the third 
volume, devoted to texts dealing with the five aggregates;  then in the fourth volume, in 
the Vedanàsaüyutta74;  and finally in the fifth volume, the Mahàvagga,75 in a section 
with texts on mindfulness of in-breathing and out-breathing (ànàpànasati).  The first 
volume of the Saüyuttanikàya, from which this phrase is absent, is largely made up of 
verse suttas, which do not lend themselves easily to analysis of these kinds of terms. 
The phrase is also absent from the Dãghanikàya, where we find texts of a rather different 
nature to those in the three other principal Nikàyas.  Thus we find this phrase represented 
in most of the major groups of texts in the Nikàyas, and within the Saüyuttanikàya, 
where the texts are arranged according to their subject matter, we find it in each major 
subdivision except for the verse collection.  It is possible that the fact that this phrase is 
distributed in such a manner points to it being considered of some significance by the 
compilers of these texts.  In truth, though, we know little about the process by which 
these texts were compiled, and suggestions like this must necessarily remain speculative.
This phrase, which puts so much emphasis on the connection of vedanà with the body, is 
embedded in the same passage on each of its appearances, and this passage is of great 
soteriological significance.  This passage, which was examined in detail in the first 
chapter, puts emphasis on the understanding of the impermanent (anicca) nature of 
vedanà, and of the importance of remaining detached (visaüyutto) from vedanà.  In the 
context of the important role of vedanà in the soteriological process described here, the 
phrase on the bodily nature of vedanà takes on even greater significance.  And in the 
Gela¤¤asutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta, as we saw above, this passage follows on from one 
which explains how vedanà is intimately connected with the body.
Emphasis on bodily aspect of vedanà in the Dãghanakhasutta
72 SN II 82-83
73 SN III 126
74 SN IV 213
75 SN V 319
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Another sutta which was commented upon in the first chapter of this thesis in order to 
highlight the emphasis which is put on vedanà in a description of a soteriological process 
is also of some interest in terms of our understanding of the relationship between vedanà 
and the body as represented in these texts.  This is the Dãghanakhasutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya.  In this sutta we find the following description of the body:
Now, Aggivessana, this body made of material form, consisting of the four great 
elements, procreated by a mother and father, and built up out of boiled rice and 
porridge, is subject to impermanence, to being worn and rubbed away, to 
dissolution and disintegration.76
A passage very similar to this one is used in a number of places in the Nikàyas to explain 
the term which refers to the body in extended metaphors.  For example, earlier on in the 
Majjhimanikàya, we find the term “ant-hill” (vammãka) used to refer to the body, and it 
is explained in the following manner:  
Bhikkhu, the ant-hill is a symbol for this body, consisting of the four great 
elements, procreated by a mother and father, built up out of boiled rice and 
porridge, and subject to impermanence, to being worn and rubbed away, to 
dissolution and disintegration.77
In other metaphors, the terms “boil”,78 “town”,79 and “chariot”80 are explained in exactly 
the same way.  In other contexts as well, we find this passage used when reference is 
made to the body.81  This passage is, therefore, a kind of standard, paradigmatic 
description of the body in the Nikàyas.
The passage in the Dãghanakhasutta continues in the following manner:
76 Ayaü kho pan’Aggivessana kàyo råpã càtummahàbhåtiko màtàpettikasambhavo odanakummàsåpacayo 
aniccucchàdana-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhaüsanadhammo.  MN I 500
77 Vammãko ti kho bhikkhu imassetaü càtumahàbhåtikassa kàyassa adhivacanaü màtàpettikasambhavassa 
odanakummàsupacayassa anicc-cucchàdana-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhaüsanadhammassa.  MN I 144
78 SN IV 83 and AN IV 386
79 SN IV 194
80 SN IV 292
81 DN I 76, MN II 17, SN V 369-70
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It should be regarded as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumour, as a 
dart, as a calamity, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as void, as not 
self.82
There follows a brief passage which states that if one views the body in the terms with 
which it is described here, desire towards the body will be abandoned.  Immediately after 
this comes a blunt statement of the three vedanàs:
There are these three vedanàs, Aggivessana, pleasant vedanà, unpleasant vedanà, 
and vedanà which is neither pleasant nor unpleasant.83
There is no preparation for this sudden change of topic.  This same phrase, or phrases 
almost identical with it, occurs quite a number of times in the Nikàyas.  When it does 
occur, it is either the subject matter of the entire sutta, as in many of the suttas of the 
Vedanàsaüyutta;84 or it is related to the broader context of the sutta, as for example, in 
discussion of the place of vedanà in the dependent origination schema 
(pañiccasamuppàda)85; or it is in a sutta which is concerned with enumerating various 
types of phenomena (dhamma), as in the Saïgãtisutta and the Dasuttarasutta of the last 
volume of the Dãghanikàya.86  Finding it suddenly cropping up as it does here without 
any preparation is quite unusual.
What we have in effect is a stark juxtaposition of a significant passage on the body with 
a significant passage on vedanà.  For, as we have seen in the first chapter, the theme of 
vedanà is now developed:  vedanà plays a central role in a description of a soteriological 
practice, so much so that the sutta has an alternative title in the commentarial literature, 
as the Vedanàpariggahanasutta, the Discourse on the Grasping of Vedanà.  A significant 
feature of this passage is the emphasis on the impermanent nature of vedanà:
82 aniccato dukkhato rogato gaõóato sallato aghato àbàdhato parato palokato su¤¤ato anattato 
samanupassitabbo.  MN I 500
83 Tisso kho imà Aggivessana vedanà:  sukhà vedanà dukkhà vedanà adukkhamasukhà vedanà.  MN I 500
84 See SN IV 204, ff.
85 SN II 53 and SN II 99
86 DN III 216 and 275
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Pleasant vedanà, Aggivessana, is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, 
subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away and ceasing.87
Even though there is no explicit link made in the jump from a description of the nature of 
the body to that of the nature of vedanà, there is an important thematic link between 
these descriptions.  That is the emphasis in both descriptions on impermanence, one of 
the key concepts of the Nikàyas.  The body is  “subject to impermanence, to being worn 
and rubbed away, to dissolution and disintegration” (aniccucchàdana-parimaddana-
bhedana-viddhaüsanadhammo).  It “should be regarded as impermanent...” (aniccato...  
samanupassitabbo).  
Bearing this connection in mind, and bearing in mind the juxtaposition of these two 
significant passages, one is tempted to conclude that the bodily aspect of vedanà is being 
emphasised in this sutta.  This is not, however, stated explicitly, so any conclusions on 
this matter must remain conjectural.
 
Emphasis on bodily aspect of vedanà in the Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta
There is another sutta in the Majjhimanikàya which we have seen as giving an important 
role to vedanà in a description of a soteriological process, and which also implies a 
connection between the body and vedanà.  This is the Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta.  The 
relevant passage begins in this manner:
When he has seen a material shape through the eye, he does not feel attraction for 
agreeable material shapes, he does not feel repugnance for disagreeable material 
shapes; and he dwells with mindfulness aroused as to the body, with a mind that 
is unlimited; and he comprehends that freedom of mind and that freedom through 
intuitive wisdom as they really are, whereby those evil unskilled states of his are 
stopped without remainder.  Having abandoned thus compliance and antipathy, 
whatever vedanà he feels--pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant--he 
does not delight in that vedanà, does not welcome it and persist in cleaving to it.88
87 Sukhà pi kho Aggivessana vedanà aniccà saïkhatà pañiccasamuppannà khayadhammà vayadhammà 
viràgadhammà nirodhadhammà  (MN I 500)
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Some key terms for our discussion can be extracted from this passage, without, I hope, 
distorting the overall sense of the passage.  Let us look at two of the phrases from this 
passage side by side.  Firstly:
he dwells with mindfulness aroused as to the body... (So... upaññhitakàyasati ca 
viharati  ...  MN I 270)
and then:
  ...  whatever vedanà he feels--pleasant or painful or neither painful nor 
pleasant--he does not delight in that vedanà, does not welcome it and persist in 
cleaving to it.  (.... yam ka¤ci vedanaü vedeti sukhaü và dukkhaü và 
adukkhamasukhaü và, so taü vedanaü nàbhinandati nàbhivadati nàjjhosàya 
tiññhati.  MN I 270)
The practice which leads to the stage at which the person described in this passage is 
able to remain unaffected by vedanà which is pleasant, painful or neither-pleasant-nor-
painful is a practice which in part at least is based on the body.  This suggests that the 
bodily aspect of vedanà may have a role to play in the process described in this passage.
Vedanà exemplifies the link between mind and body in the Nikàyas
The interest that we find in the Nikàyas in pointing out the physical and mental aspects 
of vedanà echoes a broader theme.  In a number of places, we find mental and physical 
aspects of various phenomena.  The mind and the body are both given importance in the 
description of a number of practices.  Sometimes we find this theme related in some way 
to the concept of vedanà.  This theme seems to have presented some difficulties to the 
early commentators on these texts, for we find a certain amount of inconsistency in their 
treatment of it.
88 So cakkhunà råpaü disvà piyaråpe råpe na sàrajjati, appiyaråpe råpe na byàpajjati, upaññhitakàyasati  
ca viharati appamàõacetaso, ta¤-ca cetovimuttiü pa¤¤àvimuttiü yathàbhåtaü pajànàti yatth’assa te  
pàpakà akusalà dhammà aparisesà nirujjhanti.  So evaü anurodhavirodhavippahãno yaü ka¤ci vedanaü 
vedeti, sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và, so taü vedanaü nàbhinandati nàbhivadati  
nàjjhosàya tiññhati.  MN I 270
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The following passage appears in several places in each of the four principal Nikàyas:
When he is glad, joy is born in him; in one who is joyous, the body becomes 
tranquil; one whose body is tranquil feels pleasure; in one who feels pleasure, the 
mind becomes concentrated.89
Gethin has made the following observations on this passage:
It is perhaps of some interest that passaddhi [“tranquillity”] is described in [this] 
ancient formula as being mediated through the body...  Some form of movement 
from mind to body and back again is ... quite clearly indicated in the ancient 
formula concerned with the dynamics of pãti [“joy”] and passaddhi  
[“tranquillity”].90
It is indeed a remarkable description of a process in which mental and physical events 
both play important roles and interact with each other in important ways.  Moreover, a 
term related to vedanà plays a role in this process.  The phrase sukhaü vedeti (“he feels 
pleasure”) uses a verb which is cognate with the term vedanà.  Extrapolating from the 
mental and physical aspects of vedanà that we have noticed in the above discussion, we 
can interpret the phrase sukhaü vedeti (“he feels pleasure”) as a link between the body 
(kàya) of the preceding phrase (“the body becomes tranquil,” kàyo passambhati) and the 
mind (citta) of the phrase which follows (“in one who feels pleasure, the mind becomes 
concentrated,” sukhino cittaü samàdhiyati).
The commentaries, however, have different views on the meaning of this passage.  The 
commentaries on the Dãghanikàya take kàya in this passage to mean the mind.  They 
understand the term kàya as a way of saying nàmakàya, that is, in the terms of the 
commentaries, the four immaterial aggregates.91  Other commentaries, however, are less 
unequivocal.  The commentary on this passage as it appears in the Majjhimanikàya 
89 pamuditassa pãti jàyati, pãtimanassa kàyo passambhati, passaddhakàyo sukhaü vedeti, sukhino cittaü 
samàdhiyati.  DN I 73, DN III 241, 288; MN I 37, 283; SN IV 78-79, 351-58; SN V 156, 398; AN I 243-4; 
AN III 21-23, 285-87; AN V 329-34
90 R. Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening, Leiden, Brill, 1992, p.155-6.
91 Sv I 217 on DN I 73 nàmakàyo passambhati and Sv III 1032 on DN III 241 kàyoti nàmakàyo 
pañipassambhati.
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simply glosses kàya as kàya.92  This gives us little further information on how this 
commentary wants us to understand the term.  It is possible that we are being asked to 
take kàya at face value, as meaning simply the physical body.
On its first appearance in the Aïguttaranikàya, the commentary on that text has another 
interpretation of this passage:  ““the body becomes tranquil” [means] the group of the 
mind (nàmakàya) and the group of matter (råpakàya) are without agitation”.93 
Interestingly, here the commentary seems to be taking kàya as meaning mind and body 
together, using its customary terminology of nàmakàya for the four immaterial 
aggregates and råpakàya for the aggregate of matter, that is, the body.  Later on in the 
Aïguttaranikàya commentary, however, commenting on this same phrase, we find kàya 
glossed as nàmakàya only, that is, the group of mental aggregates.94
When this passage appears in the Saüyuttanikàya, as it does in numerous places, the 
commentary is silent on the term kàya.  The term “whose body is tranquil” 
(passaddhakàyo), does, however, occur in a verse passage in the Màrasaüyutta of the 
first volume of the Saüyuttanikàya.95  And here we find yet another explanation of this 
term:  ““Whose body is tranquil” [means] whose body is tranquil because of the 
tranquillising of the body of in- and out-breathing by the fourth jhàna”.96  This is related 
to another explanation of kàya that we find in the Nikàyas.  In the Cåëavedallasutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya, the lay disciple Visàkha asks the bhikkhunã Dhammadinnà the meaning 
of the term kàyasaïkhàra (“saïkhàra of the body”).97  She tells him that it means in- and 
out-breathing (assàsapassàsà).  When he asks the reason that this definition is given, she 
says that it is because in- and out-breathing is bodily (kàyika), that these phenomena are 
“bound up with the body” (ete dhammà kàyapañibaddhà).  So the commentary on the 
Saüyuttanikàya appears not to take kàya in the term passaddhakàya to be the mental 
body, as some of the other commentaries do; it seems to understands kàya here as the 
physical body.
92 kàyo passambhatãti kàyo passaddho hoti våpasantadaratho Ps I 174 on MN I 37
93 kàyo passambhatãti nàmakàyopi råpakàyopi vigatadaratho hoti  Mp II 357 on AN I 243
94 kàyoti nàmakàyo  Mp III 230 on AN III 21
95 SN I 126
96 passaddhakàyoti catutthajjhànena assàsapassàsakàyassa passaddhattà passaddhakàyo  Spk I 187
97 MN I 301
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This survey of the commentarial interpretations of the term passaddhakàya reveals some 
tensions.  They seem to stem from a reluctance to take the term kàya in this context at 
face value.
It is “one whose body is tranquil” (passaddhakàya) who “feels pleasure” (sukhaü 
vedeti).  This allows us to speculate that the pleasure spoken of here may be related to 
the body.  The text continues:  “in one who feels pleasure, the mind becomes 
concentrated” (sukhino cittaü samàdhiyati).  Here, we may be tempted to speculate that 
the pleasure involved here is of a mental nature.  Or we could take the two phrases 
together and conclude that “pleasure” (or “happiness”) in this context is of both a mental 
and a physical nature.  The fact that the verb vedeti, related to vedanà, is used here, and 
that vedanà is shown in many places in the Nikàyas to have both a physical and a mental 
aspect, supports this third interpretation.
The commentaries are divided in their interpretation of the nature of pleasure in this 
context.  The Dãghanikàya commentary and the Aïguttaranikàya commentary say that it 
is both bodily and mental.98  The Majjhimanikàya commentary, on the other hand, 
specifies that “pleasure” in this passage is “mental pleasure”.99  It is curious to note that it 
is the Majjhimanikàya commentary, which does not define kàya in this passage as 
nàmakàya (mental group), which nevertheless represents “pleasure” only in mental 
terms.  And it is the Dãghanikàya commentary, which sees kàya as being a mental 
phenomenon (nàmakàya), which explains “pleasure” as being both bodily and mental 
(kàyikampi cetasikampi).  This seems to be further evidence of the confusion in the 
minds of the commentators on these questions.
Some kind of relationship between the mind and the body is described in other places in 
the Nikàyas as well, and examining these passages can help to put into perspective the 
question of the mental and bodily aspects of vedanà.  The following passage bears some 
strong resemblances with the passage which we have just been looking at, and it too 
appears at numerous places in the Nikàyas:
98 Sv I 217 on DN I 73:  sukhaü vedetãti kàyikampi cetasikampi sukhaü vedeti.  Mp II 357 on AN I 243: 
sukhaü vediyatãti kàyikacetasikasukhaü vediyati
99 Ps I 174 on MN I 37:  passaddhakàyo sukhanti evaü våpasantakàyadaratho cetasikaü sukhaü 
pañisaüvedeti
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Tireless energy, o brahman, was aroused in me and unremitting mindfulness was 
established, my body was tranquil and untroubled, my mind concentrated and 
unified.100
We find this passage in all of the Nikàyas except for the Dãghanikàya, and it occurs in 
several places in the Majjhimanikàya and the Aïguttaranikàya.  We also find it in the 
Itivuttaka.101  As with the previous passage, if we read kàya as the physical body here, 
the interaction between physical and mental events can be seen to be of great importance 
in this description of a spiritual practice.  Some of the terms in this passage bear a very 
close resemblance to those in the passage examined above.  Yet when we turn to the 
commentaries, we find that they explain these words quite differently.  The term 
passaddho kàyo (“my body was tranquil”) is very nearly the same as the compound 
passaddhakàyo found in the first passage.  Yet the commentary on the Majjhimanikàya 
gives an explanation for it which is very different to that given by the commentaries for 
the term passaddho kàyo.  The passage from the Majjhimanikàya commentary is as 
follows:
“The body is tranquil” (means) by the production of tranquillity of mind and 
body, my body too was tranquil.  In this connection, when the mind-body (nàma-
kàya) is tranquil the material-body (råpa-kàya) is also tranquil, therefore without 
having made a distinction between the mind-body and the material-body, the 
phrase “the body is tranquil” is used.102
This commentary is making full use of the possibility of interpreting kàya as both a 
mental and a physical phenomenon.
The Aïguttaranikàya commentary gives another interpretation of passaddho kàyo, which 
is different again from any of the various explanations which the commentaries give for 
passaddhakàya:
100 àraddhaü kho pana me bràhmaõa viriyaü bhavissati asallãnaü upaññhità sati asamuññhà passaddho 
kàyo asàraddho samàhitaü cittaü ekaggan ti.
101 MN I 21, 117, 186, 189; SN IV 125;  AN I 148, 282, AN II 14,  AN IV 176;  Itivuttaka, p.119-20
102 passaddho kàyoti kàyacittappassaddhisambhavena kàyopi me passaddho ahosi, tattha yasmà nàmakàye 
passaddhe råpakàyopi passaddhoyeva hoti, tasmà “nàmakàyo råpakàyo” ti avisesetvàva “passaddho 
kàyo” ti vuttaü.  Ps I 124 on MN I 21.
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“The body is tranquil” (means) the mental group and the body born of action is 
tranquil, has its agitation calmed.103
Here, kàya, besides being described as the group of mental aggregates, is also called the 
“body born of action” (karajakàya), a term which we have not encountered in our 
examinations of the traditional exegeses of kàya.  Whether this term is referring to a 
physical or a mental phenomenon is not immediately clear.  In the Dãghanikàya 
commentary, however, it is clearly shown to be the physical body, firstly in a passage 
which relates it to the description of the body as “made of material form, consisting of 
the four great elements, procreated by a mother and father, and built up out of boiled rice 
and porridge”, and secondly in a passage which describes it as being the “four great 
elements”.104  The commentary on passaddho kàyo in the Itivuttaka is practically 
identical with this one from the Aïguttaranikàya commentary.
So again we see here the commentaries interpreting the term kàya as both a physical and 
a mental phenomenon.  The variety of commentarial interpretations of the term kàya in 
the phrases passaddhakàya and passaddho kàyo is of great interest in assessing the 
commentators’ views on how the Nikàya texts see the relationship between the mind and 
the body.  Some of the commentaries do not allow kàya any physical aspect.  When they 
do interpret kàya as being both physical and mental, they use a wide variety of 
expressions to describe this dual aspect.
Mental and physical aspects of descriptions of the “factor of awakening of tranquillity” 
(passaddhisambojjhango)
We come away from our survey of the commentaries’ opinions on the terms 
passaddhakàya and passaddho kàyo somewhat perplexed by their contradictions and 
their efforts to make what could appear to be a simple matter appear rather complicated. 
When we look into the Nikàyas, however, for more information on these terms, the 
situation seems to be somewhat clearer.  The term passaddhi (“tranquillity”), a noun 
103 passaddho kàyoti nàmakàyo ca karajakàyo ca passaddho våpasantadaratho.  Mp II 243 on AN I 148.
104 Sv III 722 on DN II 278:  vatthu nàma karajakàyo, yaü sandhàya vuttaü -- “ida¤ca pana me vi¤¤àõaü 
ettha sitaü ettha pañibaddhan”ti.  This is a reference to DN I 76 where consciousness is said to be bound 
to the body which is råpã càtummahàbhåtiko màtàpettikasambhavo...   
Sv III 764 on DN II 291:  karajakàyo nàma cattàri mahàbhåtàni upàdàråpa¤ce ti (sic).
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related to the perfect past participle passaddha, is found in a series known as the seven 
factors of awakening (bojjhaïga).  R. Gethin has commented on the significance of this 
series:
A statement to the effect that the Buddhist path consists essentially in the 
abandoning of the five hindrances, the development of the establishings of 
mindfulness and subsequent development of the awakening-factors is found 
several times in the Nikàyas:  AN V 194-5 (cf. DN II 83 = III 101 = SN V 161; 
AN III 387;  Nett 94).105
At a number of places we find a passage which describes the factors being developed in 
a sequential manner.  The term tranquillity is preceded by “joy” (pãti) and is followed by 
“concentration” (samàdhi).  We can note in passing that this part of the series bears a 
close resemblance to the passage which we examined at the beginning of this section, 
which gives these terms in the following form:  
joy (pãti) is born in him; in one who is joyous, the body becomes tranquil 
(passambhati); one whose body is tranquil feels pleasure; in one who feels 
pleasure, the mind becomes concentrated (samàdhiyati).106
In a number of suttas which deal with the seven factors of awakening we find the 
following passage:
Of one who is joyous body is tranquil and mind is tranquil.  Now, bhikkhus, 
when a bhikkhu who is joyous has body and mind tranquillized, then it is that the 
limb of wisdom which is tranquillity is established in him.  ...  Happy is he whose 
body is tranquillized.  Of him that is happy the mind is concentrated.107
105 R. Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening, Leiden, Brill, 1992, p.58.
106 pãti jàyati, pãtimanassa kàyo passambhati, passaddhakàyo sukhaü vedeti, sukhino cittaü samàdhiyati. 
DN I 73, etc.
107 Pãtimanassa kàyo pi passambhati, cittam pi passambhati.  Yasmiü samaye bhikkhave bhikkhuno 
pãtimanassa kàyo pi passambhati cittam pi passambhati, passaddhisambojjhaïgo tasmiü samaye 
bhikkhuno àraddho hoti.  ...   passaddhakàyassa sukhaü hoti, sukhino cittaü samàdhiyati.  SN V 68, cf. 
332 and 338.  MN III 86
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Here we have a clear statement of the involvement of both mind and body in this 
process.  Equally as clear are other statements found in the Bojjhangasaüyutta of the 
Saüyuttanikàya.  The following passage occurs three times:
There are, bhikkhus, tranquillity of body and tranquillity of mind.  Systematic 
attention thereto, if made much of, is this food for the arising of the limb of 
wisdom which is tranquillity if not yet arisen, or for its cultivation and fulfilment 
if already arisen.108
Another passage from the Bojjhaïgasaüyutta gives a similar impression:
Now, bhikkhus, tranquillity of body, that is a limb of wisdom that is tranquillity. 
Tranquillity of mind, that also is a limb of wisdom that is tranquillity.109
The calming of the body and the mind is also one of the benefits of the conscientious 
practice of mindfulness of the body (kàyagatà sati) mentioned in the Aïguttaranikàya:
Bhikkhus, if one thing be practised and made much of, body is calmed, mind is 
calmed...  What one thing?  It is mindfulness centred on the body.110
This context is particularly significant because the practice of mindfulness of the body is 
explicity concerned with the physical body--the term kàya in kàyagatà sati is never 
interpreted as the mental group (nàmakàya).  From the context of these suttas there is no 
reason to think that anything other than the physical body is meant by kàya and anything 
other than the mind is meant by citta.
Once again, though, the commentaries give contradictory interpretations of these 
passages.  The commentary on the Aïguttaranikàya passage111 just quoted glosses kàya 
108 Atthi bhikkhave kàyapassaddhi cittapassaddhi, tattha yonisomanasikàrabahulãkaro ayam àhàro 
anuppannassa và passaddhisambojjhaïgassa uppàdàya uppannassa và passaddhisambojjhaïgassa 
bhàvanàya pàripåriyà.  SN V 66, 104 & 107
109 Yad api bhikkhave kàyapassaddhi tad api passaddhisambojjhaïgo yad api bhikkhave cittapassaddhi  
tad api passaddhisambojjhaïgo.  SN V 111.
110 Ekadhamme bhikkhave bhàvite bahulãkate kàyo pi passambhati cittaü pi passambhati ... Katamasmiü 
ekadhamme?  Kàyagatà-satiyà.  AN I 43
111 Mp II 79 on AN I 43
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in the phrase “the body becomes tranquil” (kàyopi passambhati) as nàmakàyopi  
karajakàyopi, that is “the mental body and the body born of deeds”.  This is the same 
gloss that this commentary gives on the term passaddho kàyo when it appears at AN I 
148, as noted above.  In that place, of course, the term citta (mind) is not mentioned in 
the text.  Here the commentary makes no mention of the fact that the phrase kàyo pi  
passambhati is followed immediately by cittam pi passambhati.  In fact, it has placed 
itself in a difficult position to give a coherent explanation for citta here, having already 
given “the mental body” as a part of its definition of kàya.
When the Saüyuttanikàya commentary gives its interpretation of the phrase “there are, 
bhikkhus, tranquillity of body and tranquillity of mind” (atthi bhikkhave kàyapassaddhi  
cittapassaddhi), we find an interpretation of these terms which we have not yet 
encountered:
“Tranquillity of the body” (means) tranquillity of the agitation of three 
aggregates.  “Tranquillity of the mind” (means) tranquillity of the aggregate of 
consciousness.112
This explanation is related to a passage which occurs a number of times in the 
Dhammasaïgaõi, the first book of the Abhidhamma.  This passage is an explanation of 
kàyapassaddhi and cittapassaddhi:  the first is explained as tranquillity of the aggregates 
of vedanà, perception (sa¤¤à) and the saïkhàras, and the second as tranquillity of the 
aggregate of consciousness (vi¤¤àõa).113  So the Saüyuttanikàya commentary explains 
kàya in this passage not as the “mental body” but as a particular aspect of the mental 
body, that is, as three of the four mental aggregates.  The term citta (“mind”) is 
understood as referring to the fourth mental aggregate, consciousness (vi¤¤àõa).
R. Gethin has made the following suggestive comments on the Dhammasaïgaõi passage:
112 kàyapassaddhãti tiõõaü khandhànaü darathapassaddhi.  cittapassaddhãti vi¤¤àõakkhandhassa 
darathapassaddhi.  Spk III 141 on SN V 66, same as Spk III 170 on SN V 111
113 Katamà tasmiü samaye kàyapassaddhi hoti?  Yà tasmiü samaye vedanàkkhandhassa sa¤¤àkkhandhassa 
saïkhàrakkhandhassa passaddhi pañipassaddhi passambhanà pañipassambhanà pañipassambhitattaü, ayaü 
tasmiü samaye kàyapassaddhi hoti.  Katamà tasmiü samaye cittapassaddhi hoti?  Yà tasmiü samaye 
vi¤¤àõakkhandhassa passaddhi pañipassaddhi passambhanà pañipassambhanà pañipassambhitattaü, ayaü 
tasmiü samaye cittapassaddhi hoti.  Dhs. 14-15, 66.
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If one is to take this at face value, it seems to indicate that vedanà, sa¤¤à and 
saükhàras are seen as in some sense able to bridge the gap between mind and 
body.  They are, as it were, what mediates one’s state of mind to the body, and 
vice versa.114
These comments may not apply, however, to the passage from the Saüyuttanikàya 
commentary.  In the context of commentarial interpretations of similar passages, it 
seems, rather, that the commentary here is taking body (kàya) as the “mental body” 
(nàma-kàya), or at least as a part of the mental body (ie. vedanà, sa¤¤à and saïkhàra). 
The commentary still has to explain citta, and rather than remain silent, as the 
commentary on the similar Aïguttaranikàya passage does, it takes citta as the aggregate 
of consciousness (vi¤¤àõa).  It seems, however, that the Saüyuttanikàya commentary’s 
analysis of kàyapassaddhi and cittapassaddhi is not entirely coherent, perhaps as a result 
of an unwillingness to take the term kàya at face value, as meaning the physical body. 
Indeed, the interpretation of “body” as vedanà, perception and the saïkhàras and of 
“mind” as consciouness seems somewhat strained in view of the fact that a few lines 
earlier in the text we find mention of “bodily energy” (kàyikaü viriyaü) and “mental 
energy” (cetasikaü viriyaü), which the commentary is quite happy to interpret in a 
straightforward manner, that is with “body” taken as referring to the physical body, and 
“mind” as meaning simply the mind in a non-technical sense.115
Nevertheless, Gethin’s comments are interesting and deserve consideration.  His 
suggestion that vedanà, sa¤¤à and saïkhàras “are, as it were, what mediates one’s state 
of mind to the body, and vice versa” seems especially true of the way that we have seen 
vedanà used in the Nikàyas.  Gethin goes on to make the following observations:
The notion of the reciprocal nature of the relationship between mind and body is 
further brought out by the way in which in the Dhammasaïgaõi (followed by the 
later Abhidhamma) tranquillity of body and mind forms a group with five other 
pairs of items.  These are lightness (lahutà) of mind and body, softness (mudutà) 
of mind and body, readiness (kamma¤¤atà) of mind and body, fitness 
(pàgu¤¤atà) of mind and body, straightness (ujukatà) of mind and body [Dhs 9]. 
114 R. Gethin, 1992, p.155.
115 Spk III 170 on SN V 111
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The relationship that these factors bear to the body is underlined by the fact that 
precisely the same terminology in part is applied to the physical world.  Among 
the twenty-seven varieties of råpa distinguished by the Dhammasaïgaõi are 
lightness, softness and readiness of råpa [Dhs 134, 144].  So what at one level 
seems to represent a quite staightforward observation of the relationship between 
body and mind is potentially a conception of some subtlety and precision.116 
These are certainly very interesting ideas;  Gethin does not, however, explore them in 
any further detail.  Let us return to the Nikàyas to see if these texts can help us in 
understanding these concepts.  There are many other places in the Nikàyas where the 
body and the mind are show as working together, apart from those that we have noticed 
in which this theme is treated in the context of “tranquillity” (passaddhi).  It is 
worthwhile here investigating some of these passages because, as we have seen, the 
physical and mental aspects of vedanà are important characteristics of that phenomenon. 
An appreciation of the view that we find in the Nikàyas of the relationship between the 
mental and the physical may help us in our understanding of the nature of vedanà.
The expressions “the body with consciousness” (savi¤¤àõaka kàya) and “in this fathom-
long body, along with its perceptions and thoughts” (imasmi¤¤eva vyàmamatte kaëevare 
sa¤¤imhi samanake)
There are two pithy expressions, found in a number of places in the Nikàyas, which are 
used to refer to the human being as a combination of mind and body.  The more common 
of these is the phrase savi¤¤àõaka kàya (“the body with consciousness”).  It is found a 
number of times in each of the principal Nikàyas, except for the Dãghanikàya.117  The 
term vi¤¤àõa (“consciousness”) seems to be used in this expression in a non-technical 
sense as referring to the mental activities of a person in general.  As S. Hamilton puts it: 
“... savi¤¤àõa kàya (sic.) is a general expression which serves well in a situation where 
one wants to convey the meaning of the whole human being’s bodily and mental 
faculties”.118  As far as it goes, this is a perfectly adequate description of this expression. 
116 R. Gethin, 1992, p.156.
117 MN III 18, 32, 36; SN II 252, 253 ; SN III 80 (twice); 103; 136-37, SN III 169-70; AN I 132 & 133, and 
AN IV 53.
118 S. Hamilton, Identity and Experience, London, Luzac Oriental, 1996, p.103
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It fails, however, to take account of the emphasis that this expression puts on the body in 
its description of a human being.  In the expression “this body with its consciousness” 
the mental activities are based upon the body.  
In the texts, this expression is always found in the locative:  imasmiü ca savi¤¤àõake 
kàye.  The body with its consciousness is described as the place where the “underlying 
tendencies” (anusayas) are eradicated.  The use of the locative is reminiscent of the 
passage which we looked at above from the âkàsasutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta in which 
different kinds of vedanàs are said to arise “in this body” (imasmiü kàyasmiü).  This 
puts similar emphasis on the body in its description of a phenomenon which is associated 
both with the mind and the body.  
The other important expression which refers to a person as composed of physical and 
mental activities is found only three times in the Nikàyas.  
Friend, in this very fathom-long body, along with its perceptions and thoughts, I 
proclaim the world to be, likewise the origin of the world and the making of the 
world to end, likewise the practice going to the ending of the world.119
The image of the body here is striking in its vivid physicality:  “this fathom-long body”. 
The term for body is not the usual kàya, nor the less common sarãra, but a term which is 
also used to refer to a dead body:  kaëevara.  Indeed C.A.F. Rhys Davids, the first 
translator of this passage, rendered kaëevara as “carcase”, not in the sense of a dead body 
but as a deprecating way of referring to a living body.120  The phrase also gives us a 
rough measure of this “thing”.  And again, as in the previous expression, the mental 
activities are based on this body.  C.A.F. Rhys Davids brings this out in a note which she 
gives to her translation which explains the literal meaning of the phrase:  “this be-sa¤¤à-
ed be-mano-ed carcase”.121  As with the previous expression, the connotations of the 
terms for the mental activities seem to be, in this context, quite general and non-
technical;  the commentary glosses manas, one of the words for mind, with another word 
119 api khvàham àvuso imasmi¤¤eva vyàmamatte kaëevare sa¤¤imhi samanake lokaü ca pa¤¤àpemi 
lokasamudayaü ca lokanirodha¤ ca lokanirodhagàminiü pañipadan ti.    SN I 62 (= AN II 48, 50)
120 C.A.F. Rhys Davids, The Book of the Kindred Sayings, London, Pali Text Society, vol.II, 1922, p.86.
121 Ibid., p.86, n.3.
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for mind, citta.122  One is reminded of the Saüyuttanikàya passage which associates 
these terms, along with the term vi¤¤àõa, which we found in the previous expression: 
“that which is called “citta”, “manas” and “vi¤¤àõa”.123
The expression imasmi¤¤eva vyàmamatte kaëevare sa¤¤imhi samanake has other 
features in common with the expression imasmiü ca savi¤¤àõake kàye.  Both of them 
clearly are in the locative case, making the body with its mental activities the locus of the 
action of the sentence.  As noted above, there is a parallel with the description of vedanà 
arising “in this body” (imasmiü kàyasmiü) in the âkàsasutta of the Vedanàsaüyutta.
Another point to note concerning the passages where we find a human being described as 
a “fathom-long body with perceptions and thoughts,” is that the context is of the utmost 
importance from the point of view of soteriology.  What we have here, in effect, with 
these four aspects of the “world” (loka), is a recasting of one of the central soteriological 
formulas of the Nikàyas, the four noble truths.  The body with its mental activities is 
“where” the Buddha declares this form of the four noble truths.  Whether we take the 
locative as a locative of reference or whether we take it in a more literal sense, the 
emphasis on the body in this important passage is striking.  We have noted that vedanà is 
often described as having both mental and bodily aspects, and that it is associated with 
the four noble truths on numerous occasions in the Vedanàsaüyutta.  In the first chapter, 
we noted the significance of the following passage:
Now to him who has feeling, bhikkhus, I make known:  This is suffering.  I make 
known:  This is the arising of suffering.  I make known:  This is the cessation of 
suffering.  I make known:  This is the practice that leads to the cessation of 
suffering.124
The term vediyamànassa of this passage is not only linked etymologically to the term 
vedanà, it must also be seen as standing in, as it were, for vedanà because the preceding 
passage is a presentation of the twelve-fold dependent origination schema (pañicca-
122 Spk I 117 on SN I 62.
123 Yaü ca kho etaü bhikkhave vuccati cittaü iti pi mano iti pi vi¤¤àõaü iti pi, SN II 94
124  Vediyamànassa kho panàhaü bhikkhave idaü dukkhan ti pa¤¤àpemi, ayaü dukkhasamudayo ti  
pa¤¤àpemi, ayaü dukkhanirodho pa¤¤àpemi, ayaü dukkhanirodhagàminã pañipadà ti pa¤¤àpemi.  AN I 
176-77
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samuppàda) which stops short at the term before vedanà.  The correspondence with our 
“fathom-long body” passage is striking.  It is all the more so if we recall in this context 
the statement in the âkàsasutta that the various vedanàs arise “in this body” (imasmiü 
kàyasmiü vividhà vedanà uppajjanti).  The overall picture from these passages is thus 
one in which the physical body plays a very significant role in representations of the 
Buddha’s soteriological strategy.
Passages which give equal emphasis to bodily and mental events
There are a number of suttas which appear to give equal emphasis to the body and the 
mind in certain aspects of their descriptions of soteriological practices.  In the 
Bojjhaïgasaüyutta of the Saüyuttanikàya, the following passage is repeated for each of 
the six sense doors:
Herein, Kuõóaliya, a bhikkhu, seeing a delightful object with the eye, does not 
hanker for it, does not thrill thereat, does not develop lust for it.  His body is 
unmoved, his mind is unmoved, inwardly well established and released.  If with 
the eye he behold an object repulsive, he is not troubled by that, his mind is not 
unsettled or depressed or resentful because of that, but his body is unmoved, his 
mind is unmoved, inwardly well established and released.125
A passage in the Udàna uses similar terms:
With mind and body firmly set,
Standing, seated or lying down,
If a bhikkhu should set up mindfulness,
He’d win the prize in first and last.126
125 Idha Kuõóaliya bhikkhu cakkhunà råpaü disvà manàpaü nàbhijjhati nàbhihaüsati na ràgaü janeti,  
tassa ñhito ca kàyo hoti ñhitaü cittaü ajjhattaü susaõñhitaü suvimuttaü.  Cakkhunà kho paneva råpaü 
disvà amanàpaü na maïku hoti, apatiññhitacitto àdãnamànaso avyàpannacetaso, tassa ñhito ca kàyo hoti  
ñhitaü cittaü ajjhattaü susaõñhitaü suvimuttaü.  SN V 74
126 ñhitena kàyena ñhitena cetasà
tiññhaü nisinno uda và sayàno
etaü satiü bhikkhu adhiññhahàno
labetha pubbàpariyaü visesaü.  Ud. 61
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There are also passages which speak of both the mind and the body suffering:
 ... he meets with pain, 
With pain of body, pain of mind.  Tormented
By body that burns and mind that burns, alike
By day and night such live painfully.127
In a passage which is found a number of times in the Aïguttaranikàya, there is a similar 
image of both mind and body burning, the cause in this case being a purely mental event:
... passion overwhelms his mind;  in that state he burns in body, he burns in 
mind...128
Again in the Aïguttaranikàya, both the body and the mind are said to be affected by 
craving, aversion and delusion (ràga, dosa, and moha) in the following passage, which is 
repeated for each of these:
“Would there not arise in that housefather or housefather’s son burning fevers of 
body or of mind that are born of lust so that, tortured by them, he would live 
unhappily?”  “They would arise, sir.”129
Here as well the image is of both body and mind burning.
 
These themes are treated somewhat more fully in a sutta of the Majjhimanikàya, the 
Mahàsaëàyatanikasutta.  The following passage is repeated for each of the sense doors:
Bhikkhus, when one does not know and see the eye as it actually is, when one 
does not know and see forms, when one does not know and see the eye-
consciousness as it actually is, when one does not know and see the eye-contact 
127 kàyadukkhaü cetodukkhaü dukkhaü so adhigacchati
óayhamànena kàyena óayhmànena cetasà
divà và yadi và rattiü, dukkhaü viharati tàdiso ti.  Itivuttaka, 23-24.
128 ... ràgo cittaü anuddhaüseti.  So ràgànuddhaüsena cittena parióayhat’eva kàyena parióayhati cetasà. 
AN III 95, 96, 98.
129 Api nu tassa gahapatissa và gahapatiputtassa và uppajjeyyuü ràgajà pariëàhà kàyikà và cetasikà và 
yehi so ràgajehi pariëàhehi parióayhamàno dukkhaü sayeyyà ti.  Evaü bhante.  AN I 137
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as it actually is, when one does not know and see as it actually is [the feeling] felt 
as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant that arises with eye-contact 
as condition, then one is inflamed by lust for the eye, for forms, for eye-
consciousness, for eye-contact, for [the feeling] felt as pleasant or painful or 
neither-painful-nor-pleasant that arises with eye-contact as condition.
When one abides inflamed by lust, fettered, infatuated, contemplating 
gratification, then the five aggregates affected by clinging are built up for oneself 
in the future;  and one’s craving--which brings renewal of being, is accompanied 
by delight and lust, and delights in this and that--increases.  One’s bodily and 
mental troubles increase, bodily and mental torments increase, one’s bodily and 
mental fevers increase, and one experiences bodily and mental suffering.130
The image of both the body and the mind burning is found again in this passage, with 
two different terms used to describe this phenomena:  pariëàha, as in the passage looked 
at above, and santàpa, from the verbal root tap, to burn.  Also of great interest in the 
present context is the passage which leads into the description of pairs of bodily and 
mental phenomena.  In this passage, which occurs very often in the Nikàyas with 
numerous variations, the term vedayita plays an important role.  For a number of reasons, 
vedayita here must be very close in meaning to vedanà.  The two words are clearly 
connected etymologically.  And vedayita is here “caused by” (paccayà) the contact 
(samphassa) of the eye, just as vedanà is caused by contact (phassa) in general in the 
dependent origination schema (pañicca-samuppàda).  Furthermore, vedayita is given in a 
three-fold classification of pleasant, painful, and neither pleasant nor painful, which is 
one of the standard classifications for the various types of vedanà.  “Not knowing, not 
seeing the vedayita which results from the contact of the eye (and of the other sense 
organs)”, leads to attachment to this vedayita, and thence to craving, and thence to bodily 
130 Cakkhuü, bhikkhave, ajànaü apassaü yathàbhåtaü, råpe ajànaü apassaü yathàbhåtaü,  
cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü ajànaü apassaü yathàbhåtaü, yam p’idaü cakkhusamphassapaccayà uppajjati  
vedayitaü sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và, tam pi ajànaü apassaü yathàbhåtaü, 
cakkhusmiü sàrajjati råpesu sàrajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõe sàrajjati cakhusamphasse sàrajjati, yam p’idaü 
cakkhusamphassapaccayà uppajjati vedayitaü sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và tasmim pi  
sàrajjati.  Tassa sàrattassa saüyuttassa sammåëhassa assàdànupassino viharato àyatiü 
pa¤cupàdànakkhandhà upacayaü gacchanti, taõhà c’assa ponobhavikà nandãràgasahagatà tatra 
tatràbhinandinã, sà c’assa pavaóóhati.   Tassa kàyikà pi darathà pavaóóhanti, cetasikà pi darathà 
pavaóóhanti, kàyikà pi santàpà pavaóóhanti, cetasikà pi santàpà pavaóóhanti, kàyikà pi pariëàhà 
pavaóóhanti, cetasikà pi pariëàhà pavaóóhanti. So kàyadukkhaü pi cetodukkham pi pañisaüvedeti.  MN 
III 287-88.
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and mental suffering.  The final phrase used to describe this suffering brings us back 
once again to the theme of vedanà:  “He experiences suffering of the body and suffering 
of the mind” (So kàyadukkhaü pi cetodukkham pi pañisaüvedeti), which brings us in 
turn to the final important topics of this chapter:  the verb pañi-saü-vid, its relationship to 
the term vedanà, and its significance in descriptions of the relationship between the mind 
and the body.
Terms derived from pañi-saü-vid, and their relationship to vedanà, and to physical and 
mental events
Pañi-saü-vid is usually translated as “to experience” or “to feel”.  The verbal root of this 
word, vid, is related to the term vedanà.  Moreover, there are a number of passages in the 
Nikàyas which give strong indications that there are very close links between the ranges 
of meanings of the verb pañi-saü-vid and the noun vedanà.  In the second chapter of this 
thesis we saw that in a number of significant passages pañi-saü-vid “stands in” for 
vedanà in statements of the dependent origination schema (pañicca-samuppàda) which 
do not conform to the standard statement of that schema.  We also find pañi-saü-vid used 
together with the triad pleasant, painful and neither-pleasant-nor-painful (sukha, dukkha, 
adukkhamasukha), which is regularly associated with the term vedanà throughout the 
Nikàyas.  In a sutta of the Majjhimanikàya, for example, we find the following:
Whatever this person experiences (pañisaüvedeti), whether pleasant or painful or 
neither-painful-nor-pleasant, unwholesome states diminish in him and 
wholesome states increase.131
Furthermore, this passage is parallelled by a passage further on in the sutta which is 
repeated for pleasant, painful and neither-pleasant-nor-painful, and which uses the term 
vedanà instead of the verb pañi-saü-vid:
131 Yaü ki¤càyaü purisapuggalo pañisaüvedeti sukhaü và dukkhaü và adukkhamasukhaü và, tassa 
akusalà dhammà parihàyanti kusalà dhammà abhivaóóhanti...  MN I 475 and cf. MN III 273.
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Here, when someone feels a certain kind of pleasant vedanà , unwholesome states 
increase in him and wholesome states diminish...132
Consider also the manner in which pañi-saü-vid is parallelled by vedanà in the following 
passage from the Devadahasutta of the Majjhimanikàya:
    ... if, bhikkhus, the pleasure and pain which creatures experience 
[pañisaüvedenti] are due to what was previously done, certainly, bhikkhus, the 
Tathàgata was formerly a doer of deeds that were well done in that he now feels 
[vedeti] such cankerless pleasant vedanà.133
In the Mahànidànasutta of the Dãghanikàya, we find the two terms in one phrase:  “My 
self is not vedanà, my self does not feel [apañisaüvedano]”.134  Because of these close 
connections between the term vedanà and forms derived from pañi-saü-vid, an 
investigation of the role that forms derived from pañi-saü-vid play in descriptions of the 
relationship between the mind and the body is warranted in the present context.
In the passage quoted above from the Mahàsaëàyatanikasutta, pañi-saü-vid is used in 
connection with both bodily suffering and mental suffering;  the two are juxtaposed.135 
There are also a number of passages in the Nikàyas in which pañi-saü-vid is associated 
either with physical events or with mental events.  Let us first take a look at those 
passages in which the physical aspect is most important.  The following passage appears 
in the Saüyuttanikàya:
Were he struck, lord, by but one arrow, he would because of that suffer 
[pañisaüvediyetha] pain [dukkha] and sorrow [domanassa];  what need to speak 
of being struck by three hundred.136
132 Idh’ekaccassa evaråpaü sukhaü vedanaü vediyato akusalà dhammà abhivaóóhanti kusalà dhammà 
parihàyanti...  MN I 475
133 Sace bhikkhave sattà pubbekatahetu sukhadukkhaü pañisaüvedenti, addhà bhikkhave Tathàgato 
pubbesukatakammakàrã, yaü etarahi evaråpà anàsavà sukhà vedanà vedeti.  MN II 227
134 na h’eva kho me vedanà attà, appañisaüvedano me attà,  DN II 66
135 So kàyadukkhaü pi cetodukkham pi pañisaüvedeti.  MN III 287-88.
136 Ekissa pi bhante sattiyà ha¤¤amàno tato nidànaü dukkhaü domanassaü pañisaüvediyetha ko pana 
vàdo tãhi sattisatehi ha¤¤ayamàno ti.  SN II 100
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The two terms used here to describe the suffering caused by the arrow, dukkha and 
domanassa, are of some interest in the present discussion.  These terms are glossed in the 
Mahàsatipaññhànasutta in a manner which once again reveals the interest that the Nikàyas 
have in the physical and mental aspects of various phenomena:
And what is pain (dukkha)?  Whatever bodily painful feeling, bodily unpleasant 
feeling, painful and unpleasant feeling results from bodily contact, that, bhikkhus 
is called lamentation.
And what is sadness (domanassa)?  Whatever mental painful feeling, 
mental unpleasant feeling, painful or unpleasant sensation results from mental 
contact, that, bhikkhus, is called sadness.137
The mental nature of domanassa is clear from the term itself:  domanassa is a formation 
from manas (“mind”) with the prefix du(r), implying difficulty or badness.  This is made 
explicit in the above gloss.  We also find the two terms sukha and somanassa paired in a 
similar way, and at SN V 209 they are described as bodily (kàyika) pleasure and mental 
(cetasika) pleasure respectively.  This neat exegesis of these terms does not, however, fit 
with all the contexts in which they occur.  In the passage quoted above from the 
Mahàsaëàyatanasutta, for example, we find suffering (dukkha) specified as “suffering of 
the mind” (cetodukkha).  In the above passage from the Saüyuttanikàya, the suffering 
(dukkha) that the person who is struck by an arrow would experience (pañisaüvediyetha) 
is clearly bodily suffering.  At the same time he would experience mental suffering 
(domanassa).
Pañi-saü-vid used in connection with mental events
We turn now to those passages which in which pañi-saü-vid is used in the context of 
purely mental events.  There are a number of places in which pañi-saü-vid occurs with 
the phrase “mental suffering and distress” (cetasikaü dukkhaü domanassam).138  The 
following passage occurs in two places in the Saüyuttanikàya;  on each occasion it is 
137 Katama¤ ca bhikkhave dukkhaü?  Yaü kho bhikkhave kàyikaü dukkhaü kàyikaü asàtaü 
kàyasamphassajaü dukkhaü asàtaü vedayitaü, idaü vuccati bhikkhave dukkhaü.  Katama¤ ca bhikkhave 
domanassaü?  Yaü kho bhikkhave cetasikaü dukkhaü cetasikaü asàtaü manosamphassajaü dukkhaü 
asàtaü vedayitaü, idaü vuccati bhikkhave domanassaü.  DN II 306
138 eg. AN I 157, AN I 216.
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repeated five times to illustrate the breaking of each of the layperson’s “five precepts” 
(cf. AN III 203-5; 208-12):
That guilty dread, housefather, which he who kills begets in this very life, as a 
result of his killing;  that guilty dread about the future life, which he who kills 
begets;  that mental suffering and distress experienced [pañisaüvediyati] by 
him...139
Pañi-saü-vid is also used in connection with mental events without reference to the 
phrase “mental suffering and distress” (cetasikaü dukkhaü domanassaü).  The 
following passage is from a sutta in the Majjhimanikàya which describes some of the 
Buddha’s students (sàvakas) who pay attention to his teaching, and others who do not. 
The Buddha remains balanced with both of these types of students:
With that the Tathàgata is not satisfied and experiences [pañisaüvedeti] no 
satisfaction, and he is not dissatisfied and experiences no dissatisfaction.140
The Buddha does not experience (pañisaüvedeti) attamanatà (“satisfaction” or 
“pleasure”).  This is another term which contains the word manas (“mind”), the first part 
of the compound being a past participle from à-dà, “taken up”.  The literal meaning of 
the term is thus “the state of one who has an up raised mind”.  So here again pañi-saü-
vid is used in connection with mental activity.141
The above passages give an overview of the use of the term pañi-saü-vid in connection 
with mental and physical events.  
ânàpànasati and the description of mental and bodily events
139 Yaü gahapati pàõàtipàtã pàõàtipàtapaccayà diññhadhammikam pi bhayaü veram pasavati  
samparàyikam pi bhayaü veraü pasavati, cetasikaü pi dukkhaü domanassam pañisaüvediyati.  SN II 68 
& SN V 387-88
140 Tatra bhikkhave Tathàgato na c’eva attamano hoti na ca attamanataü pañisaüvedeti, na ca 
anattamano hoti na ca anattamanataü pañisaüvedeti.  MN III 221
141 Cf. a similar usage at DN III 60, ràjà... dibbe cakkaratane antarahite anattamano ahosi, anattamanata¤ 
ca pañisaüvedesi.
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There is a very important practice described in many places in the Nikàyas in which 
terms derived from pañi-saü-vid play a significant role, and for which the above 
discussion will serve as a useful introduction, because the question of mental and bodily 
events is raised by this practice:  this is the practice of the awareness of the incoming and 
outgoing breath (ànàpànasati).  Descriptions of this practice occurs in the 
Satipaññhànasuttas of the Dãghanikàya and the Majjhimanikàya.142  An entire sutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya, the ânàpànasatisutta, is devoted to a full exposition of the practice and 
its relation to other important practices.  In the Mahàràhulovàdasutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya, the Buddha is represented as teaching this practice to his son, Ràhula, 
who had become a bhikkhu.143  And there is an entire section (saüyutta) of the fifth 
volume of the Saüyuttanikàya devoted to suttas dealing with this topic.  The practice is 
also described in a sutta of the Aïguttaranikàya.144
The very name of the practice of ànàpànasati indicates that it is connected with both the 
body and with the mind.  Breathing in and breathing out (ànàpàna) is clearly a physical 
function, and the awareness of this (sati) is a mental activity.  In the ânàpànasaüyutta of 
the Saüyuttanikàya which deals with this topic, there are, moreover, explicit references 
to the mental and bodily effects of this practice.  In one sutta there is a description of 
Mahàkappina, a senior bhikkhu, seated in meditation.  The Buddha asks the bhikkhus if 
wavering (i¤jitatta) or shaking (phanditatta) of the body of this bhikkhu is ever seen. 
They reply that such things are never seen, whether he is sitting amid the Saïgha or on 
his own.  The Buddha goes on to make the following statement:
It is by cultivating and making much of the concentration on in-breathing and 
out-breathing that there is no wavering or shaking of body, no wavering or 
shaking of mind.145   
The effects of the practice of ànàpànasati are here given in both physical and mental 
terms.
142 DN II 291 and MN I 56
143 MN I 425
144 AN V 111
145 ânàpànasatisamàdhissa bhikkhave bhàvitattà bahulãkatattà neva kàyassa i¤jitattaü và hoti  
phanditattaü và, na cittassa i¤jitattaü và hoti phanditattaü và.  SN V 316
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In another sutta of this saüyutta the Buddha explains the benefits, physical and mental, 
that he gained from this practice before he was fully enlightened, and he recommends 
that the bhikkhus practice in this way if they wish to experience similar benefits:
Formerly, bhikkhus, before I myself was enlightened with the perfect wisdom, 
and was yet a Bodhisattva, I used generally to spend my time in this way of living 
[that is, concentrated on ànàpànasati].  As I generally lived in this way, neither 
my body nor my eyes were fatigued, and my mind was freed from the àsavas.
Wherefore, bhikkhus, if a bhikkhu should desire:  May neither my body nor my 
eyes be fatigued, and by not clinging may my mind be free from the àsavas, --he 
must give strict attention to this same intent concentration on in-breathing and 
out-breathing.146
The third sutta of the ânàpànasaüyutta in which the body plays an important role is the 
Vesàlãsutta.  The sutta relates that on a certain occasion the Buddha gave a discourse on 
“the impure” (asubha).  No details of this discourse are given, but it is related that after 
the Buddha had withdraw, requesting not to be disturbed for a fortnight, the bhikkhus 
tried to put the teachings of this discourse into practice with disastrous results:
As to this body, they worried about it, felt shame and loathing for it, and sought 
for a weapon [to kill themselves].147
When the Buddha returned, and found out that the bhikkhus had misunderstood his 
teaching on the impure and interpreted it as revulsion for the body, he taught them 
mindfulness of in- and out-breathing.  It is possible to see ànàpànasati here being 
considered as a corrective to the aversion for the body that the bhikkhus had developed.
Descriptions of the practice of ànàpànasati
146 Aham pi sudam bhikkhave pubbeva sambodhà anabhisambuddho bodhisatto va samàno iminà vihàrena 
bahulaü viharàmi, tassa mayham bhikkhave iminà vihàrena bahulaü viharato neva kàyo kilamati na 
cakkhunã, anupàdàya ca me àsavehi cittaü vimuccati.  Tasmà ti ha bhikkhave bhikkhu ce pi àkaïkheyya 
Neva kàyo kilameyya na ca cakkhunã, anupàdàya ca me àsavehi cittaü vimucceyyà ti.  Ayam eva 
ànàpànasatisamàdhi sàdhukam manasi kàtabbo.  SN V 317
147 Te iminà kàyena aññiyàmànà haràyamànà jigucchamànà satthahàrakam pariyesanti. SN V 320.
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Let us turn now to the descriptions of the actual practice of ànàpànasati that we find in 
these texts.  If the text is laid out in point form, the important role that the term pañi-saü-
vid plays is immediately evident.  This also highlights the roles of bodily and mental 
functions in this practice:
1)  Breathing in long, he understands:  “I breathe in long”; or breathing out long, 
he understands: “I breathe out long”.
2)  Breathing in short, he understands:  “I breathe in short”.  ...
3)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in feeling the whole body 
(sabbakàyapañisaüvedã)”;  he trains thus:  “I shall breathe out feeling the whole 
body”.
4)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in tranquillising the bodily formation 
(passambhayaü kàyasaïkhàraü).”  ...
5)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in feeling rapture (pãtipañisaüvedã).”  ...
6)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in feeling pleasure (sukhapañisaüvedã).”  ...
7)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in feeling the mental formation 
(cittasaïkhàrapañisaüvedã).”  ...
8)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in tranquillising the mental formation 
(passambhayaü cittasaïkhàraü).”  ...
9)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in feeling the mind (cittapañisaüvedã).”  ...
10)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in gladdening the mind”.  ...
11)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in concentrating the mind”.  ...
12)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in liberating the mind.”
13)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in contemplating impermanence.”  ...
14)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in contemplating fading away.”  ...
15)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in contemplating cessation.”  ...
16)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in contemplating relinquishment.”  ...148
148 dãghaü và assasanto dãghaü assasàmãti pajànàti, dãghaü và passasanto dighaü passasàmãti pajànàti.
rassaü và assasanto rassaü assasàmãti pajànàti...
sabbakàyapañisaüvedã assasissàmãti sikkhati, sabbakàyapañisaüvedã passasissàmãti sikkhati...
passambhayaü kàyasaïkhàraü assasissàmãti sikkhati...
pãtipañisaüvedã assasissàmãti sikkhati...
sukhapañisaüvedã assasissàmãti sikkhati...
cittasaïkhàrapañisaüvedã assasissàmãti sikkhati...
passambhayaü cittasaïkhàraü assasissàmãti sikkhati...
cittapañisaüvedã assasissàmãti sikkhati...
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In the ânàpànasatisutta and in several of the suttas of the ânàpànasaüyutta149 this 
presentation is followed by an exposition of the same sixteen items divided into four 
groups of four items each.  Each of these groups is associated with one of the four 
establishings of mindfulness (satipaññhànas):  the first with the observation of the body 
(kàyànupassanà), the second with the observation of vedanà (vedanànupassanà), the 
third with the observation of the mind (cittànupassanà), and the fourth with the 
observation of mental phenomena (dhammànupassanà).  In fact in some of these suttas, 
this second presentation of the sixteen items comes as the answer to the question “And 
how, bhikkhus, does mindfulness of breathing, developed and cultivated, fulfil the four 
establishings of mindfulness?”150  This system of classification is partly reflected in the 
Satipaññhànasuttas themselves.  The description of ànàpànasati there includes only the 
first four items of this list, and, in accordance with the above classification, is found in 
the section on the observation of the body (kàyànupassanà).  The other sections, 
however, have no mention of ànàpànasati.
In the context of the present discussion, the first phrase to catch our attention in this first 
group is “He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in feeling the whole body 
(sabbakàyapañisaüvedã)”.  Here pañi-saü-vid is clearly used in the context of bodily 
activity.  This expression seems to be saying that the bhikkhu is training himself to feel 
his whole body as he breathes in, and, in the following phrase, as he breathes out.  If one 
takes into account here the connection between pañi-saü-vid and vedanà, and the 
statement in the Vedanàsaüyutta that vedanà arises “in this body” (imasmiü kàyasmiü 
vividhà vedanà uppajjanti), this interpretation seems quite plausible.
The commentaries almost invariably give very few comments on the practice of 
ànàpànasati;  instead, they refer to the Visuddhimagga.  The Visuddhimagga sees the 
abhippamodayaü cittaü assasissàmãti sikkhati...
samàdahaü cittaü assasissàmãti sikkhati...
vimocayaü cittaü assasissàmãti sikkhati...
aniccànupassã assasissàmãti sikkhati...
viràgànupassã assasissàmãti sikkhati...
nirodhànupassã assasissàmãti sikkhati...
pañinissaggànupassã assasissàmãti sikkhati...
MN I 425; III 82-83; SN V  311-41, passim.; AN V 111
149 Numbers 10, 13-16
150 Kathaü bhàvità ca bhikkhave ànàpànasati kathaü bahulãkatà cattàro satipaññhàne paripåreti?  MN III 
83, cf. SN V 329, 334
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above phrase in a quite different light.  As we have noted in connection with other 
passages, there appears to be a reluctance on the part of the commentarial tradition to 
take the term kàya in its most straightforward meaning as the physical body.  Here, 
despite the fact that we are in the section related to the observation of the body, which is 
explicitly the observation of the physical body of the person undertaking this practice, 
the Visuddhimagga interprets the term body (kàya) as the “in-breath body” and the “out-
breath body.”151  The text’s “whole body” (sabbakàya) is understood in this 
interpretation as the “beginning, middle and end” (àdimajjhapariyosàna) of this “body of 
the breath” of which the meditator is to be aware.
The next item from this list of interest in our study is the fourth one.  This phrase is 
paralleled by the eighth member of the list:
4)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in tranquillising the bodily formation...” 
(passambhayaü kàyasaïkhàraü assasissàmãti sikkhati...)
8)  He trains thus:  “I shall breathe in tranquillising the mental formation ... 
“ (passambhayaü cittasaïkhàraü assasissàmãti sikkhati...)
With these two phrases we see once again the concerns that these texts show for both the 
bodily and mental aspects of certain phenomena.  The word passambhayaü 
(“tranquillising”) is the present participle of the verb passambheti, which is the causative 
form of the verb passambhati.  This verb is related to the past passive participle 
passaddha (“tranquillized”) and the noun passaddhi (“tranquillity”).  We have seen that 
the mental and physical aspects of these notions are mentioned in the texts, for example 
in the phrase “There is, bhikkhus, tranquillity of the body and tranquillity of the mind.”152 
There are five places in the Nikàyas in which the description of the practice of 
ànàpànasati, which includes of course items 4) and 8) quoted above, occurs in the same 
sutta as the phrase “the body becomes tranquil, the mind becomes tranquil, (there is) the 
awakening-factor of tranquillity”.153  The parallels between these phrases is immediately 
apparent.  In each of these suttas, a connection is explicitly made between the practice of 
151 assàsakàya and passàsakàya Vism. 273
152 Atthi bhikkhave kàyapassaddhi cittapassaddhi  SN V 66, 104, 107
153 kàyo pi passambhati cittam pi passambhati, passaddhisambojjhaïgo  MN III 86; SN V 332, 338; and 
SN V 334 and 335, though here the text has been much abbreviated
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ànànpànasati and the practice of the seven factors of awakening.  The awakening-factor 
of tranquillity (passaddhisambojjhanga) is the fifth of these factors of awakening.
It seems, then, quite reasonable to pair the fourth and eighth items of the description of 
ànàpànasati, and to see in them a parallelling of physical and mental phenomena.  There 
is, however, an obvious difference between the ànàpànasati phrases and the description 
of the awakening-factor of tranquillity:  in the ànàpànasati setting we are dealing with 
the saïkhàra of the body (kàya) and the saïkhàra of the mind (citta);  the 
passaddhisambojjhaïga mentions only body (kàya) and mind (citta).  The term 
saïkhàra is a notoriously difficult one to interpret.  Paul Griffiths considers it to be 
“effectively untranslatable”154.  Sometimes its meaning is quite general, and in the 
present context it is possible to understand kàyasaïkhàra and cittasaïkhàra as bodily 
and mental activities in general.
The Visuddhimagga, however, again sees the matter differently.  It understands 
kàyasaïkhàra and cittasaïkhàra in these phrases as having very specific meanings:  for 
the Visuddhimagga, kàyasaïkhàra is “in-breathing and out-breathing” 
(assàsapassàsà)155 and cittasaïkhàra is “perception and vedanà” (sa¤¤à ca vedanà 
ca).156  These definitions are connected with a passage in the Cåëavedallasutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya which we have had occasion to refer to earlier in this chapter.  There 
kàyasaïkhàra and cittasaïkhàra are defined in just this manner.  There are two points 
which support the Visuddhimagga’s interpretation.  Firstly, understanding kàyasaïkhàra 
as “in-breathing and out-breathing” in the context of a description of the practice of 
“mindfulness of in-breathing and out-breathing” seems to make perfect sense.  Secondly, 
in those suttas where the ànàpànasati practice is divided into four groups corresponding 
to the four satipaññhànas, cittasaïkhàra occurs as a member of the group which belongs 
154  Paul J. Griffiths, On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the mind-body problem, La Salle, Ill., 
Open Court, 1986, p.108.
155  The Visuddhimagga quotes from the Pañisambhidàmagga on this point:  Katame kàyasaïkhàrà? 
Dãghaü assàsa ... passàsàkàyikà ete dhammà kàyapañibaddhà kàyasaïkhàrà...  PTS ed. of Vism, p.276.
156  The Visuddhimagga and the commentaries to the relevant passages in the ânàpànasatisutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya (MA IV 141 on MN III 84) and the ânàpànasaüyutta of the Saüyuttanikàya (SA III 271 
on SN V 324)
all quote from the Pañisambhidàmagga:  “Perception and feeling belong to the mind, these things being 
bound up with the mind are mental formations” (¥àõamoli)  (sa¤¤à ca vedanà ca cetasikà, ete dhammà 
cittapañibaddhà cittasaïkhàrà) Pañis. i.188.  The Visuddhimagga also says “[t]he mental formation consists 
of the two aggregates of feeling and perception” (¥àõamoli, p.310) (Cittasaïkhàro ti vedanàdayo dve 
khandhà) PTS ed. of VM, p.288.
129
to the practice of the observation of vedanà (vedanànupassanà).  Understanding 
cittasaïkhàra, therefore, as “perception and vedanà” is a quite convincing explanation of 
the term.
One way in which this explanation falls short, however, is that it fails to make a 
complete correspondence between the description of ànàpànasati and the description of 
the three types of saïkhàras found in the Cåëavedallasutta because it does not account 
for one of these saïkhàras, namely, the saïkhàra of speech (vacãsaïkhàra), which is 
explained in a metaphorical manner in the Cåëavedallasutta as referring to modes of 
thinking (vitakkavicàra).
Nevertheless, the commentaries may well be justified in their interpretation of the terms 
kàyasaïkhàra and cittasaïkhàra, though we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
intention of the author(s) of the sutta passages was to parallel bodily activities in a 
general sense and mental activities in a general sense.  
The Visuddhimagga quotes from the Pañisambhidàmagga, an exegetical work from the 
Khuddakanikàya, the fifth Nikàya, to give another interpretation of the term 
kàyasaïkhàra.  This second interpretation appears to take the term to mean activities 
associated with the physical body in general, whereas the first interpretation specifies in- 
and out-breathing as kàyasaïkhàra.  The passage quoted proceeds as follows:
When there are such bodily formations [saïkhàras] whereby there is bending 
backwards, sideways, in all directions, and forwards, and perturbation, 
vacillation, moving and shaking of the body, he trains thus “I shall breathe in 
tranquillizing the bodily formation”, he trains thus “I shall breathe out 
tranquillizing the bodily formation”.  When there are such bodily formations 
whereby there is no bending backwards, sideways, in all directions, and forwards, 
and no perturbation, vacillation, moving and shaking of the body, quietly, subtly, 
he trains thus “I shall breathe in tranquillizing the bodily formation”, he trains 
thus “I shall breathe out tranquillizing the bodily formation”.157
157 ¥àõamoli.  Vism. viii.181 quotes Pañisambhidàmagga, p.184-6
Yathàråpehi kàyasaïkhàrehi kàyassa ànamanà, vinamanà, sannamanà, paõamanà, i¤janà, phandanà, 
calanà, kampanà passambhayaü kàyasaïkhàraü assasissàmã ti sikkhati, passambhayaü kàyasaïkhàraü 
passasissàmã ti sikkhati.  Yathàråpehi kàyasaïkhàrehi kàyassa na ànamanà, na vinamanà, na sannamanà,  
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The emphasis here is clearly on the physical body as a whole, which we may compare 
with cittasaïkhàra as referring to mental activities in general.
Thus descriptions of the practice of ànàpànasati reflect the interest that we find in the 
Nikàyas in mental and physical aspects of various phenomena.
Conclusion
This survey of descriptions of the mental and physical aspects of vedanà in the Nikàyas 
shows that the widely held assumption that vedanà is a purely mental phenomenon is not 
borne out by a close study of the texts.  Furthermore, the interest that the texts show in 
describing both mental and physical aspects of vedanà reflects a general interest in the 
Nikàyas in mental and physical aspects of various phenomena.  
Given the important role that vedanà  plays in certain descriptions of soteriological 
practices and of causal sequences, as seen in the first two chapters of this thesis, the 
attempt made in this chapter to further our understanding of the nature of vedanà 
assumes considerable significance.
na paõamanà, ani¤janà, aphandanà, acalanà, akampanà santaü sukhumaü passambhayaü 
kàyasaïkhàraü assasissàmi passasissàmã ti sikkhati.  PTS ed., p.276.
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Chapter Four:  A survey of the use of the term vedanà in descriptions of the 
workings of kamma in the Nikàyas
In certain characteristic descriptions of the results of kamma that are found in the 
Nikàyas, the term vedanà features prominently.  J. McDermott comments on one aspect 
of kamma in the following terms:
The usual position of the Pàli Nikàyas ... is that there are five possible courses, or 
realms of existence (gati), into which sentient beings may be born.  These five 
courses, or destinies--as the term is often translated--are listed in ascending order 
as (1) niraya, purgatory or hell; (2) tiracchànayoni, brute creation, the realm of 
animals; (3) pettivisaya, the world of the shades; (4) manussà, men, human 
existence; (5) devà, the gods, heavenly existence.1
He adds in a footnote that “these five gatis are listed at Dãgha-Nikàya 3.234; Aïguttara-
Nikàya 4.459; Majjhima-Nikàya 1.73...”.1  In the last mentioned, a part of the 
Mahàsãhanàdasutta, we find some elaboration on these states.  For the first gati, the 
Buddha is represented as speaking in the following terms:
And then later on, with the divine eye, which is purified and surpasses the human, 
I see that on the dissolution of the body, after death, he has reappeared in a state 
of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, in hell, and is feeling 
extremely painful, racking, piercing vedanà.2
The experiencing of the fruit of one’s actions is here explained in terms of the type of 
vedanà that one feels in one’s next life.  Similarly, for the remaining four “destinies”, the 
state in which one is born is spoken of in terms of the vedanà which one feels 
(vediyamàna) in that state.  For one reborn in the realm of animals (tiracchànayoni), the 
vedanà felt there is “painful, racking, piercing” (dukkha tippà kañukà).  For one reborn in 
the “the realm of the departed spirits”  (PED for pittivisaya) there is “abundantly painful” 
vedanà (dukkhabahulà).  For one reborn amongst human beings, there is much 
1 Ibid., p.172, note 25.
2 tam enaü passàmi aparena samayena dibbena cakkhunà visuddhena atikkantamànusakena kàyassa 
bhedà param maraõà apàyaü duggatiü vinipàtaü nirayaü upapannaü ekantadukkhà tippà kañukà 
vedanà vediyamànaü.  MN I 74
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pleasurable vedanà (sukhabahulà vedanà).  And for one reborn in a “good destiny” (su-
gati), that is in heaven (sagga), there is only pleasant vedanà (ekantasukhà vedanà).
In a sutta of the Aïguttaranikàya, these five destinies are listed in connection with a term 
which is related to the term vedanà--vedaniya.  This comes as the reply to the question 
“And what, bhikkhus, is the diversity of kamma?”3:
There is action that is experienced (vedaniya) in hell, there is action that is 
experienced in the realm of animals, there is action that is experienced in the 
realm of the departed, there is action that is experienced in the world of humans, 
there is action that is experienced in the world of the gods.4
This passage is especially noteworthy because it follows on immediately from one of the 
most remarkable statements on kamma/karma in Indian thought, in which the Buddha is 
represented as declaring that he says that kamma is “intention” (cetana).5  R. Gombrich 
has commented that this marks “a turning point in the history of civilisation” in its 
ethicizing of the universe. 6
The Kukkuravatikasutta and vedanà
So in these significant passages on the concept of kamma, vedanà and a term closely 
related to vedanà feature prominently.  This happens again in another of the key passages 
on kamma in the Nikàyas.  The following passage is found at a number of places;  the 
locus classicus is its appearance in the Kukkuravatikasutta of the Majjhimanikàya.  The 
Buddha is represented as addressing a certain Puõõa:  
Puõõa, there are four kinds of action (kamma) proclaimed by me after realising 
them for myself with direct knowledge.  What are the four?  There is dark action 
with dark result;  there is bright action with bright result;  there is dark-and-bright 
3 Katamo ca bhikkhave kammànaü vemattatà? AN III 415
4 Atthi bhikkhave kammaü nirayavedaniyaü, atthi kammaü tiracchànayonivedaniyaü, atthi kammaü 
pittivisayavedaniyaü, atthi kammaü manussalokavedaniyaü, atthi kammaü devalokavedaniyaü.  AN III 
415
5 Cetanàhaü bhikkhave kammaü vadàmi; cetayitvà kammaü karoti ...  AN III 415
6 R. Gombrich, How Buddhism Began, the Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings, London, Athlone 
Press, 1996, p. 51.
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action with dark-and-bright result; and there is action that is neither dark nor 
bright with neither-dark-nor-bright result, action that leads to the destruction of 
action.7
Following this announcement of the theme, each of the four kinds of action are 
described.  Firstly the “dark action” (kammaü kaõhaü):
Here someone generates an afflictive bodily formation, an afflictive verbal 
formation, an afflictive mental formation.  Having generated an afflictive bodily 
formation, an afflictive verbal formation, an afflictive mental formation, he 
reappears in an afflictive world.  When he has reappeared in an afflictive world, 
afflictive contacts touch him.  Being touched by afflictive contacts, he feels 
afflictive vedanà, extremely painful, as in the case of the beings in hell.8
As in the Mahàsãhanàdasutta, the end result of an action (kamma) is expressed in terms 
of vedanà.  Similarly, when the “bright action with bright result” (kammaü sukkaü 
sukkavipàkaü) is explained, the result is given in terms of vedanà:  the person who 
generates unafflictive bodily, verbal and mental formations subsequently reappears in an 
unafflictive world and feels vedanà which is unafflictive and extremely pleasant 
(ekantasukha), “as in the case of the Subhakiõõa devas”.  And again, for action “which is 
both dark and bright” (kammaü kaõhasukkhaü), that is for one who generates bodily, 
verbal and mental formations which are both afflictive and unafflictive, the result is 
reappearance in a world which is both afflictive and unafflictive where one feels vedanà 
which is both afflictive and unafflictive, vedanà which is a mixture of pleasure and pain 
(vokiõõaü sukhadukkhaü), “as is the case of human beings and some gods and some 
beings in the lower worlds.”9
7 Cattàr’ imàni Puõõa kammàni mayà sayü abhi¤¤à sacchikatvà paveditàni, katamàni cattàri:  Atthi  
Puõõa kammaü kaõhaü kaõhavipàkaü, atthi Puõõa kammaü sukkaü sukhavipàkaü, atthi Puõõa 
kammaü kaõhasukkaü kaõhasukkavipàkaü, atthi Puõõa kammaü akaõhaü asukkaü 
akaõhàsukkavipàkaü kammaü kammakkhayàya saüvattati.  MN I 389
8 Idha Puõõa ekacco sabyàbajjhaü kàyasaïkhàraü abhisaïkharoti  ...  abhisaïkharitvà sabyàbajjhaü 
lokaü upapajjati... sabyàbajjhà phassà phusanti... sabyàbajjhaü vedanaü vedeti ekantadukkhaü seyyathà 
pi sattà nerayikà.  MN I 389-90.
9 seyyathà pi manussà ekacce ca devà ekacce ca vinipàtikà
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Thus these three passages give a prominent role to vedanà in the working out of kamma. 
The fourth passage, which describes action which leads to the destruction of action 
(kammaü kammakkhayàya saüvattati), makes no mention of vedanà.10
The term duggati-vedaniya
In a phrase which occurs in many places in the Nikàyas, a person who sees with the 
divine eye (dibba cakkhu) sees beings who have arisen “according to their actions” 
(yathà-kammåpage) in “happy and unhappy destinations” (sugate duggate)11.  In the 
Cåëa-assapurasutta of the Majjhimanikàya the term vedaniya is compounded with a 
similar term for “unhappy destination”--duggati--in the Buddha’s following statement:
I, bhikkhus, say that if he does not follow the practice fitting for recluses, there is 
no getting rid of these stains on recluses, defects in recluses, faults in recluses, 
occasions for the sorrowful states, of what is to be experienced in an unhappy 
destination (duggativedaniya).12
Of the five destinations into which one may be reborn in accordance with one’s 
kamma,13 three are duggatis, “unhappy destinations”.  Here these duggatis are “to be 
felt” or “to be experienced” (vedaniya) by the ascetic (samaõa) who behaves wrongly.
10 Cf. L. Schmithausen’s comments on this fourth category:  “This Sutta not only makes black (bad), white 
(good) and mixed karma responsible for rebirth, but also establishes neither black nor white karma as a 
kind of counter-karma conducive to the destruction of ordinary, retributive karma,” in Ronald W. Neufeldt 
(ed.), Karma and Rebirth: post classical developments, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1986, 
p.205.
11 DN I 82, MN I 22, etc.
12 ... imesaü kho ahaü bhikkhave samaõamalànaü samaõadosànaü samaõakasañànaü àpàyikànaü 
ñhànànaü duggativedaniyànaü appahànà na samaõasàmãcipañipadaü pañipanno ti vadàmi.  MN I 281
13 Compare the commonly occurring phrase yathà-kammåpage, “according to their actions”, which is used 
in conjunction with sugate and duggate,”happy and unhappy destinations” DN I 82, MN I 22, etc.
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Vedanà and kamma in the Devadåtasutta
In the Devadåtasutta of the Majjhimanikàya, the term vedanà is once again found in an 
account of the ripening of kamma.   In this sutta the fate after death of a person who has 
conducted himself badly in body, speech and mind is related.  He is reborn in hell 
(niraya), and led before King Yama, the god of death, by the warders of hell 
(nirayapàlà).  They address Yama:
Sir, this man had no respect for mother and father, recluses and bràhmins.  He 
showed no deference to the elders of his clan.  Let the king order his 
punishment.14
Yama admonishes the man, and when the admonishing is over and Yama falls silent, 
there follows a long description of the various tortures that are inflicted upon him by the 
warders of hell.15  After the description of each torture, two phrases recur.  The second of 
these relates to the doctrine of kamma expounded in the Nikàyas:  “Yet he does not do 
his time (kàlaü karoti) so long as that evil action has not exhausted its results”.16  The 
first phrase which follows the description of each torture introduces vedanà into this 
process:  “there he feels painful, racking, piercing vedanà.”17  Thus once again we find 
the term vedanà used in an important account of the ripening of kamma.
In the Màratajjaniyasutta, also of the Majjhimanikàya, we find a description of 
the fate of the evil Dåsã, who attacked one of the disciples of a previous Buddha by the 
name of Kakusandha.  He is reborn in the Great Hell (mahàniraya).  We are told that this 
goes by a number of names:  one of these is related to the term vedanà, Paccatta-
vedaniya, variously translated as “the Separate Feelings,”18 and “the hell to be felt for 
oneself”.19  In the verse section of this sutta, it is said of the hell in which Dåsã suffers 
14 Ayaü deva puriso ametteyyo apetteyyo asàma¤¤o ...  imassa devo daõóam paõetå ti.  MN III 179  = AN 
I 138.
15 MN III 182-86
16 na ca tàva kàlaü karoti yàva na taü pàpakammaü vyantihoti. MN III 183-86 passim.
17 so tattha dukkhà tippà kañukà vedanà vedeti  MN III 183-86 passim.
18 I.B. Horner, The Collection of Middle Length Sayings, London, Pali Text Society, 1954-1959, vol. iii, 
p.36.
19 Bhikkhu ¥àõamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, Boston, Wisdom 
Publications, 1995, p.435.
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that it has “one hundred stakes of steel, each with its own vedanà”.20  Dåsã also suffers in 
another part of  the Great Hell, and there he experiences vedanà called vuññhànima.  The 
exact significance of this last term is unclear.  What is clear from this passage, however, 
is that vedanà plays an important role in the fruition of Dåsã’s evil deeds.
In the Cåëadhammasamàdànasutta of the Majjhimanikàya as well, painful vedanà is said 
to be experienced in hell (niraya) by religious men (samaõa-bràhmana) who indulge in 
sense pleasures.21  These “painful, racking, piercing vedanà” (dukkhà tippà kañukà 
vedanà) are used to illustrate the way of undertaking things (dhammasamàdàna) which 
is pleasant now and ripens in the future as pain (paccuppannasukhaü àyatiü 
dukkhavipàkaü).
Kamma which is diññhadhamma-vedaniya, samparàya-vedaniya, etc.  AN IV 382
We find the term vedaniya used repeatedly in connection with kamma in a dialogue 
between Sàriputta and a bhikkhu in the Aïguttaranikàya.  The bhikkhu puts the 
following question to Sàriputta:
How is it, reverend Sàriputta?  Does one live the godly life under the Fortunate 
One in the hope:  “ May an action [whose result] is to be experienced here and 
now (kammaü diññhadhammavedaniyaü) become an action [whose result] is to 
be experienced by me in the next life (kammaü samparàyavedaniyaü)”?22
Sàriputta replies in the negative to this question.  The bhikkhu puts nine more questions 
which all include kamma which is “to be experienced” (vedaniya) in various ways, 
which are all replied to in the negative.  The second is the opposite of the first:  “may an 
action [whose result] is to be experienced in the next life (kammaü 
samparàyavedaniyaü) become an action [whose result] is to be experienced by me here 
and now (kammaü diññhadhammavedaniyaü).”  The third and fourth questions combine 
vedaniya with terms which are often found in conjunction with vedanà, pleasant (sukha) 
20 sataü àsi ayosankå, sabbe paccattavedanà  MN I 337
21 MN I 305
22 kin nu kho àvuso Sàriputta “yaü kammaü diññhadhammavedaniyaü, taü me kammaü 
samparàyavedaniyaü hotå” ti etassa atthàya Bhagavati brahmacariyaü vussatã ti?  AN IV 382
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and painful (dukkha);  the third question has:  “may an action [whose result] is to be 
experienced as pleasant (kammaü sukhavedaniyaü) become an action [whose result] is 
to be experienced by me as painful (kammaü dukkhavedaniyaü).”  The fourth is the 
reverse of this.  Thus we see in this sutta a significant combination of a discussion on the 
theme of the workings of kamma and the use of a term which is closely related to 
vedanà.
In the above passage the phrase “kamma which is to be experienced here and now” 
(kammaü diññhadhammavedaniyaü) is found.  In a sutta in the Majjhimanikàya the idea 
of kamma being experienced “here and now” (diññhe va dhamme) is expressed with a 
verb formed from pañi-saü-vid, rather than with the gerundive vedaniya:
You are experiencing (pañisaüvedesi) here and now the result of actions 
(kammassa vipàkam) because of which you might have been tortured in hell for 
many years, for many hundred of years, for many thousand of years.23
The close connection between these terms is clear when passages like these are 
compared.
The term pañi-saü-vid in descriptions of the working of kamma:  the Devadåtasutta and 
the Makhàdevasutta
Forms from pañi-saü-vid are very often found in connection with the term vipàka, which 
literally means “fruit” and which is often translated as “result”, implying the result of 
one’s actions (kamma).  This combination is so common that C.A.F. Rhys Davids, in her 
translation of a text studied below supplies the word “result” in square brackets where 
the text has only “he experiences” (so pañisaüvediyati).24  We see pañi-saü-vid used in 
passages connected with expositions of the doctrine of kamma in the Devadåtasutta of 
the Majjhimanikàya, which as we saw above, also uses the term vedanà in this 
connection.  Before the descriptions of the results of kamma which include the term 
23 Yassa kho tvaü kammassa vipàkena bahåni vassàni bahåni vassasatàni bahåni vassasahassàni niraye 
pacceyyàsi, tassa tvaü, bràhmaõa, kammassa vipàkaü diññhe va dhamme pañisaüvedesãti.  MN II 104
24 C.A.F. Rhys Davids and F.L. Woodward, The Book of the Kindred Sayings, London, Pali Text Society, 
1950-1956, vol. ii, p.16.
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vedanà, there occurs a passage in which Yama the god of death admonishes the evil-
doer.  Several times he tells this man:
... this evil action of yours was not done by your mother or your father, or by your 
brother or your sister, or by your friends and companions, or by your kinsmen 
and relatives, or by recluses and brahmins, or by gods:  this evil action was done 
by you yourself, and you yourself will experience (pañisaüvedissasi) its result 
(vipàkaü).25
Thus we see a verb from pañi-saü-vid playing an important role in a description of the 
process of kamma.
Forms from pañi-saü-vid are not used only in connection with the experiencing of the 
results of evil deed.  As a part of a narrative passage in the Makhàdevasutta of the 
Majjhimanikàya, a certain charioteer by the name of Màtali, who is about to take his king 
to an assembly of gods in his divine chariot (dibba yàna), addresses the king in the 
following manner:
But, great king, by which route shall I drive you:  by that on which doers of evil 
experience (pañisaüvedenti) the results of evil actions, or by that on which doers 
of good experience (pañisaüvedenti) the results of good actions?26
The term pañisaüvedenti is used to express the experiencing of the results of actions 
(kammànaü vipàkaü) both good and bad.  The king replies to the charioteer “Drive me 
by both routes, Màtali” (ubhayen’eva maü, Màtali, nehãti);  and the commentary informs 
us that Màtali led the king first through the hell realm (niraya), and then he led him 
through the heavenly world (devaloka).
25 Taü kho pana te etam pàpaü kammaü n’eva màtarà kataü na pitarà kataü na bhàtarà kataü na 
bhaginiyà kataü na mittàmaccehi kataü na ¤àtisàlohitehi kataü na samaõabràhmaõehi kataü na 
devatàhi kataü;  tayà v’ etaü pàpaü kammaü kataü;  tva¤ ¤eva etassa vipàkaü pañisaüvedissasãti.  MN 
III 179-80
26 Api ca, mahàràja, katamena taü nemi.  --yena và pàpakammà pàpakànaü kammànaü vipàkaü 
pañisaüvedenti, yena và kalyàõakammà kalyàõànaü kammànaü vipàkaü pañisaüvedentãti?  MN II 80
139
The terms pañi-saü-vid and vedaniya in descriptions of the results of kamma experienced 
in the present existence.
Forms from pañi-saü-vid are not only found in connection with the experiencing of the 
fruits of kamma in subsequent lives;  they are also used to describe the experiencing of 
these fruits in the present life.  The following passage from a sutta in the 
Aïguttaranikàya is repeated for acts (kamma) born of aversion (dosa)and for acts born of 
delusion (moha):
An act performed in lust, born of lust, orginating in lust, arising from lust, has its 
fruit wherever one’s personal self (attabhàva) is reborn.  Wherever that act come 
to fruition, there one experiences (pañisaüvedeti) the fruit thereof in the present 
existence or when born into future existences.27
We looked above at a sutta from the Aïguttaranikàya (AN I 134) which has an example 
of the term pañisaüvedeti used in conjunction with the phrase “the result of one’s 
kamma” (kammassa vipàkaü).  This same sutta concludes with a verse passage which 
includes the term vedaniya28 in the description of kamma experienced in this life:
From lust or malice or delusion born, 
An action, great or small, performed by fools
Just here (idh’eva) is felt (vedanãya):  no other ground is seen
[For its fulfilment].29
Similar terms are used in a verse in the Theragàthà:
Whatever evil was done by me previously in other births, 
27 Yaü bhikkhave lobhapakataü kammaü lobhajaü lobhanidànaü lobhasamudayaü yatth’ assa 
attabhàvo nibbattati tattha taü kammaü vipaccati, yattha taü kammaü vipaccati tattha tassa kammassa 
vipàkaü pañisaüvedeti diññh’eva dhamme uppajje và apare va pariyàye.  AN I 134
For the last phrase in this passage I have followed O. von Hinüber’s translation of his “restored” text: 
“The original text thus restored [ie change of và to va] translates as:  “in the present existence or when 
born into future existences” ”.  O. von Hinüber, Selected Papers on Pàli Studies, Oxford, Pali Text 
Society, 1994, p.48.
28 The text here has vedanãya.  Both forms are found, without, apparently, any difference in meaning.
29 Lobhajaü dosaja¤ c’eva mohaja¤ càpi ‘viddasu
Yaü tena pakataü kammaü appaü và yadi và bahuü
Idh’eva taü vedanãyaü vatthuü a¤¤aü na vijjati...  AN I 136
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that must now be experienced (idh’eva taü vedaniyam).  No other basic cause 
exists.30
A prose passage in the Aïguttaranikàya uses these terms in a significant discussion of 
aspects of the process of kamma:
He comes to know thus:  Whatever evil deed has been done by me here with this 
body born of action, all of that must be felt here (sabban taü idha vedanãyaü); 
then it will not follow me and come to be hereafter.31
The term pañi-sam-vid and the Aïgulimàlasutta
The Aïgulimàlasutta of the Majjhimanikàya has a particularly interesting example of the 
use of the term pañi-saü-vid in connection with kamma.  The following passage purports 
to describe an incident which occurred after the notorious murderer Aïgulimàla had met 
the Buddha, ceased his life of crime, become a bhikkhu, and attained arahantship:
Then, when it was morning, the venerable Aïgulimàla dressed, and taking his 
bowl and outer robe, went into Sàvatthã for alms. Now on that occasion someone 
threw a clod and hit the venerable Aïgulimàla’s body, someone else threw a stick 
and hit his body, and someone else threw a potsherd and hit his body.  Then, with 
blood running from his cut head, with his bowl broken, and with his outer robe 
torn, the venerable Aïgulimàla went to the Blessed One.  The Blessed One saw 
him coming in the distance and told him:  “Bear it, brahmin!  Bear it, brahmin! 
You are experiencing (pañisaüvedesi) here and now the result of actions because 
of which you might have been tortured in hell for many years, for many hundred 
of years, for many thousand of years.32
30 Yaü mayà pakataü pàpaü pubbe a¤¤àsu jàtisu,
idh’eva taü vedaniyaü, vatthu a¤¤aü na vijjati.  Thag.81
31 So evaü pajànàti:  Yaü kho me idha ki¤ci pubbe iminà karajakàyena pàpakammaü kataü, sabban taü 
idha vedanãyaü, na taü anugaü bhavissatã ti.  AN V  300
32 Tena kho pana samayena a¤¤ena pi leóóu khitto àyasmato Aïgulimàlassa kàye nipatati    ...  
Adhivàsehi tvaü, bràhmaõa;  adhivàsehi tvaü, bràhmaõa.  Yassa kho tvaü kammassa vipàkena bahåni  
vassàni bahåni vassasatàni bahåni vassasahassàni niraye pacceyyàsi, tassa tvaü, bràhmaõa, kammassa 
vipàkaü diññhe va dhamme pañisaüvedesãti.  MN II 104
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Besides noticing the use of the “experiencing” or “feeling” (pañi-sam-vid) of the results 
of actions, it is also worth noting that the Buddha tells Aïgulimàla to “bear (it)” 
(adhivàsehi).   As we have seen in the first chapter of this thesis, there are quite a number 
of passages in the Nikàyas in which we find the term adhivàseti (“to bear” or “to 
endure”), and other terms related to it, in connection with vedanà, and especially in 
connection with unpleasant physical vedanà.   Here the word vedanà is not used, but 
clearly Aïgulimàla has undergone an experience which is unpleasant both physically and 
mentally.
The phrase vado vedeyyo   MN I 258
The use of forms derived from pañi-saü-vid in the context of discussion of the nature of 
kamma, and the combination of this usage with terms related to vedanà is found in a 
significant phrase which occurs in two of the suttas of the Majjhimanikàya.  This phrase 
represents a view which is condemned by the Buddha.  In the Mahàtaõhàsaïkhayasutta it 
is said to be spoken by the bhikkhu Sàti who uses it to qualify the consciousness 
(vi¤¤àõa) which, according to him, “runs and wanders through the round of rebirth” 
(sandhàvati saüsarati):
Venerable sir, it is that which speaks (vado) and feels (vedeyyo) and experiences (
pañisaüvedeti) here and there the result of good and bad actions.33
When this phrase occurs in the Sabbàsavasutta it qualifies the self (attà) in the last of a 
series of views on the self which are condemned by the Buddha;  in this view the self is 
considered to be “permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change” and it is 
claimed that this self “will endure as long as eternity.”34
In the phrase which is common to both suttas, we again find pañisaüvedeti used in 
conjunction with the results of kamma.  The subject of this phrase is consciousness or the 
self, and one of the points of interest in the phrase is the two unusual terms used to 
qualify the subject:  consciousness or the self is said here to be vado vedeyyo.  Both of 
33 Yvàyaü bhante vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyàõapàpakànaü kammànaü vipàkaü pañisaüvedeti.  MN I 
258
34 nicco dhuvo sassato avipariõàmadhammo sassatisamaü tath’eva ñhassatãti MN I 8
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these terms are used very rarely in the Nikàyas;  indeed these appear to be the only 
occurrences of them apart from the use of vada in compounds.  The commentaries on 
both of these passages gloss these two terms respectively as vadati (“it speaks”) and 
vedayati (“it feels”).  It is the second term which concerns us here:  it is clearly related to 
the verbal root vid, and to the noun vedanà.35  This consciousness or self which “feels” 
(vedeyyo) also “experiences” (pañi-saü-vid) the results of kamma.  A close connection is 
thus established between the terms vedeyyo and  pañi-saü-vid, and the doctrine of 
kamma.
Sà vedanà so vediyatãti  ...  SN II 23
Along with the term vedanà, verbal forms derived from pañi-saü-vid are also used in 
conjunction with the concept of kamma at numerous places in the Nikàyas.  The 
parallelism between the usage of these two terms in this context can be seen in two suttas 
of the Nidànasaüyutta of the Saüyuttanikàya.  In one of these, the Buddha is 
represented as saying that the following two phrases do not represent his views:
Sà vedanà so vediyatãti  ...  A¤¤à vedanà, a¤¤à vediyatãti...36 
The meaning of these phrases is not immediately apparent.  They can, however, be 
compared with two phrases which occur in a similar context in the sutta which 
immediately precedes this one.  Again, the Buddha is represented as saying that he does 
not hold these views:
So karoti so pañisaüvediyatãti  ...   A¤¤o karoti a¤¤o pañisaüvediyatãti  ...37 
C.A.F. Rhys Davids, in her 1922 translation of this passage gives:
“One and the same person both acts and experiences [the result]”...  “One acts, 
another experiences [the result].”38
35 The PED does not notice this word.
36 SN II 23
37 SN II 20
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She has clearly modelled her translation of the first quoted passage on this one:
 
The experience (vedanà) and he who experiences [hereafter] (vediyati) are one 
and the same.  ...  The experience and he who experiences [hereafter] are 
different one from the other.39
The noteworthy aspect of these two passages is the striking parallellism between the use 
of the term vedanà and vediyati in one, and the use of the terms karoti and 
pañisaüvediyati in the other.  All of these terms are here used in a discussion of an aspect 
of the doctrine of kamma.
Loõaphalasutta, AN I 249 ff.
The term vedaniya is also used to express the experiencing of kamma “in this life” in an 
important sutta on kamma from the Aïguttaranikàya, the Loõaphalasutta:
Now, for instance, there may be some trifling evil action of some person or other 
which may take him to hell.  Or again there may be a like trifling evil action of 
some person or other which is to be experienced (vedanãya) in this very life …40
This follows on from an especially interesting use of the term vedaniya.  This same sutta 
opens with two statements, the first of which “does not allow an opportunity for the utter 
destruction of suffering”;  the second does allow this to happen:
 
1)  Just as this man does a deed, so does he experience (pañisaüvediyati) it.
2)  Just as this man does a deed that is to be experienced (vedanãyaü) so does he 
experience (pañisaüvediyati) its fulfilment (vipàka).41
38 C.A.F. Rhys Davids and F.L. Woodward, The Book of the Kindred Sayings, London, Pali Text Society, 
1950-1956, vol.ii, p.16.
39 Ibid., vol.ii, p.18.
40 Idha bhikkhave ekaccassa puggalassa appamattakam pi pàpaü kammaü kataü tam enaü nirayaü 
upaneti.  Idha pana bhikkhave ekaccassa puggalassa tàdisaü yeva appamattakaü pàpaü kammaü kataü 
diññhadhamme c’ eva vedanãyaü hoti...  AN I 249
41 ... yathà yathàyaü puriso kammaü karoti tathà tathà taü pañisaüvediyatã ti ... yathà yathà vedanãyaü 
ayam puriso kammaü karoti tathà tathàssa vipàkaü pañisaüvediyatã ti.  AN I 249.
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Vedaniya is one of the key terms of the second statement.  In the first, the man’s action 
(kamma) is not an action which is “to be experienced” (vedanãya), as it is in the second. 
The other difference between the two statements is that in the first the man experiences 
the action itself, whereas in the second it is specified that he experiences the result 
(vipàka) of the action.42
An important distinction is being draw here between an action that is “to be experienced” 
or “to be felt” (vedaniya), and an action that is simply an action.  La Vall‚e Poussin, as 
long ago as 1913, made the following perceptive observations on these concepts:
The action of the body, of the voice or of thinking ... killing, stealing, etc., is not 
really an act (karman) in the Buddhist sense of the word, i.e., is not vedanãya, 
capable of being “felt”, pregnant with retribution, unless it is “perfect” or 
“finished” (abhisaïkhata = abhisaüskçta), i.e., thought, reflected upon, or wished 
(abhisaücetayita).43
For La Vall‚e Poussin, then, the term vedaniya plays an important role in its connection 
with kamma;  it signifies that the “act” (kamma) which it qualifies is not just “to be 
experienced”, but is “pregnant (grosse) with retribution”.  For this to be the case, the act 
must also be abhisaïkhata, “constructed” or “formed.”
Old kamma and the terms vedaniya and vedanà
La Vall‚e Poussin’s observations come as part of a discussion of two similar passages 
from the Nikàyas.  He gives a translation which conflates the two passages:
42 This distinction is explored further in certain Abhidhamma texts.  W. Halbfass notes that “Kathàvatthu 
7.10 establishes a sharp distinction between kamma and kammavipàka.”  W.D. O’Flaherty, ed., Karma 
and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, Berkely, University of California Press, 1980, p.296, note 95.
43 Louis de La Vall‚e Poussin, Bouddhisme,  Études et mat‚riaux, Th‚orie des douze causes,  Ghent, 
Universit‚ de Gand, 1913, p.9:  “... l’action du corps, de la voix ou de la pensée, ... tuer, voler, etc., n’est 
vraiment un acte (karman) au sens bouddhique du mot, c’est-à-dire n’est vedanãya, capable d’être “sentie”, 
grosse de retribution, que si elle est “parfaite” ou “achevée” (abhisaïkhata = abhisaüskçta), c’est-à-dire 
pens‚e, r‚fl‚chie, ou voulue (abhisaücetayita).”
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The body, the eye, the tongue … should be considered as being the old act, the 
act which is completed, reflected on, a cause of sensation …44
The first passage is from the Nidànasaüyutta of the Saüyuttanikàya:
The body, bhikkhus, is not your own, neither is it that of any others.  It is to be 
viewed as action that is old, brought about and intentionally done, as a base for 
feeling (vedaniya).45
The second is from the Saëàyatanasaüyutta of the same nikàya.
The eye, bhikkhus, is to be viewed as action that is old, brought about and 
intentionally done, as a base for feeling (vedaniya).46
This is then repeated for the other five sense doors, which includes the mind 
(mano) in the schema of the Nikàyas.  In his translation, La Vall‚e Poussin renders 
vedaniya as “cause for sensation” (“cause de sensation”).  Woodward in his 1927 
translation gives “a base for feeling,” which I have followed in the above translations. 
Woodward indicates that he is following the commentary which on the 
Saëàyatanasaüyutta passages gives vedanàya vatthå, a “ground (or reason) for vedanà”, 
for vedaniya.47  
The term vedaniya is thus seen playing an important role in these significant passages on 
kamma.  The theme of “old kamma” (puràõa-kamma) occurs also in the Udàna in 
relation to the topic of this thesis.  We find there a short sutta which labels certain types 
of painful vedanà as being “born from the result of old kamma”.
44 Ibid., p.11:  Le corps, l’oeil, la langue ... il faut le consid‚rer comme ‚tant l’acte ancien, l’acte parfait, 
r‚fl‚chi, cause de sensation.
45 Nàyam bhikkhave kàyo tumhàkaü na pi a¤¤esaü.  Puràõaü idam bhikkhave kammaü abhisaïkhatam 
abhisa¤cetayitaü vedaniyaü daññhabbaü.  SN II 65.
46 Cakkhum bhikkhave puràõakammaü abhisaïkhatam abhisa¤cetayitaü vedaniyaü daññhabbaü.  SN IV 
132
47 Spk II 402
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Mindful and fully understanding, he bears without wavering vedanà which is 
born from the result of old kamma, painful, racking, sharp, piercing.48
The Mahàkammavibhaïgasutta
The term vedaniya also plays a significant role in another important statement on 
kamma, the Mahàkammavibhaïgasutta, the Great Discourse on the Analysis of Kamma, 
of the Majjhimanikàya.  A certain wanderer by the name of Potaliputta is shown as 
asking a bhikkhu the following question:
Friend Samiddhi, having done an intentional action by way of body, speech, or 
mind, what does one feel (vediyati)?49
The bhikkhu gives an unsatisfatory answer, and later the Buddha is asked for the proper 
way to answer this question.  He replies in the following manner:
Having done an intentional (sa¤cetanikaü) action by way of body, speech, or 
mind [whose result is] to be felt as pleasant (sukhavedanãyaü), one feels pleasure 
(sukhaü so vediyati).  Having done an intentional action by way of body, speech, 
or mind [whose result is] to be felt as painful, one feels pain.  Having done an 
intentional action by way of body, speech, or mind [whose result is] to be felt as 
neither-pain-nor-pleasure, one feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure.50
This discussion of kamma has a number of points in common with the Saüyuttanikàya 
passages which we have just been examining.  Potaliputta asks about kamma which is 
“intentional” (sa¤cetanika).  The “old kamma” (puràõaü kammaü) which is the body at 
SN II 65 and the six sense doors at SN IV 132, is “intentionally done” (abhisa¤cetayita; 
PED “raised into consciousness, thought out, intended, planned”).  The connection 
between these terms and the term vedaniya is brought out by La Vall‚e Poussin in his 
48 purànàkammavipàkajaü dukkhaü tippaü kharaü kañukaü vedanaü adhivàsento sato sampajàno 
aviha¤¤amàno.  Ud. 21
49 Sa¤cetanikaü, àvuso Samiddhi, kammaü katvà kàyena vàcàya manasà, kiü so vediyatãti.  MN III 207
50 Sa¤cetanikaü, àvuso Potaliputta, kammaü katvà kàyena vàcàya manasà sukhavedanãyaü, sukhaü so 
vediyati.  Sa¤cetanikaü, àvuso Potaliputta, kammaü katvà kàyena vàcàya manasà dukkhavedanãyaü, 
dukkhaü so vediyati.  Sa¤cetanikaü, àvuso Potaliputta, kammaü katvà kàyena vàcàya manasà 
adukkhamasukhavedanãyaü, adukkhamasukhaü so vediyati.  MN III 209
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paraphrase of the Saüyuttanikàya passages, which is worth repeating here:   “[t]he action 
of the body, of the voice or of thinking ... , is not really an act ... i.e., is not vedanãya, 
capable of being “felt”, pregnant with retribution, unless it is “perfect” or “finished” 
(abhisaïkhata = abhisaüskçta), i.e., thought, reflected upon, or wished 
(abhisaücetayita).”51
The term vedaniya is used in a somewhat different way in this Majjhimanikàya passage 
than it is in the Saüyuttanikàya passages:  here it is qualified as either pleasant (sukha), 
painful (dukkha), or neither pleasant nor painful (adukkhamasukha).  This corresponds to 
one of the standard classifications of vedanà which is commonly found in the Nikàyas. 
In fact, prior to the Buddha’s statement quoted above, the Buddha tells the bhikkhus that 
Potaliputta had been asking about the three vedanàs.52
 
Curiously, though, when the term vedaniya is used again, later in the sutta, it is used in 
conjunction with sukha- and dukkha- only.  These words occur in the final section, which 
is, according to the commentary, “the expounding of the knowledge of the great 
exposition of action”;  the earlier part of the sutta is the “setting up of the outline for the 
purpose of presenting that exposition.”  In this final section the following passage 
occurs:
Therein, ânanda, as to the person who kills living beings, takes what is not given, 
misconducts himself in sensual pleasures, speaks falsehood, speaks maliciously, 
speaks harshly, gossips, is covetous, has a mind of ill will, and holds wrong view, 
and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a state of deprivation, 
in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell:  either earlier he did an evil 
action to be felt as painful (dukkhavedaniya), or later he did an evil action to be 
felt as painful, or at the time of death he acquired and undertook wrong view.53
51 LVP, 1913, p.11.
52 àdiso va, ânanda, Potaliputtena paribbàjakena tisso vedanà pucchità.  MN III 208
53 Tatr’, ânanda, yvàyaü puggalo idha pàõàtipàtã hoti adinnàdàyã hoti kàmesu micchàcàrã hoti musàvàdã 
hoti pisuõàvàco hoti pharusàvàco hoti samphappalàpã hoti abhijjhàlå hoti vyàpannacitto hoti micchàdiññhã  
hoti, ... kàyassa bhedà param maraõà apàyaü duggatiü vinipàtaü nirayaü uppajjati, pubbe và ‘ssa taü 
kataü hoti pàpakammaü dukkhavedanãyaü, pacchà và ‘ssa taü kataü hoti pàpakammaü 
dukkhavedanãyaü, maraõakàle và ’ssa hoti micchàdiññhi samattà samàdiõõà.  MN III 214
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Here again the term vedaniya plays a key role in a passage which explains the working 
of kamma.  An evil deed (pàpakamma) is “to be felt as painful” (dukkhavedaniya).  Later 
on, a good deed (kalyàõakamma) is said to be “felt as pleasant” (sukhavedaniya).  Other 
factors, however, come into play in the rebirth process, and even one who has done good 
deeds may, if he takes hold of wrong views at the time of death, be reborn in a lower 
realm.  It is stated, however, that this person does experience the result of his deeds 
(vipàkaü pañisaüvedeti) “in the present existence or when born into future existences.”54 
Another word related to vedanà (pañisaüvedeti) is used here to express the 
“experiencing” of the results on kamma.
kammànaü ... appañisaüviditvà  ...  AN V 292. 
We have noticed that in the last three suttas that we have examined, kamma is described 
as vedaniya (or sukhavedaniya, etc.) and as intentional (sa¤cetanika) or willed 
(abhisa¤cetayita).  There is a series of three suttas in the Aïguttaranikàya (AN V 292-
301) in which kamma which is intentional (sa¤cetanika) is used in conjunction with a 
verbal form from pañi-saü-vid:
I, declare, bhikkhus, that of intentional (sa¤cetanika) deeds done and 
accumulated there can be no wiping out without experiencing (appañisaüviditvà) 
the result thereof, and that too whenever arising, either in this same visible state 
or in some state hereafter.  I declare, bhikkhus, that there is no ending of 
suffering as regards intentional deeds done and accumulated without 
experiencing (appañisaüviditvà) the results thereof.55
This passage is repeated five times in the course of the three suttas.
54 diñthe va dhamme ... uppajjaü và apare va pariyàye.  MN III 214
55 Nàhaü bhikkhave sa¤cetanikànaü kammànaü katànaü upacitànaü appañisaüviditvà vyantibhàvaü 
vadàmi, ta¤ ca kho diññh’eva dhamme upapajjaü và apare và pariyàye.  Na tvevàhaü bhikkhave 
sa¤cetanikànaü kammànaü katànaü upacitànaü appañisaüviditvà dukkhass’ antakiriyaü vadàmi.  AN V 
292, 294, 297, 298, 299.
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Conclusion
There is a great deal of complexity surrounding many of the passages on kamma in the 
Nikaayas.  Many aspects of this question have not been touched on in this chapter.  One 
thing I hope, though, has been made clear, and that is the fact that in many descriptions 
of the workings of kamma the term vedanà and terms related to it play a very significant 
role.
150
Chapter Five:  Conclusion.
In chapter three of this thesis I made a brief study of an oft-quoted line from the Nikàyas:
Bhikkhus, even if bandits were to sever you savagely limb by limb with a two-
handled saw, he who gave rise to a mind of hate towards them would not be 
carrying out my teaching.56
I pointed out there that this is the classic statement of the case of one who experiences 
physical pain but is not affected by it at the mental level, and I tried to establish a 
connection between this statement and what we can glean of the Buddha’s teachings on 
vedanà as represented in the Nikàyas.  Everyone who reads this statement must surely be 
struck by the extraordinary demands that it is making on a practitioner of the Buddha’s 
teaching:  what kind of person would be able to remain balanced enough in a situation 
like this not to react with some negative emotion?  If S.N. Goenka is correct in his 
understanding of the role of the objective observation of all kinds of physical sensations 
in the practice of the Buddha’s teaching, perhaps it is one who is an expert in such 
observation.
In all of the vast writings on Buddhist thought and literature, there has not been, as far as 
I am aware, a study of the use of the term vedanà in the Pali Nikàyas. The purpose of this 
thesis has been, therefore, to explore the use of this term vedanà in the Pali texts.  This 
was done by focussing on a number of themes in connection with vedanà.    
The first chapter focussed on passages in which vedanà features in descriptions of 
practices which lead to liberation from suffering.  The passages studied in this chapter 
clearly give great emphasis to vedanà in their descriptions of soteriological processes. 
As far as I am aware, none of these passages have been grouped together and examined 
by those who have written on these texts.  This survey shows that Goenka’s emphasis on 
vedanà in his meditation teachings has a firm basis in the texts of the Nikàyas.
56 Ubhatodaõóakena ce pi bhikkhave kakacena corà ocarakà aïgamaïgàni okanteyyuü, tatràpi yo mano 
padåseyya na me so tena sàsanakaro.  MN I 129
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When drawing conclusions from any study of passages in the Nikàyas, however, it is 
important to bear in mind the disparate nature of these texts.  R. Gethin’s comments, 
quoted in the introduction to this thesis, are worth repeating here: 
We are faced not so much with a single finished canvas as with a bewildering 
array of sketches and detailed studies which it is impossible to take in at once. 
Their subject is seen from different angles and in various aspects;  it is viewed 
from near and afar.57
There are of course many suttas in the Nikàyas which make no mention of the term 
vedanà.  This is not to say, however, that these suttas contradict the hypothesis that the 
correct understanding of vedanà is an important element in the path to liberation.  
The second chapter was an extension of the first, studying the use of the term vedanà in 
passages dealing with the causal sequence which has profound soteriological 
significance, the pañicca-samuppàda (“dependent origination”), and in other passages 
dealing with related causal sequences.  This detailed study of the role of vedanà in causal 
sequences found in the Nikàyas showed that there are indeed passages in which this term 
is given marked emphasis, and that the striking statements quoted at the beginning of the 
second chapter from the writings of three Buddhist scholars, Kalupahana, Nyanaponika 
and Bhikkhu Bodhi, do have a basis in the texts, especially when taken in conjunction 
with the passages explored in the first chapter of this thesis.  In causal sequences of 
different kinds we find vedanà being given an important role.  As far as I know, this 
thesis is the first study to explore this question in any detail.  
The third chapter looked at passages in the Nikàyas which deal with mental and physical 
aspects of vedanà.  Goenka places great emphasis on the role that bodily sensations play 
in the meditation technique that he teaches:
Vipassanà means a special kind of vision:  observation of the reality within 
oneself.  This is achieved by taking as the object of attention one’s own physical 
sensations.  The technique is the systematic and dispassionate observation of 
57 R. Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening:  A Study of the Bodhi-Pakkhiyà Dhammà, Leiden, Brill, 
1992, p.20.
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sensations within oneself.  This observation unfolds the entire reality of mind and 
body.58
This chapter examined texts from the Nikàyas which put vedanà in physical and mental 
contexts.  It also placed this issue in the broader context of descriptions of physical and 
mental aspects of other phenomena in the Nikàyas.  This survey of descriptions of the 
mental and physical aspects of vedanà in the Nikàyas showed that the widely held 
assumption that vedanà is a purely mental phenomenon is not borne out by a close study 
of the texts.  Furthermore, the interest that the texts show in describing both mental and 
physical aspects of vedanà reflects a general interest in the Nikàyas in mental and 
physical aspects of various phenomena.  Given the important role that vedanà  plays in 
certain descriptions of soteriological practices and of causal sequences, as seen in the 
first two chapters of this thesis, the attempt made in this chapter to further our 
understanding of the nature of vedanà assumes considerable significance.
An important aspect of the third chapter is a detailed investigation of the conflicting 
views found in the Pali commentaries on many passages relating to the mind-body 
theme.  The interest that we find in the Nikàyas in pointing out the physical and mental 
aspects of vedanà echoes a broader theme:  in a large number of places we find 
descriptions of mental and physical aspects of various phenomena.  This theme seems to 
have presented some difficulties to the early commentators on these texts, for we find a 
certain amount of inconsistency in their treatment of it.  For example, the following 
passage appears in several places in each of the four principal Nikàyas:
When he is glad, joy is born in him; in one who is joyous, the body becomes 
tranquil; one whose body is tranquil feels pleasure; in one who feels pleasure, the 
mind becomes concentrated.59
It is a remarkable description of a process in which mental and physical events both play 
important roles and interact with each other in important ways.  Moreover, a term related 
58 W. Hart, The Art of Living, Vipassana Meditation as Taught by S.N. Goenka, San Francisco, Harper and 
Row, 1987, p.91.  The italics are mine.
59 pamuditassa pãti jàyati, pãtimanassa kàyo passambhati, passaddhakàyo sukhaü vedeti, sukhino cittaü 
samàdhiyati.  DN I 73, DN III 241, 288; MN I 37, 283; SN IV 78-79, 351-58; SN V 156, 398; AN I 243-4; 
AN III 21-23, 285-87; AN V 329-34
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to vedanà plays a role in this process:  the phrase sukhaü vedeti (“he feels pleasure”) 
uses a verb which is cognate with the noun vedanà.  We can interpret the phrase sukhaü 
vedeti (“he feels pleasure”) as a link between the body (kàya) of the preceding phrase 
(“the body becomes tranquil,” kàyo passambhati) and the mind (citta) of the phrase 
which follows (“in one who feels pleasure, the mind becomes concentrated,” sukhino 
cittaü samàdhiyati).
The commentaries, however, have different views on the meaning of this passage.  The 
commentaries on the Dãghanikàya, for example, take kàya in this passage to mean the 
mind.  They understand the term kàya as a way of saying nàmakàya, that is, in the terms 
of the commentaries, the four immaterial aggregates.60  Other commentaries, however, 
are less unequivocal.  The commentary on this passage as it appears in the 
Majjhimanikàya simply glosses kàya as kàya.61  This gives us little further information 
on how this commentary wants us to understand the term.  It is possible that we are being 
asked to take kàya at face value, as meaning simply the physical body.  On its first 
appearance in the Aïguttaranikàya, the commentary on that text has another 
interpretation of this passage:  ““the body becomes tranquil” [means] the group of the 
mind (nàmakàya) and the group of matter (råpakàya) are without agitation”.62 
Interestingly, here the commentary seems to be taking kàya as meaning mind and body 
together, using its customary terminology of nàmakàya for the four immaterial 
aggregates and råpakàya for the aggregate of matter, that is, the body.  
The commentaries are divided in their interpretation of the nature of pleasure in this 
context.  The Dãghanikàya commentary and the Aïguttaranikàya commentary say that it 
is both bodily and mental.63  The Majjhimanikàya commentary, on the other hand, 
specifies that “pleasure” in this passage is “mental pleasure”.64  It is curious to note that it 
is the Majjhimanikàya commentary, which does not define kàya in this passage as 
nàmakàya (mental group), which nevertheless represents “pleasure” only in mental 
60 Sv I 217 on DN I 73 nàmakàyo passambhati and Sv III 1032 on DN III 241 kàyoti nàmakàyo 
pañipassambhati.
61 kàyo passambhatãti kàyo passaddho hoti våpasantadaratho Ps I 174 on MN I 37
62 kàyo passambhatãti nàmakàyopi råpakàyopi vigatadaratho hoti  Mp II 357 on AN I 243
63 Sv I 217 on DN I 73:  sukhaü vedetãti kàyikampi cetasikampi sukhaü vedeti.  Mp II 357 on AN I 243: 
sukhaü vediyatãti kàyikacetasikasukhaü vediyati
64 Ps I 174 on MN I 37:  passaddhakàyo sukhanti evaü våpasantakàyadaratho cetasikaü sukhaü 
pañisaüvedeti
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terms.  And it is the Dãghanikàya commentary, which sees kàya as being a mental 
phenomenon (nàmakàya), which explains “pleasure” as being both bodily and mental 
(kàyikampi cetasikampi).  This seems to be further evidence of confusion in the minds of 
the commentators on these questions.  This confusion seems to stem from a reluctance to 
take the term kàya in this context at face value.  The study in chapter three of the tension 
within the commentarial tradition of this important aspect of the interpretation of these 
key passages has not, as far as I am aware, been carried out prior this thesis.  It may well 
constitute the most important contribution that this thesis makes to the furthering of our 
understanding of why it is that comparatively little attention has been payed to the study 
of the importance of the term vedanà in the Pali texts.  At an early stage in the tradition, 
there seems to have arisen some confusion on these matters.
The fourth chapter surveyed passages in the Nikàyas which highlight vedanà in their 
descriptions of the workings of kamma (Skt. karma).  There is a great deal of complexity 
surrounding many of the passages on kamma in the Nikàyas.  Many aspects of this 
question have not been touched on in this chapter.  The passages surveyed in this chapter 
do, however, show that in many descriptions of the workings of kamma the term vedanà 
and terms related to it play a very significant role. 
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